2f5a6a96bd
A common source of mistakes when authoring sepolicy is properly
setting up property sets. This is a 3 part step of:
1. Allowing the unix domain connection to the init/property service
2. Allowing write on the property_socket file
3. Allowing the set on class property_service
The macro unix_socket_connect() handled 1 and 2, but could be
confusing for first time policy authors. 3 had to be explicitly
added.
To correct this, we introduce a new macros:
set_prop(sourcedomain, targetprop)
This macro handles steps 1, 2 and 3.
No difference in sediff is expected.
(cherrypicked from commit 625a3526f1)
Change-Id: I630ba0178439c935d08062892990d43a3cc1239e
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@linux.intel.com>
116 lines
4.3 KiB
Text
116 lines
4.3 KiB
Text
# recovery console (used in recovery init.rc for /sbin/recovery)
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# Declare the domain unconditionally so we can always reference it
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# in neverallow rules.
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type recovery, domain;
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# But the allow rules are only included in the recovery policy.
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# Otherwise recovery is only allowed the domain rules.
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recovery_only(`
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allow recovery self:capability { chown dac_override fowner fsetid setfcap setuid setgid sys_admin sys_tty_config };
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# Set security contexts on files that are not known to the loaded policy.
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allow recovery self:capability2 mac_admin;
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# Run helpers from / or /system without changing domain.
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allow recovery rootfs:file execute_no_trans;
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allow recovery system_file:file execute_no_trans;
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# Mount filesystems.
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allow recovery rootfs:dir mounton;
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allow recovery fs_type:filesystem ~relabelto;
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allow recovery unlabeled:filesystem ~relabelto;
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allow recovery contextmount_type:filesystem relabelto;
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# Create and relabel files and directories under /system.
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allow recovery exec_type:{ file lnk_file } { create_file_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
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allow recovery system_file:{ file lnk_file } { create_file_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
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allow recovery system_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
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# We may be asked to set an SELinux label for a type not known to the
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# currently loaded policy. Allow it.
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allow recovery unlabeled:{ file lnk_file } { create_file_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
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allow recovery unlabeled:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
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# 0eb17d944704b3eb140bb9dded299d3be3aed77e in build/ added SELinux
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# support to OTAs. However, that code has a bug. When an update occurs,
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# some directories are inappropriately labeled as exec_type. This is
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# only transient, and subsequent steps in the OTA script correct this
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# mistake. New devices are moving to block based OTAs, so this is not
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# worth fixing. b/15575013
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allow recovery exec_type:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
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# Write to /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
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# TODO: create more specific label?
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allow recovery proc:file w_file_perms;
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# Write to /sys/class/android_usb/android0/enable.
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# TODO: create more specific label?
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allow recovery sysfs:file w_file_perms;
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access_kmsg(recovery)
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# Access /dev/android_adb or /dev/usb-ffs/adb/ep0
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allow recovery adb_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow recovery functionfs:dir search;
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allow recovery functionfs:file rw_file_perms;
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# Required to e.g. wipe userdata/cache.
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allow recovery device:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow recovery block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow recovery dev_type:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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# GUI
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allow recovery self:process execmem;
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allow recovery ashmem_device:chr_file execute;
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allow recovery graphics_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow recovery graphics_device:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow recovery input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow recovery input_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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allow recovery tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# Create /tmp/recovery.log and execute /tmp/update_binary.
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allow recovery tmpfs:file { create_file_perms x_file_perms };
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allow recovery tmpfs:dir create_dir_perms;
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# Manage files on /cache
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allow recovery cache_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow recovery cache_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Reboot the device
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set_prop(recovery, powerctl_prop)
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# Start/stop adbd via ctl.start adbd
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set_prop(recovery, ctl_default_prop)
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# Use setfscreatecon() to label files for OTA updates.
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allow recovery self:process setfscreate;
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# Allow recovery to create a fuse filesystem, and read files from it.
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allow recovery fuse_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow recovery fuse:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow recovery fuse:file r_file_perms;
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wakelock_use(recovery)
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# This line seems suspect, as it should not really need to
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# set scheduling parameters for a kernel domain task.
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allow recovery kernel:process setsched;
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')
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# Recovery should never touch /data.
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#
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# In particular, if /data is encrypted, it is not accessible
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# to recovery anyway.
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#
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# For now, we only enforce write/execute restrictions, as domain.te
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# contains a number of read-only rules that apply to all
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# domains, including recovery.
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#
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# TODO: tighten this up further.
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neverallow recovery data_file_type:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
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neverallow recovery data_file_type:dir no_w_dir_perms;
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