platform_system_sepolicy/public/hal_cas.te
Jeff Vander Stoep 89d771871e Remove unnecessary HAL permissions
Comments indicate that these permissions are used to access already
open FDs. However, getattr of a directory is clearly not necessary
for that, search of system_data_file is already granted to domain
and following symlinks is clearly not needed for reading an already
open FD.

Bug: 34980020
Test: boot marlin. Test drm with google play movies, no related
    denials
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsMediaTestCases -t \
    android.media.cts.MediaCasTest
    5/6 tests fail with no related selinux denials. The same 5/6
    also fail in selinux permissive mode.
Change-Id: Ib4b9a1e18bdc479d656b2d64917bbc0358515525
2017-10-09 15:50:10 -07:00

35 lines
1.1 KiB
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# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
binder_call(hal_cas_client, hal_cas_server)
binder_call(hal_cas_server, hal_cas_client)
add_hwservice(hal_cas_server, hal_cas_hwservice)
allow hal_cas_client hal_cas_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
allow hal_cas_server hidl_memory_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
# Permit reading device's serial number from system properties
get_prop(hal_cas, serialno_prop)
# Read files already opened under /data
allow hal_cas system_data_file:file { getattr read };
# Read access to pseudo filesystems
r_dir_file(hal_cas, cgroup)
allow hal_cas cgroup:dir { search write };
allow hal_cas cgroup:file w_file_perms;
# Allow access to ion memory allocation device
allow hal_cas ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow hal_cas hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
allow hal_cas tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
###
### neverallow rules
###
# hal_cas should never execute any executable without a
# domain transition
neverallow hal_cas { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
# do not allow privileged socket ioctl commands
neverallowxperm hal_cas domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;