platform_system_sepolicy/private/traced_probes.te
Primiano Tucci 353b93a90c Allow traced_probes to access battery coulomb counters
Allows battery counters to be logged in the trace. This
is to allow high fidelity attribution of battery power.

Matching feature CL: aosp/838951

SELinux denials that lead to this:
avc: denied { read } for comm="traced_probes" name="u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0" dev="tmpfs" ino=17794 scontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
avc: denied { read } for comm="traced_probes" name="u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0" dev="tmpfs" ino=17794 scontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 duplicate messages suppressed
avc: denied { read } for comm="traced_probes" name="u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0" dev="tmpfs" ino=17794 scontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { read } for comm="traced_probes" name="u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0" dev="tmpfs" ino=17794 scontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { open } for comm="traced_probes" path="/dev/__properties__/u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0" dev="tmpfs" ino=17794 scontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { open } for comm="traced_probes" path="/dev/__properties__/u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0" dev="tmpfs" ino=17794 scontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { getattr } for comm="traced_probes" path="/dev/__properties__/u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0" dev="tmpfs" ino=17794 scontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { getattr } for comm="traced_probes" path="/dev/__properties__/u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0" dev="tmpfs" ino=17794 scontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { call } for comm="traced_probes" scontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tcontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=1
avc: denied { call } for comm="traced_probes" scontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tcontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=1
avc: denied { search } for comm="hwservicemanage" name="26854" dev="proc" ino=4959346 scontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
avc: denied { search } for comm="hwservicemanage" name="26854" dev="proc" ino=4959346 scontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
avc: denied { read } for comm="hwservicemanage" name="current" dev="proc" ino=4959383 scontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { read } for comm="hwservicemanage" name="current" dev="proc" ino=4959383 scontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { open } for comm="hwservicemanage" path="/proc/26854/attr/current" dev="proc" ino=4959383 scontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { open } for comm="hwservicemanage" path="/proc/26854/attr/current" dev="proc" ino=4959383 scontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { getattr } for comm="hwservicemanage" scontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tclass=process permissive=1


Bug: 113076327
Change-Id: I4aabd0d70025105320c4a8d34470098807d56899
2018-12-03 13:32:48 +00:00

111 lines
4.1 KiB
Text

# Perfetto tracing probes, has tracefs access.
type traced_probes_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
# Allow init to exec the daemon.
init_daemon_domain(traced_probes)
# Write trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires connecting to its
# producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
allow traced_probes traced:fd use;
allow traced_probes traced_tmpfs:file { read write getattr map };
unix_socket_connect(traced_probes, traced_producer, traced)
# Allow traced_probes to access tracefs.
allow traced_probes debugfs_tracing:dir r_dir_perms;
allow traced_probes debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
allow traced_probes debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
# TODO(primiano): temporarily I/O tracing categories are still
# userdebug only until we nail down the blacklist/whitelist.
userdebug_or_eng(`
allow traced_probes debugfs_tracing_debug:file rw_file_perms;
')
# Allow traced_probes to start with a higher scheduling class and then downgrade
# itself.
allow traced_probes self:global_capability_class_set { sys_nice };
# Allow procfs access
r_dir_file(traced_probes, domain)
# Allow to log to kernel dmesg when starting / stopping ftrace.
allow traced_probes kmsg_device:chr_file write;
# Allow traced_probes to list the system partition.
allow traced_probes system_file:dir { open read };
# Allow traced_probes to list some of the data partition.
allow traced_probes self:global_capability_class_set dac_read_search;
allow traced_probes apk_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
allow traced_probes dalvikcache_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
userdebug_or_eng(`
allow traced_probes system_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
')
allow traced_probes system_app_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
allow traced_probes backup_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
allow traced_probes bootstat_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
allow traced_probes update_engine_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
allow traced_probes update_engine_log_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
allow traced_probes user_profile_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
# Allow traced_probes to run atrace. atrace pokes at system services to enable
# their userspace TRACE macros.
domain_auto_trans(traced_probes, atrace_exec, atrace);
# Allow traced_probes to kill atrace on timeout.
allow traced_probes atrace:process sigkill;
# Allow traced_probes to access /proc files for system stats.
# Note: trace data is NOT exposed to anything other than shell and privileged
# system apps that have access to the traced consumer socket.
allow traced_probes {
proc_meminfo
proc_vmstat
proc_stat
}:file r_file_perms;
# Allow access to the IHealth HAL service for tracing battery counters.
hal_client_domain(traced_probes, hal_health)
###
### Neverallow rules
###
### traced_probes should NEVER do any of this
# Disallow mapping executable memory (execstack and exec are already disallowed
# globally in domain.te).
neverallow traced_probes self:process execmem;
# Block device access.
neverallow traced_probes dev_type:blk_file { read write };
# ptrace any other app
neverallow traced_probes domain:process ptrace;
# Disallows access to /data files.
neverallow traced_probes {
data_file_type
-apk_data_file
-dalvikcache_data_file
-system_data_file
-system_app_data_file
-backup_data_file
-bootstat_data_file
-update_engine_data_file
-update_engine_log_data_file
-user_profile_data_file
# TODO(b/72998741) Remove vendor_data_file exemption. Further restricted in a
# subsequent neverallow. Currently only getattr and search are allowed.
-vendor_data_file
-zoneinfo_data_file
}:dir *;
neverallow traced_probes system_data_file:dir ~{ getattr userdebug_or_eng(`open read') search };
neverallow traced_probes zoneinfo_data_file:dir ~r_dir_perms;
neverallow traced_probes { data_file_type -zoneinfo_data_file }:lnk_file *;
neverallow traced_probes { data_file_type -zoneinfo_data_file }:file *;
# Only init is allowed to enter the traced_probes domain via exec()
neverallow { domain -init } traced_probes:process transition;
neverallow * traced_probes:process dyntransition;