336d0fed4e
I took current AOSP policy as base, then removed sepolicy so that the set of type and attributes was a subset of types and attributes in Q sepolicy, with exception of those that have not yet been cleand up in current AOSP: mediaswcodec_server netd_socket mediaextractor_update_service thermalserviced thermalserviced_exec Bug: 133196056 Test: n/a Change-Id: I863429d61d3fad0272c1d3f1e429cd997513a74a Merged-In: I3e091652fa8d1757b1f71f7559186d5b32f000d5
25 lines
1 KiB
Text
25 lines
1 KiB
Text
type fsverity_init, domain, coredomain;
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type fsverity_init_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
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init_daemon_domain(fsverity_init)
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# Allow this shell script to run and execute toybox
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allow fsverity_init shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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allow fsverity_init toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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# Allow to read /proc/keys for searching key id.
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allow fsverity_init proc_keys:file r_file_perms;
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# Kernel only prints the keys that can be accessed and only kernel keyring is needed here.
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dontaudit fsverity_init init:key view;
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dontaudit fsverity_init vold:key view;
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allow fsverity_init kernel:key { view search write setattr };
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allow fsverity_init fsverity_init:key { view search write };
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# Allow init to write to /proc/sys/fs/verity/require_signatures
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allow fsverity_init proc_fs_verity:file w_file_perms;
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# When kernel requests an algorithm, the crypto API first looks for an
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# already registered algorithm with that name. If it fails, the kernel creates
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# an implementation of the algorithm from templates.
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dontaudit fsverity_init kernel:system module_request;
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