90 lines
3.5 KiB
Text
90 lines
3.5 KiB
Text
###
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### SDK Sandbox process.
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###
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### This file defines the security policy for the sdk sandbox processes.
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type sdk_sandbox, domain;
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typeattribute sdk_sandbox coredomain;
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net_domain(sdk_sandbox)
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app_domain(sdk_sandbox)
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# Allow finding services. This is different from ephemeral_app policy.
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# Adding services manually to the allowlist is preferred hence app_api_service is not used.
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allow sdk_sandbox activity_service:service_manager find;
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allow sdk_sandbox activity_task_service:service_manager find;
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allow sdk_sandbox audio_service:service_manager find;
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# Audit the access to signal that we are still investigating whether sdk_sandbox
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# should have access to audio_service
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# TODO(b/211632068): remove this line
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auditallow sdk_sandbox audio_service:service_manager find;
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allow sdk_sandbox hint_service:service_manager find;
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allow sdk_sandbox surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
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allow sdk_sandbox thermal_service:service_manager find;
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allow sdk_sandbox trust_service:service_manager find;
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allow sdk_sandbox uimode_service:service_manager find;
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allow sdk_sandbox webviewupdate_service:service_manager find;
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# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
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# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
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perfetto_producer(sdk_sandbox)
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# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
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can_profile_heap(sdk_sandbox)
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can_profile_perf(sdk_sandbox)
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# allow sdk sandbox to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
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# modify them other than to connect
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allow sdk_sandbox system_server:udp_socket {
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connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
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# allow access to sdksandbox data directory
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allow sdk_sandbox sdk_sandbox_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow sdk_sandbox sdk_sandbox_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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neverallow sdk_sandbox { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { execute execute_no_trans };
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# Receive or send uevent messages.
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neverallow sdk_sandbox domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
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# Receive or send generic netlink messages
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neverallow sdk_sandbox domain:netlink_socket *;
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# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
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# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
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neverallow sdk_sandbox debugfs:file read;
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# execute gpu_device
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neverallow sdk_sandbox gpu_device:chr_file execute;
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# access files in /sys with the default sysfs label
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neverallow sdk_sandbox sysfs:file *;
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# Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files
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# Create a more specific label if needed
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neverallow sdk_sandbox proc:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
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# Directly access external storage
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neverallow sdk_sandbox { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:file {open create};
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neverallow sdk_sandbox { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:dir search;
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# Avoid reads to proc_net, it contains too much device wide information about
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# ongoing connections.
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neverallow sdk_sandbox proc_net:file no_rw_file_perms;
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# SDK sandbox processes have their own storage not related to app_data_file or privapp_data_file
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neverallow sdk_sandbox { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms;
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neverallow sdk_sandbox { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file no_rw_file_perms;
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# SDK sandbox processes don't have any access to external storage
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neverallow sdk_sandbox { media_rw_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms;
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neverallow sdk_sandbox { media_rw_data_file }:file no_rw_file_perms;
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neverallow { sdk_sandbox } tmpfs:dir no_rw_file_perms;
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neverallow sdk_sandbox hal_drm_service:service_manager find;
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