platform_system_sepolicy/fsck.te
Stephen Smalley cedee697c3 Fix fsck-related denials with encrypted userdata.
Allow error reporting via the pty supplied by init.
Allow vold to invoke fsck for checking volumes.

Addresses denials such as:
avc:  denied  { ioctl } for  pid=133 comm="e2fsck" path="/dev/pts/0" dev="devpts" ino=3 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:devpts:s0 tclass=chr_file

avc: denied { execute } for pid=201 comm="vold" name="e2fsck" dev="mmcblk0p25" ino=98 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0 tclass=file

These denials show up if you have encrypted userdata.

Change-Id: Idc8e6f83a0751f17cde0ee5e4b1fbd6efe164e4c
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-09-30 13:49:58 -04:00

26 lines
988 B
Text

# e2fsck or any other fsck program run by init.
type fsck, domain;
type fsck_exec, exec_type, file_type;
permissive_or_unconfined(fsck)
init_daemon_domain(fsck)
# /dev/__null__ created by init prior to policy load,
# open fd inherited by fsck.
allow fsck tmpfs:chr_file { read write ioctl };
# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
allow fsck devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl };
# Run e2fsck on block devices.
# TODO: Assign userdata and cache block device types to the corresponding
# block devices in all device policies, and then remove access to
# block_device:blk_file from here.
allow fsck block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allow fsck userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allow fsck cache_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
# Only allow entry from init via the e2fsck binary.
neverallow { domain -init } fsck:process transition;
neverallow domain fsck:process dyntransition;
neverallow fsck { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec}:file entrypoint;