38c12828da
Better document the reasons behind the neverallow for tcp/udp sockets. Test: policy compiles. Change-Id: Iee386af3be6fc7495addc9300b5628d0fe61c8e9
44 lines
1.6 KiB
Text
44 lines
1.6 KiB
Text
# mediacodec - audio and video codecs live here
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type mediacodec, domain;
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type mediacodec_exec, exec_type, file_type;
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typeattribute mediacodec mlstrustedsubject;
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binder_use(mediacodec)
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binder_call(mediacodec, binderservicedomain)
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binder_call(mediacodec, appdomain)
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binder_service(mediacodec)
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add_service(mediacodec, mediacodec_service)
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allow mediacodec mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
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allow mediacodec surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
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allow mediacodec gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow mediacodec video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow mediacodec video_device:dir search;
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allow mediacodec ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow mediacodec hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
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# hidl access
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hwbinder_use(mediacodec)
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hwallocator_use(mediacodec)
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allow mediacodec system_file:dir { open read };
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# mediacodec should never execute any executable without a
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# domain transition
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neverallow mediacodec { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
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# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
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# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
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# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
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# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
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# hardware/content. Etc.
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#
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# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
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# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
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# Lengthier explanation here:
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# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
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neverallow mediacodec domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
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