e922aa38bf
This is needed because some oat dex files are generated without world readable permissions. See the bug for details. We are still constrained by the SELinux rules above. Bug: 129048073 Change-Id: I84e34f83ceb299ff16b29a78f16c620fc0aa5d68
75 lines
2.8 KiB
Text
75 lines
2.8 KiB
Text
# Android heap profiling daemon. go/heapprofd.
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#
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# On user builds, this daemon is responsible for receiving the initial
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# profiling configuration, finding matching target processes (if profiling by
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# process name), and sending the activation signal to them (+ setting system
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# properties for new processes to start profiling from startup). When profiling
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# is triggered in a process, it spawns a private heapprofd subprocess (in its
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# own SELinux domain), which will exclusively handle profiling of its parent.
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#
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# On debug builds, this central daemon performs profiling for all target
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# processes (which talk directly to this daemon).
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type heapprofd_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
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type heapprofd_tmpfs, file_type;
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init_daemon_domain(heapprofd)
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tmpfs_domain(heapprofd)
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# Allow apps in other MLS contexts (for multi-user) to access
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# shared memory buffers created by heapprofd.
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typeattribute heapprofd_tmpfs mlstrustedobject;
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set_prop(heapprofd, heapprofd_prop);
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# Necessary for /proc/[pid]/cmdline access & sending signals.
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typeattribute heapprofd mlstrustedsubject;
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# Allow sending signals to processes. This excludes SIGKILL, SIGSTOP and
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# SIGCHLD, which are controlled by separate permissions.
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allow heapprofd self:capability kill;
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# When scanning /proc/[pid]/cmdline to find matching processes for by-name
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# profiling, only whitelisted domains will be allowed by SELinux. Avoid
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# spamming logs with denials for entries that we can not access.
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dontaudit heapprofd domain:dir { search open };
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# Write trace data to the Perfetto traced daemon. This requires connecting to
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# its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
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allow heapprofd traced:fd use;
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allow heapprofd traced_tmpfs:file { read write getattr map };
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unix_socket_connect(heapprofd, traced_producer, traced)
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# When handling profiling for all processes, heapprofd needs to read
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# executables/libraries/etc to do stack unwinding.
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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r_dir_file(heapprofd, system_file_type)
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r_dir_file(heapprofd, apk_data_file)
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r_dir_file(heapprofd, dalvikcache_data_file)
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r_dir_file(heapprofd, vendor_file_type)
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# Some dex files are not world-readable.
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# We are still constrained by the SELinux rules above.
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allow heapprofd self:global_capability_class_set dac_read_search;
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')
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# This is going to happen on user but is benign because central heapprofd
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# does not actually need these permission.
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# If the dac_read_search capability check is rejected, the kernel then tries
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# to perform a dac_override capability check, so we need to dontaudit that
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# as well.
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dontaudit heapprofd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_read_search dac_override };
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never_profile_heap(`{
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bpfloader
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init
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kernel
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keystore
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llkd
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logd
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ueventd
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vendor_init
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vold
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}')
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full_treble_only(`
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neverallow heapprofd vendor_file:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
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')
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