224921d18a
Values of the following properties are set by SoC vendors on some devices including Pixels. - persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.cap - persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable - persist.vendor.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable - ro.bt.bdaddr_path - wlan.driver.status So they should be whitelisted for compatibility. Bug: 77633703 Test: succeeded building and tested with Pixels Change-Id: Ib2b81bcc1fd70ddd571dc7fb2b923b576d62b7d5
87 lines
3.2 KiB
Text
87 lines
3.2 KiB
Text
# audioserver - audio services daemon
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typeattribute audioserver coredomain;
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type audioserver_exec, exec_type, file_type;
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init_daemon_domain(audioserver)
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r_dir_file(audioserver, sdcard_type)
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binder_use(audioserver)
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binder_call(audioserver, binderservicedomain)
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binder_call(audioserver, appdomain)
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binder_service(audioserver)
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hal_client_domain(audioserver, hal_allocator)
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# /system/lib64/hw for always-passthrough Allocator HAL ashmem / mapper .so
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r_dir_file(audioserver, system_file)
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hal_client_domain(audioserver, hal_audio)
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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# used for TEE sink - pcm capture for debug.
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allow audioserver media_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow audioserver audioserver_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow audioserver audioserver_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# ptrace to processes in the same domain for memory leak detection
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allow audioserver self:process ptrace;
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')
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add_service(audioserver, audioserver_service)
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allow audioserver activity_service:service_manager find;
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allow audioserver appops_service:service_manager find;
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allow audioserver batterystats_service:service_manager find;
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allow audioserver permission_service:service_manager find;
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allow audioserver power_service:service_manager find;
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allow audioserver scheduling_policy_service:service_manager find;
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# Allow read/write access to bluetooth-specific properties
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set_prop(audioserver, bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop)
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set_prop(audioserver, bluetooth_prop)
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set_prop(audioserver, exported_bluetooth_prop)
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# Grant access to audio files to audioserver
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allow audioserver audio_data_file:dir ra_dir_perms;
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allow audioserver audio_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# allow access to ALSA MMAP FDs for AAudio API
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allow audioserver audio_device:chr_file { read write };
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not_full_treble(`allow audioserver audio_device:dir r_dir_perms;')
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not_full_treble(`allow audioserver audio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;')
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# For A2DP bridge which is loaded directly into audioserver
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unix_socket_connect(audioserver, bluetooth, bluetooth)
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# Allow shell commands from ADB and shell for CTS testing/dumping
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allow audioserver adbd:fd use;
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allow audioserver adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
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allow audioserver shell:fifo_file { read write };
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# Allow shell commands from ADB for CTS testing/dumping
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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allow audioserver su:fd use;
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allow audioserver su:fifo_file { read write };
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allow audioserver su:unix_stream_socket { read write };
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')
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# audioserver should never execute any executable without a
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# domain transition
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neverallow audioserver { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
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# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
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# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
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# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
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# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
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# hardware/content. Etc.
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#
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# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
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# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
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# Lengthier explanation here:
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# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
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neverallow audioserver domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
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