55e5c9b513
public/property split is landed to selectively export public types to
vendors. So rules happening within system should be in private. This
introduces private/property.te and moves all allow and neverallow rules
from any coredomains to system defiend properties.
Bug: 150331497
Test: system/sepolicy/tools/build_policies.sh
Change-Id: I0d929024ae9f4ae3830d4bf3d59e999febb22cbe
Merged-In: I0d929024ae9f4ae3830d4bf3d59e999febb22cbe
(cherry picked from commit 42c7d8966c
)
78 lines
3.1 KiB
Text
78 lines
3.1 KiB
Text
# Domain for update_engine daemon.
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type update_engine, domain, update_engine_common;
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type update_engine_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
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net_domain(update_engine);
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# Following permissions are needed for update_engine.
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allow update_engine self:process { setsched };
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allow update_engine self:global_capability_class_set { fowner sys_admin };
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# Note: fsetid checks are triggered when creating a file in a directory with
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# the setgid bit set to determine if the file should inherit setgid. In this
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# case, setgid on the file is undesirable so we should just suppress the
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# denial.
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dontaudit update_engine self:global_capability_class_set fsetid;
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allow update_engine kmsg_device:chr_file { getattr w_file_perms };
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allow update_engine update_engine_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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wakelock_use(update_engine);
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# Ignore these denials.
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dontaudit update_engine kernel:process setsched;
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dontaudit update_engine self:global_capability_class_set sys_rawio;
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# Allow using persistent storage in /data/misc/update_engine.
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allow update_engine update_engine_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow update_engine update_engine_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Allow using persistent storage in /data/misc/update_engine_log.
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allow update_engine update_engine_log_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow update_engine update_engine_log_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Don't allow kernel module loading, just silence the logs.
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dontaudit update_engine kernel:system module_request;
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# Register the service to perform Binder IPC.
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binder_use(update_engine)
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add_service(update_engine, update_engine_service)
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# Allow update_engine to call the callback function provided by priv_app/GMS core.
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binder_call(update_engine, priv_app)
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# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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auditallow update_engine priv_app:binder { call transfer };
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auditallow priv_app update_engine:binder transfer;
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auditallow update_engine priv_app:fd use;
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')
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binder_call(update_engine, gmscore_app)
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# Allow update_engine to call the callback function provided by system_server.
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binder_call(update_engine, system_server)
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# Read OTA zip file at /data/ota_package/.
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allow update_engine ota_package_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow update_engine ota_package_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Use Boot Control HAL
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hal_client_domain(update_engine, hal_bootctl)
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# access /proc/misc
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allow update_engine proc_misc:file r_file_perms;
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# read directories on /system and /vendor
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allow update_engine system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# update_engine tries to determine the parent path for all devices (e.g.
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# /dev/block/by-name) by reading the default fstab and looking for the misc
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# device. ReadDefaultFstab() checks whether a GSI is running by checking
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# gsi_metadata_file. We never apply OTAs when GSI is running, so just deny
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# the access.
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dontaudit update_engine gsi_metadata_file:dir search;
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# Allow to write to snapshotctl_log logs.
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# TODO(b/148818798) revert when parent bug is fixed.
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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allow update_engine snapshotctl_log_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
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allow update_engine snapshotctl_log_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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')
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