336d0fed4e
I took current AOSP policy as base, then removed sepolicy so that the set of type and attributes was a subset of types and attributes in Q sepolicy, with exception of those that have not yet been cleand up in current AOSP: mediaswcodec_server netd_socket mediaextractor_update_service thermalserviced thermalserviced_exec Bug: 133196056 Test: n/a Change-Id: I863429d61d3fad0272c1d3f1e429cd997513a74a Merged-In: I3e091652fa8d1757b1f71f7559186d5b32f000d5
30 lines
1.3 KiB
Text
30 lines
1.3 KiB
Text
# bpf program loader
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type bpfloader, domain;
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type bpfloader_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
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typeattribute bpfloader coredomain;
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# These permission is required for pin bpf program for netd.
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allow bpfloader fs_bpf:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow bpfloader fs_bpf:file create_file_perms;
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allow bpfloader devpts:chr_file { read write };
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# Allow bpfloader to create bpf maps and programs. The map_read and map_write permission is needed
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# for retrieving a pinned map when bpfloader do a run time restart.
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allow bpfloader self:bpf { prog_load prog_run map_read map_write map_create };
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allow bpfloader self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
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###
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### Neverallow rules
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###
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader } *:bpf { map_create prog_load };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -netutils_wrapper } *:bpf prog_run;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init } bpfloader_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };
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neverallow bpfloader domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
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# only system_server, netd and bpfloader can read/write the bpf maps
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neverallow { domain -system_server -netd -bpfloader} *:bpf { map_read map_write };
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# No domain should be allowed to ptrace bpfloader
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neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd') } bpfloader:process ptrace;
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set_prop(bpfloader, bpf_progs_loaded_prop)
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