f5446eb148
On PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE devices, non-vendor domains (except vendor
apps) are not permitted to use Binder. This commit thus:
* groups non-vendor domains using the new "coredomain" attribute,
* adds neverallow rules restricting Binder use to coredomain and
appdomain only, and
* temporarily exempts the domains which are currently violating this
rule from this restriction. These domains are grouped using the new
"binder_in_vendor_violators" attribute. The attribute is needed
because the types corresponding to violators are not exposed to the
public policy where the neverallow rules are.
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: Device boots, no new denials
Test: In Chrome, navigate to ip6.me, play a YouTube video
Test: YouTube: play a video
Test: Netflix: play a movie
Test: Google Camera: take a photo, take an HDR+ photo, record video with
sound, record slow motion video with sound. Confirm videos play
back fine and with sound.
Bug: 35870313
Change-Id: I0cd1a80b60bcbde358ce0f7a47b90f4435a45c95
93 lines
3.8 KiB
Text
93 lines
3.8 KiB
Text
###
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### Services with isolatedProcess=true in their manifest.
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###
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### This file defines the rules for isolated apps. An "isolated
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### app" is an APP with UID between AID_ISOLATED_START (99000)
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### and AID_ISOLATED_END (99999).
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###
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typeattribute isolated_app coredomain;
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app_domain(isolated_app)
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# Access already open app data files received over Binder or local socket IPC.
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allow isolated_app app_data_file:file { append read write getattr lock };
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allow isolated_app activity_service:service_manager find;
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allow isolated_app display_service:service_manager find;
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allow isolated_app webviewupdate_service:service_manager find;
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# Google Breakpad (crash reporter for Chrome) relies on ptrace
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# functionality. Without the ability to ptrace, the crash reporter
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# tool is broken.
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# b/20150694
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# https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=475270
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allow isolated_app self:process ptrace;
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# b/32896414: Allow accessing sdcard file descriptors passed to isolated_apps
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# by other processes. Open should never be allowed, and is blocked by
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# neverallow rules below.
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# TODO: consider removing write/append. We want to limit isolated_apps
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# ability to mutate files of any type.
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# media_rw_data_file is included for sdcardfs, and can be removed if sdcardfs
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# is modified to change the secontext when accessing the lower filesystem.
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allow isolated_app { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:file { read write append getattr lock };
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auditallow isolated_app { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:file { write append };
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# For webviews, isolated_app processes can be forked from the webview_zygote
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# in addition to the zygote. Allow access to resources inherited from the
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# webview_zygote process. These rules are specialized copies of the ones in app.te.
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# Inherit FDs from the webview_zygote.
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allow isolated_app webview_zygote:fd use;
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# Notify webview_zygote of child death.
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allow isolated_app webview_zygote:process sigchld;
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# Inherit logd write socket.
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allow isolated_app webview_zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
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# Read system properties managed by webview_zygote.
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allow isolated_app webview_zygote_tmpfs:file read;
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#####
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##### Neverallow
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#####
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# Do not allow isolated_app to directly open tun_device
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neverallow isolated_app tun_device:chr_file open;
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# Isolated apps should not directly open app data files themselves.
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neverallow isolated_app app_data_file:file open;
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# Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
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# TODO: are there situations where isolated_apps write to this file?
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# TODO: should we tighten these restrictions further?
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neverallow isolated_app anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
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neverallow isolated_app anr_data_file:dir ~search;
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# b/17487348
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# Isolated apps can only access three services,
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# activity_service, display_service and webviewupdate_service.
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neverallow isolated_app {
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service_manager_type
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-activity_service
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-display_service
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-webviewupdate_service
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}:service_manager find;
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# Isolated apps shouldn't be able to access the driver directly.
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neverallow isolated_app gpu_device:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };
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# Do not allow isolated_app access to /cache
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neverallow isolated_app cache_file:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
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neverallow isolated_app cache_file:file ~{ read getattr };
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# Do not allow isolated_app to access external storage, except for files passed
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# via file descriptors (b/32896414).
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neverallow isolated_app { storage_file mnt_user_file sdcard_type }:dir ~getattr;
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neverallow isolated_app { storage_file mnt_user_file }:file_class_set *;
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neverallow isolated_app sdcard_type:{ devfile_class_set lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } *;
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neverallow isolated_app sdcard_type:file ~{ read write append getattr lock };
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# Do not allow USB access
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neverallow isolated_app { usb_device usbaccessory_device }:chr_file *;
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# Restrict the webview_zygote control socket.
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neverallow isolated_app webview_zygote_socket:sock_file write;
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