e922aa38bf
This is needed because some oat dex files are generated without world readable permissions. See the bug for details. We are still constrained by the SELinux rules above. Bug: 129048073 Change-Id: I84e34f83ceb299ff16b29a78f16c620fc0aa5d68
299 lines
9 KiB
Text
299 lines
9 KiB
Text
# Transition to crash_dump when /system/bin/crash_dump* is executed.
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# This occurs when the process crashes.
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# We do not apply this to the su domain to avoid interfering with
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# tests (b/114136122)
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domain_auto_trans({ domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }, crash_dump_exec, crash_dump);
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allow domain crash_dump:process sigchld;
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# Allow every process to check the heapprofd.enable properties to determine
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# whether to load the heap profiling library. This does not necessarily enable
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# heap profiling, as initialization will fail if it does not have the
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# necessary SELinux permissions.
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get_prop(domain, heapprofd_prop);
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# Allow heap profiling on debug builds.
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userdebug_or_eng(`can_profile_heap_userdebug_or_eng({
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domain
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-bpfloader
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-init
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-kernel
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-keystore
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-llkd
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-logd
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-logpersist
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-recovery
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-recovery_persist
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-recovery_refresh
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-ueventd
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-vendor_init
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-vold
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})')
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# Path resolution access in cgroups.
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allow domain cgroup:dir search;
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allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup:dir w_dir_perms;
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allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup:file w_file_perms;
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allow domain cgroup_rc_file:dir search;
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allow domain cgroup_rc_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow domain task_profiles_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow domain vendor_task_profiles_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Allow all domains to read sys.use_memfd to determine
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# if memfd support can be used if device supports it
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get_prop(domain, use_memfd_prop);
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# For now, everyone can access core property files
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# Device specific properties are not granted by default
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not_compatible_property(`
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get_prop(domain, core_property_type)
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get_prop(domain, exported_dalvik_prop)
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get_prop(domain, exported_ffs_prop)
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get_prop(domain, exported_system_radio_prop)
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get_prop(domain, exported2_config_prop)
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get_prop(domain, exported2_radio_prop)
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get_prop(domain, exported2_system_prop)
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get_prop(domain, exported2_vold_prop)
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get_prop(domain, exported3_default_prop)
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get_prop(domain, exported3_radio_prop)
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get_prop(domain, exported3_system_prop)
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get_prop(domain, vendor_default_prop)
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')
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compatible_property_only(`
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get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, core_property_type)
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get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported_dalvik_prop)
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get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported_ffs_prop)
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get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported_system_radio_prop)
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get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported2_config_prop)
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get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported2_radio_prop)
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get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported2_system_prop)
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get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported2_vold_prop)
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get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported3_default_prop)
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get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported3_radio_prop)
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get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported3_system_prop)
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get_prop({domain -coredomain -appdomain}, vendor_default_prop)
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')
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# Allow access to fsverity keyring.
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allow domain kernel:key search;
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# Allow access to keys in the fsverity keyring that were installed at boot.
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allow domain mini-keyctl:key search;
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# For testing purposes, allow access to keys installed with su.
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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allow domain su:key search;
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')
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# Limit ability to ptrace or read sensitive /proc/pid files of processes
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# with other UIDs to these whitelisted domains.
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neverallow {
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domain
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-vold
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userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd')
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-dumpstate
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userdebug_or_eng(`-incidentd')
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-storaged
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-system_server
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userdebug_or_eng(`-perfprofd')
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} self:global_capability_class_set sys_ptrace;
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# Limit ability to generate hardware unique device ID attestations to priv_apps
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neverallow { domain -priv_app } *:keystore_key gen_unique_id;
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neverallow {
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domain
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-init
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-vendor_init
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userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')
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} debugfs_tracing_debug:file no_rw_file_perms;
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# System_server owns dropbox data, and init creates/restorecons the directory
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# Disallow direct access by other processes.
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neverallow { domain -init -system_server } dropbox_data_file:dir *;
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neverallow { domain -init -system_server } dropbox_data_file:file ~{ getattr read };
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###
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# Services should respect app sandboxes
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neverallow {
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domain
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-appdomain
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-installd # creation of sandbox
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} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
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# Only the following processes should be directly accessing private app
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# directories.
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neverallow {
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domain
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-adbd
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-appdomain
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-app_zygote
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-dexoptanalyzer
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-installd
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userdebug_or_eng(`-perfprofd')
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-profman
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-rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
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-runas
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-system_server
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-viewcompiler
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} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir *;
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# Only apps should be modifying app data. installd is exempted for
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# restorecon and package install/uninstall.
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neverallow {
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domain
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-appdomain
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-installd
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-rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
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} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir ~r_dir_perms;
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neverallow {
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domain
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-appdomain
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-app_zygote
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-installd
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userdebug_or_eng(`-perfprofd')
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-rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
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} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file_class_set open;
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neverallow {
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domain
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-appdomain
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-installd # creation of sandbox
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} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
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neverallow {
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domain
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-installd
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} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { relabelfrom relabelto };
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# The staging directory contains APEX and APK files. It is important to ensure
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# that these files cannot be accessed by other domains to ensure that the files
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# do not change between system_server staging the files and apexd processing
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# the files.
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neverallow { domain -init -system_server -apexd -installd} staging_data_file:dir *;
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neverallow { domain -init -system_server -apexd -kernel -installd } staging_data_file:file *;
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neverallow { domain -init -system_server -installd} staging_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
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# apexd needs the link and unlink permissions, so list every `no_w_file_perms`
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# except for `link` and `unlink`.
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neverallow { domain -init -system_server } staging_data_file:file
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{ append create relabelfrom rename setattr write no_x_file_perms };
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neverallow {
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domain
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-appdomain # for oemfs
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-bootanim # for oemfs
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-recovery # for /tmp/update_binary in tmpfs
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} { fs_type -rootfs }:file execute;
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#
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# Assert that, to the extent possible, we're not loading executable content from
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# outside the rootfs or /system partition except for a few whitelisted domains.
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# Executable files loaded from /data is a persistence vector
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# we want to avoid. See
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# https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=955 for example.
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#
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neverallow {
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domain
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-appdomain
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with_asan(`-asan_extract')
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-shell
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userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
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-system_server_startup # for memfd backed executable regions
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-app_zygote
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-webview_zygote
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-zygote
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userdebug_or_eng(`-mediaextractor')
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userdebug_or_eng(`-mediaswcodec')
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} {
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file_type
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-system_file_type
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-system_lib_file
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-system_linker_exec
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-vendor_file_type
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-exec_type
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-postinstall_file
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}:file execute;
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# Only init is allowed to write cgroup.rc file
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neverallow {
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domain
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-init
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-vendor_init
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} cgroup_rc_file:file no_w_file_perms;
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# Only authorized processes should be writing to files in /data/dalvik-cache
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neverallow {
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domain
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-init # TODO: limit init to relabelfrom for files
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-zygote
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-installd
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-postinstall_dexopt
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-cppreopts
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-dex2oat
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-otapreopt_slot
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-art_apex_postinstall
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-art_apex_boot_integrity
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} dalvikcache_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
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neverallow {
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domain
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-init
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-installd
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-postinstall_dexopt
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-cppreopts
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-dex2oat
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-zygote
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-otapreopt_slot
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-art_apex_boot_integrity
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-art_apex_postinstall
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} dalvikcache_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
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# Minimize dac_override and dac_read_search.
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# Instead of granting them it is usually better to add the domain to
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# a Unix group or change the permissions of a file.
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define(`dac_override_allowed', `{
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dnsmasq
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dumpstate
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init
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installd
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install_recovery
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userdebug_or_eng(`llkd')
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lmkd
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netd
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perfprofd
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postinstall_dexopt
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recovery
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rss_hwm_reset
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sdcardd
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tee
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ueventd
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uncrypt
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vendor_init
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vold
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vold_prepare_subdirs
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zygote
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}')
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neverallow ~dac_override_allowed self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
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# Since the kernel checks dac_read_search before dac_override, domains that
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# have dac_override should also have dac_read_search to eliminate spurious
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# denials. Some domains have dac_read_search without having dac_override, so
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# this list should be a superset of the one above.
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neverallow ~{
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dac_override_allowed
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traced_probes
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userdebug_or_eng(`heapprofd')
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} self:global_capability_class_set dac_read_search;
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# Limit what domains can mount filesystems or change their mount flags.
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# sdcard_type / vfat is exempt as a larger set of domains need
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# this capability, including device-specific domains.
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neverallow {
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domain
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-apexd
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recovery_only(`userdebug_or_eng(`-fastbootd')')
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-init
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-kernel
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-otapreopt_chroot
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-recovery
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-update_engine
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-vold
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-zygote
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} { fs_type -sdcard_type }:filesystem { mount remount relabelfrom relabelto };
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