platform_system_sepolicy/private/network_stack.te
Maciej Żenczykowski c23fb986cb update post bpf tethering mainline module split from netd
FYI: running networking tests needs extra privs:
  #============= su ==============
  allow su self:capability2 bpf;

  #============= untrusted_app ==============
  allow untrusted_app self:key_socket create;
  allow untrusted_app self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
  allow untrusted_app self:packet_socket create;

But obviously we can't add the last three, and not even sure about the first.

Test: atest, TreeHugger
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Change-Id: I778ccaf5d100cb26f167a0c690e0125594d477c3
2021-03-16 04:10:09 -07:00

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# Networking service app
typeattribute network_stack coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
app_domain(network_stack);
net_domain(network_stack);
allow network_stack self:global_capability_class_set {
net_admin
net_bind_service
net_broadcast
net_raw
};
# Allow access to net_admin ioctl, DHCP server uses SIOCSARP
allowxperm network_stack self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
# The DhcpClient uses packet_sockets
allow network_stack self:packet_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
# Monitor neighbors via netlink.
allow network_stack self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
allow network_stack app_api_service:service_manager find;
allow network_stack dnsresolver_service:service_manager find;
allow network_stack netd_service:service_manager find;
allow network_stack radio_service:service_manager find;
allow network_stack radio_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow network_stack radio_data_file:file create_file_perms;
binder_call(network_stack, netd);
# in order to invoke side effect of close() on such a socket calling synchronize_rcu()
# TODO: Remove this permission when 4.9 kernel is deprecated.
allow network_stack self:key_socket create;
# Grant read permission of connectivity namespace system property prefix.
get_prop(network_stack, device_config_connectivity_prop)
# Create/use netlink_tcpdiag_socket to get tcp info
allow network_stack self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_read nlmsg_write };
############### Tethering Service app - Tethering.apk ##############
hal_client_domain(network_stack, hal_tetheroffload)
# Create and share netlink_netfilter_sockets for tetheroffload.
allow network_stack self:netlink_netfilter_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
allow network_stack network_stack_service:service_manager find;
# allow Tethering(network_stack process) to run/update/read the eBPF maps to offload tethering traffic by eBPF.
allow network_stack { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:dir search;
allow network_stack { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file { read write };
allow network_stack bpfloader:bpf { map_read map_write prog_run };
# Only the bpfloader and the network_stack should ever touch 'fs_bpf_tethering' programs/maps.
# Unfortunately init/vendor_init have all sorts of extra privs
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_tethering:dir ~getattr;
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_tethering:file *;
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -network_stack } fs_bpf_tethering:dir ~{ getattr open read search setattr };
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -network_stack } fs_bpf_tethering:file ~{ map open read setattr };