36dd2a410c
Test: manually tested to prevent sepolicy violation Change-Id: I9ebcc86464a9fc61a49d5c9be40f19f3523b6785
847 lines
33 KiB
Text
847 lines
33 KiB
Text
#
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# System Server aka system_server spawned by zygote.
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# Most of the framework services run in this process.
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#
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typeattribute system_server coredomain;
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typeattribute system_server mlstrustedsubject;
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# Define a type for tmpfs-backed ashmem regions.
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tmpfs_domain(system_server)
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# Create a socket for connections from crash_dump.
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type_transition system_server system_data_file:sock_file system_ndebug_socket "ndebugsocket";
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allow system_server zygote_tmpfs:file read;
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# For art.
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allow system_server dalvikcache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow system_server dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# When running system server under --invoke-with, we'll try to load the boot image under the
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# system server domain, following links to the system partition.
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with_asan(`allow system_server dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;')
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# /data/resource-cache
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allow system_server resourcecache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow system_server resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# ptrace to processes in the same domain for debugging crashes.
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allow system_server self:process ptrace;
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# Child of the zygote.
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allow system_server zygote:fd use;
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allow system_server zygote:process sigchld;
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# May kill zygote on crashes.
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allow system_server zygote:process sigkill;
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allow system_server crash_dump:process sigkill;
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allow system_server webview_zygote:process sigkill;
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# Read /system/bin/app_process.
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allow system_server zygote_exec:file r_file_perms;
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# Needed to close the zygote socket, which involves getopt / getattr
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allow system_server zygote:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr };
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# system server gets network and bluetooth permissions.
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net_domain(system_server)
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# in addition to ioctls whitelisted for all domains, also allow system_server
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# to use privileged ioctls commands. Needed to set up VPNs.
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allowxperm system_server self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
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bluetooth_domain(system_server)
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# These are the capabilities assigned by the zygote to the
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# system server.
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allow system_server self:global_capability_class_set {
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ipc_lock
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kill
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net_admin
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net_bind_service
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net_broadcast
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net_raw
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sys_boot
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sys_nice
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sys_ptrace
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sys_time
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sys_tty_config
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};
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wakelock_use(system_server)
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# Trigger module auto-load.
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allow system_server kernel:system module_request;
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# Allow alarmtimers to be set
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allow system_server self:global_capability2_class_set wake_alarm;
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# Create and share netlink_netfilter_sockets for tetheroffload.
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allow system_server self:netlink_netfilter_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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# Use netlink uevent sockets.
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allow system_server self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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# Use generic netlink sockets.
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allow system_server self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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allow system_server self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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# libvintf reads the kernel config to verify vendor interface compatibility.
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allow system_server config_gz:file { read open };
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# Use generic "sockets" where the address family is not known
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# to the kernel. The ioctl permission is specifically omitted here, but may
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# be added to device specific policy along with the ioctl commands to be
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# whitelisted.
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allow system_server self:socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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# Set and get routes directly via netlink.
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allow system_server self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
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# Kill apps.
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allow system_server appdomain:process { getpgid sigkill signal };
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# Set scheduling info for apps.
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allow system_server appdomain:process { getsched setsched };
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allow system_server audioserver:process { getsched setsched };
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allow system_server hal_audio:process { getsched setsched };
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allow system_server hal_bluetooth:process { getsched setsched };
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allow system_server cameraserver:process { getsched setsched };
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allow system_server hal_camera:process { getsched setsched };
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allow system_server mediaserver:process { getsched setsched };
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allow system_server bootanim:process { getsched setsched };
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# Allow system_server to write to /proc/<pid>/timerslack_ns
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allow system_server appdomain:file w_file_perms;
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allow system_server audioserver:file w_file_perms;
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allow system_server cameraserver:file w_file_perms;
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allow system_server hal_audio_server:file w_file_perms;
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# Read /proc/pid data for all domains. This is used by ProcessCpuTracker
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# within system_server to keep track of memory and CPU usage for
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# all processes on the device. In addition, /proc/pid files access is needed
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# for dumping stack traces of native processes.
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r_dir_file(system_server, domain)
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# Read/Write to /proc/net/xt_qtaguid/ctrl and and /dev/xt_qtaguid.
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allow system_server qtaguid_proc:file rw_file_perms;
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allow system_server qtaguid_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# Write /proc/uid_cputime/remove_uid_range.
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allow system_server proc_uid_cputime_removeuid:file { w_file_perms getattr };
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# Write /proc/uid_procstat/set.
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allow system_server proc_uid_procstat_set:file { w_file_perms getattr };
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# Write to /proc/sysrq-trigger.
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allow system_server proc_sysrq:file rw_file_perms;
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# Delete /data/misc/stats-data/ and /data/misc/stats-service/ directories.
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allow system_server stats_data_file:dir { open read remove_name search write };
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allow system_server stats_data_file:file unlink;
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# Read /sys/kernel/debug/wakeup_sources.
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allow system_server debugfs:file r_file_perms;
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allow system_server debugfs_wakeup_sources:file r_file_perms;
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# The DhcpClient and WifiWatchdog use packet_sockets
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allow system_server self:packet_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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# NetworkDiagnostics requires explicit bind() calls to ping sockets. These aren't actually the same
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# as raw sockets, but the kernel doesn't yet distinguish between the two.
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allow system_server node:rawip_socket node_bind;
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# 3rd party VPN clients require a tun_socket to be created
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allow system_server self:tun_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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# Talk to init and various daemons via sockets.
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unix_socket_connect(system_server, lmkd, lmkd)
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unix_socket_connect(system_server, mtpd, mtp)
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unix_socket_connect(system_server, netd, netd)
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unix_socket_connect(system_server, vold, vold)
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unix_socket_connect(system_server, zygote, zygote)
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unix_socket_connect(system_server, racoon, racoon)
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unix_socket_connect(system_server, uncrypt, uncrypt)
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# Communicate over a socket created by surfaceflinger.
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allow system_server surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt };
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# Communicate over a socket created by webview_zygote.
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allow system_server webview_zygote:unix_stream_socket { read write connectto setopt };
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# Perform Binder IPC.
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binder_use(system_server)
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binder_call(system_server, appdomain)
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binder_call(system_server, binderservicedomain)
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binder_call(system_server, dumpstate)
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binder_call(system_server, fingerprintd)
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binder_call(system_server, gatekeeperd)
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binder_call(system_server, installd)
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binder_call(system_server, incidentd)
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binder_call(system_server, netd)
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binder_call(system_server, statsd)
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binder_call(system_server, storaged)
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binder_call(system_server, vold)
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binder_call(system_server, wificond)
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binder_call(system_server, wpantund)
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binder_service(system_server)
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# Use HALs
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_allocator)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_authsecret)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_broadcastradio)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_configstore)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_contexthub)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_fingerprint)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_gnss)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_graphics_allocator)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_ir)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_light)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_memtrack)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_neuralnetworks)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_oemlock)
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allow system_server hal_omx_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
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allow system_server hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_power)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_sensors)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_tetheroffload)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_thermal)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_tv_cec)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_tv_input)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_usb)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_usb_gadget)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_vibrator)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_vr)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_weaver)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_wifi)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_wifi_offload)
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hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_wifi_supplicant)
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binder_call(system_server, mediacodec)
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# Talk with graphics composer fences
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allow system_server hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
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# Use RenderScript always-passthrough HAL
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allow system_server hal_renderscript_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
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# Offer HwBinder services
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add_hwservice(system_server, fwk_scheduler_hwservice)
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add_hwservice(system_server, fwk_sensor_hwservice)
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# Talk to tombstoned to get ANR traces.
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unix_socket_connect(system_server, tombstoned_intercept, tombstoned)
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# List HAL interfaces to get ANR traces.
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allow system_server hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list;
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# Send signals to trigger ANR traces.
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allow system_server {
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# This is derived from the list that system server defines as interesting native processes
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# to dump during ANRs or watchdog aborts, defined in NATIVE_STACKS_OF_INTEREST in
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# frameworks/base/services/core/java/com/android/server/Watchdog.java.
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audioserver
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cameraserver
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drmserver
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inputflinger
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mediadrmserver
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mediaextractor
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mediaserver
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mediametrics
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sdcardd
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statsd
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surfaceflinger
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# This list comes from HAL_INTERFACES_OF_INTEREST in
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# frameworks/base/services/core/java/com/android/server/Watchdog.java.
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hal_audio_server
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hal_bluetooth_server
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hal_camera_server
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hal_graphics_composer_server
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hal_sensors_server
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hal_vr_server
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mediacodec # TODO(b/36375899): hal_omx_server
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}:process { signal };
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# Use sockets received over binder from various services.
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allow system_server audioserver:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
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allow system_server audioserver:udp_socket rw_socket_perms;
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allow system_server mediaserver:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
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allow system_server mediaserver:udp_socket rw_socket_perms;
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# Use sockets received over binder from various services.
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allow system_server mediadrmserver:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
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allow system_server mediadrmserver:udp_socket rw_socket_perms;
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# Get file context
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allow system_server file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
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# access for mac_permissions
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allow system_server mac_perms_file: file r_file_perms;
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# Check SELinux permissions.
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selinux_check_access(system_server)
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allow system_server sysfs_type:dir search;
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r_dir_file(system_server, sysfs_android_usb)
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allow system_server sysfs_android_usb:file w_file_perms;
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r_dir_file(system_server, sysfs_ipv4)
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allow system_server sysfs_ipv4:file w_file_perms;
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r_dir_file(system_server, sysfs_rtc)
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r_dir_file(system_server, sysfs_switch)
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r_dir_file(system_server, sysfs_wakeup_reasons)
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allow system_server sysfs_nfc_power_writable:file rw_file_perms;
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allow system_server sysfs_mac_address:file r_file_perms;
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allow system_server sysfs_power:dir search;
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allow system_server sysfs_power:file rw_file_perms;
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allow system_server sysfs_thermal:dir search;
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allow system_server sysfs_thermal:file r_file_perms;
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# TODO: Remove when HALs are forced into separate processes
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allow system_server sysfs_vibrator:file { write append };
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# TODO: added to match above sysfs rule. Remove me?
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allow system_server sysfs_usb:file w_file_perms;
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# Access devices.
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allow system_server device:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow system_server mdns_socket:sock_file rw_file_perms;
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allow system_server alarm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow system_server gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow system_server iio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow system_server input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow system_server input_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow system_server radio_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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allow system_server tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow system_server usbaccessory_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow system_server video_device:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow system_server video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow system_server adbd_socket:sock_file rw_file_perms;
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allow system_server rtc_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow system_server audio_device:dir r_dir_perms;
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# write access needed for MIDI
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allow system_server audio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# tun device used for 3rd party vpn apps
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allow system_server tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# Manage system data files.
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allow system_server system_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow system_server system_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
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allow system_server keychain_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow system_server keychain_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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allow system_server keychain_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
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# Manage /data/app.
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allow system_server apk_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow system_server apk_data_file:{ file lnk_file } { create_file_perms link };
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allow system_server apk_tmp_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow system_server apk_tmp_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Access /vendor/{app,framework,overlay}
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r_dir_file(system_server, vendor_app_file)
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r_dir_file(system_server, vendor_framework_file)
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r_dir_file(system_server, vendor_overlay_file)
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# Manage /data/app-private.
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allow system_server apk_private_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow system_server apk_private_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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allow system_server apk_private_tmp_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow system_server apk_private_tmp_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Manage files within asec containers.
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allow system_server asec_apk_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow system_server asec_apk_file:file create_file_perms;
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allow system_server asec_public_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Manage /data/anr.
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#
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# TODO: Some of these permissions can be withdrawn once we've switched to the
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# new stack dumping mechanism, see b/32064548 and the rules below. In particular,
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# the system_server should never need to create a new anr_data_file:file or write
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# to one, but it will still need to read and append to existing files.
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allow system_server anr_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow system_server anr_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# New stack dumping scheme : request an output FD from tombstoned via a unix
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# domain socket.
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#
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# Allow system_server to connect and write to the tombstoned java trace socket in
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# order to dump its traces. Also allow the system server to write its traces to
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# dumpstate during bugreport capture.
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unix_socket_connect(system_server, tombstoned_java_trace, tombstoned)
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allow system_server tombstoned:fd use;
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allow system_server dumpstate:fifo_file append;
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# Read /data/misc/incidents - only read. The fd will be sent over binder,
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# with no DAC access to it, for dropbox to read.
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allow system_server incident_data_file:file read;
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# Allow dropbox to read /data/misc/perfetto-traces. Only the fd is sent over
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# binder.
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allow system_server perfetto_traces_data_file:file read;
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allow system_server perfetto:fd use;
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# Allow dropbox to read /data/misc/perfprofd. Only the fd is sent over binder.
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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allow system_server perfprofd_data_file:file read;
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allow system_server perfprofd:fd use;
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')
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# Manage /data/backup.
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allow system_server backup_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow system_server backup_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Write to /data/system/heapdump
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allow system_server heapdump_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
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allow system_server heapdump_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Manage /data/misc/adb.
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allow system_server adb_keys_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow system_server adb_keys_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Manage /data/misc/network_watchlist
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allow system_server network_watchlist_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow system_server network_watchlist_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Manage /data/misc/sms.
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# TODO: Split into a separate type?
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allow system_server radio_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow system_server radio_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Manage /data/misc/systemkeys.
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allow system_server systemkeys_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow system_server systemkeys_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Manage /data/misc/textclassifier.
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allow system_server textclassifier_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow system_server textclassifier_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Access /data/tombstones.
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allow system_server tombstone_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow system_server tombstone_data_file:file r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Manage /data/misc/vpn.
|
|
allow system_server vpn_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
|
|
allow system_server vpn_data_file:file create_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Manage /data/misc/wifi.
|
|
allow system_server wifi_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
|
|
allow system_server wifi_data_file:file create_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Manage /data/misc/zoneinfo.
|
|
allow system_server zoneinfo_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
|
|
allow system_server zoneinfo_data_file:file create_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Walk /data/data subdirectories.
|
|
# Types extracted from seapp_contexts type= fields.
|
|
allow system_server { system_app_data_file bluetooth_data_file nfc_data_file radio_data_file shell_data_file app_data_file }:dir { getattr read search };
|
|
# Also permit for unlabeled /data/data subdirectories and
|
|
# for unlabeled asec containers on upgrades from 4.2.
|
|
allow system_server unlabeled:dir r_dir_perms;
|
|
# Read pkg.apk file before it has been relabeled by vold.
|
|
allow system_server unlabeled:file r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Populate com.android.providers.settings/databases/settings.db.
|
|
allow system_server system_app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
|
|
allow system_server system_app_data_file:file create_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Receive and use open app data files passed over binder IPC.
|
|
# Types extracted from seapp_contexts type= fields.
|
|
allow system_server { system_app_data_file bluetooth_data_file nfc_data_file radio_data_file shell_data_file app_data_file }:file { getattr read write append };
|
|
|
|
# Access to /data/media for measuring disk usage.
|
|
allow system_server media_rw_data_file:dir { search getattr open read };
|
|
|
|
# Receive and use open /data/media files passed over binder IPC.
|
|
# Also used for measuring disk usage.
|
|
allow system_server media_rw_data_file:file { getattr read write append };
|
|
|
|
# Relabel apk files.
|
|
allow system_server { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:{ dir file } { relabelfrom relabelto };
|
|
allow system_server { apk_data_file apk_private_data_file }:{ dir file } { relabelfrom relabelto };
|
|
|
|
# Relabel wallpaper.
|
|
allow system_server system_data_file:file relabelfrom;
|
|
allow system_server wallpaper_file:file relabelto;
|
|
allow system_server wallpaper_file:file { rw_file_perms rename unlink };
|
|
|
|
# Backup of wallpaper imagery uses temporary hard links to avoid data churn
|
|
allow system_server { system_data_file wallpaper_file }:file link;
|
|
|
|
# ShortcutManager icons
|
|
allow system_server system_data_file:dir relabelfrom;
|
|
allow system_server shortcut_manager_icons:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
|
|
allow system_server shortcut_manager_icons:file create_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Manage ringtones.
|
|
allow system_server ringtone_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
|
|
allow system_server ringtone_file:file create_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Relabel icon file.
|
|
allow system_server icon_file:file relabelto;
|
|
allow system_server icon_file:file { rw_file_perms unlink };
|
|
|
|
# FingerprintService.java does a restorecon of the directory /data/system/users/[0-9]+/fpdata(/.*)?
|
|
allow system_server system_data_file:dir relabelfrom;
|
|
|
|
# Property Service write
|
|
set_prop(system_server, system_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, exported_system_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, exported2_system_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, exported3_system_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, safemode_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, dhcp_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, net_radio_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, net_dns_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, system_radio_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, exported_system_radio_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, debug_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, powerctl_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, fingerprint_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, exported_fingerprint_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, device_logging_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, dumpstate_options_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, overlay_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, exported_overlay_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, pm_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, exported_pm_prop)
|
|
userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(system_server, wifi_log_prop)')
|
|
|
|
# ctl interface
|
|
set_prop(system_server, ctl_default_prop)
|
|
set_prop(system_server, ctl_bugreport_prop)
|
|
|
|
# cppreopt property
|
|
set_prop(system_server, cppreopt_prop)
|
|
|
|
# BootReceiver to read ro.boot.bootreason
|
|
get_prop(system_server, bootloader_boot_reason_prop)
|
|
# PowerManager to read persist.sys.boot.reason
|
|
get_prop(system_server, last_boot_reason_prop)
|
|
|
|
# Collect metrics on boot time created by init
|
|
get_prop(system_server, boottime_prop)
|
|
|
|
# Read device's serial number from system properties
|
|
get_prop(system_server, serialno_prop)
|
|
|
|
# Read/write the property which keeps track of whether this is the first start of system_server
|
|
set_prop(system_server, firstboot_prop)
|
|
|
|
# Create a socket for connections from debuggerd.
|
|
allow system_server system_ndebug_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Manage cache files.
|
|
allow system_server cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
|
|
allow system_server { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir { relabelfrom create_dir_perms };
|
|
allow system_server { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file { relabelfrom create_file_perms };
|
|
allow system_server { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:fifo_file create_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
allow system_server system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
|
|
allow system_server system_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# LocationManager(e.g, GPS) needs to read and write
|
|
# to uart driver and ctrl proc entry
|
|
allow system_server gps_control:file rw_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Allow system_server to use app-created sockets and pipes.
|
|
allow system_server appdomain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } { getattr getopt setopt read write shutdown };
|
|
allow system_server appdomain:{ fifo_file unix_stream_socket } { getattr read write };
|
|
|
|
# BackupManagerService needs to manipulate backup data files
|
|
allow system_server cache_backup_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
|
|
allow system_server cache_backup_file:file create_file_perms;
|
|
# LocalTransport works inside /cache/backup
|
|
allow system_server cache_private_backup_file:dir create_dir_perms;
|
|
allow system_server cache_private_backup_file:file create_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Allow system to talk to usb device
|
|
allow system_server usb_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
|
|
allow system_server usb_device:dir r_dir_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Read from HW RNG (needed by EntropyMixer).
|
|
allow system_server hw_random_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Read and delete files under /dev/fscklogs.
|
|
r_dir_file(system_server, fscklogs)
|
|
allow system_server fscklogs:dir { write remove_name };
|
|
allow system_server fscklogs:file unlink;
|
|
|
|
# logd access, system_server inherit logd write socket
|
|
# (urge is to deprecate this long term)
|
|
allow system_server zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
|
|
|
|
# Read from log daemon.
|
|
read_logd(system_server)
|
|
read_runtime_log_tags(system_server)
|
|
|
|
# Be consistent with DAC permissions. Allow system_server to write to
|
|
# /sys/module/lowmemorykiller/parameters/adj
|
|
# /sys/module/lowmemorykiller/parameters/minfree
|
|
allow system_server sysfs_lowmemorykiller:file { getattr w_file_perms };
|
|
|
|
# Read /sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops
|
|
# Don't worry about overly broad permissions for now, as there's
|
|
# only one file in /sys/fs/pstore
|
|
allow system_server pstorefs:dir r_dir_perms;
|
|
allow system_server pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# /sys access
|
|
allow system_server sysfs_zram:dir search;
|
|
allow system_server sysfs_zram:file r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
add_service(system_server, system_server_service);
|
|
allow system_server audioserver_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server batteryproperties_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server drmserver_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server dumpstate_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server fingerprintd_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server hal_fingerprint_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server gatekeeper_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server incident_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server installd_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server keystore_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server netd_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server nfc_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server radio_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server stats_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server storaged_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server vold_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow system_server wificond_service:service_manager find;
|
|
|
|
allow system_server keystore:keystore_key {
|
|
get_state
|
|
get
|
|
insert
|
|
delete
|
|
exist
|
|
list
|
|
reset
|
|
password
|
|
lock
|
|
unlock
|
|
is_empty
|
|
sign
|
|
verify
|
|
grant
|
|
duplicate
|
|
clear_uid
|
|
add_auth
|
|
user_changed
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
# Allow system server to search and write to the persistent factory reset
|
|
# protection partition. This block device does not get wiped in a factory reset.
|
|
allow system_server block_device:dir search;
|
|
allow system_server frp_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Clean up old cgroups
|
|
allow system_server cgroup:dir { remove_name rmdir };
|
|
|
|
# /oem access
|
|
r_dir_file(system_server, oemfs)
|
|
|
|
# Allow resolving per-user storage symlinks
|
|
allow system_server { mnt_user_file storage_file }:dir { getattr search };
|
|
allow system_server { mnt_user_file storage_file }:lnk_file { getattr read };
|
|
|
|
# Allow statfs() on storage devices, which happens fast enough that
|
|
# we shouldn't be killed during unsafe removal
|
|
allow system_server sdcard_type:dir { getattr search };
|
|
|
|
# Traverse into expanded storage
|
|
allow system_server mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Allow system process to relabel the fingerprint directory after mkdir
|
|
# and delete the directory and files when no longer needed
|
|
allow system_server fingerprintd_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms remove_name rmdir relabelto write };
|
|
allow system_server fingerprintd_data_file:file { getattr unlink };
|
|
|
|
# Allow system process to read network MAC address
|
|
allow system_server sysfs_mac_address:file r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
userdebug_or_eng(`
|
|
# Allow system server to create and write method traces in /data/misc/trace.
|
|
allow system_server method_trace_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
|
|
allow system_server method_trace_data_file:file { create w_file_perms };
|
|
|
|
# Allow system server to read dmesg
|
|
allow system_server kernel:system syslog_read;
|
|
|
|
# Allow writing and removing window traces in /data/misc/wmtrace.
|
|
allow system_server wm_trace_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
|
|
allow system_server wm_trace_data_file:file { getattr setattr create unlink w_file_perms };
|
|
')
|
|
|
|
# For AppFuse.
|
|
allow system_server vold:fd use;
|
|
allow system_server fuse_device:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
|
|
allow system_server app_fuse_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
|
|
allow system_server app_fuse_file:file { read write open getattr append };
|
|
|
|
# For configuring sdcardfs
|
|
allow system_server configfs:dir { create_dir_perms };
|
|
allow system_server configfs:file { getattr open create unlink write };
|
|
|
|
# Connect to adbd and use a socket transferred from it.
|
|
# Used for e.g. jdwp.
|
|
allow system_server adbd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
|
|
allow system_server adbd:fd use;
|
|
allow system_server adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };
|
|
|
|
# Allow invoking tools like "timeout"
|
|
allow system_server toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Postinstall
|
|
#
|
|
# For OTA dexopt, allow calls coming from postinstall.
|
|
binder_call(system_server, postinstall)
|
|
|
|
allow system_server postinstall:fifo_file write;
|
|
allow system_server update_engine:fd use;
|
|
allow system_server update_engine:fifo_file write;
|
|
|
|
# Access to /data/preloads
|
|
allow system_server preloads_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
|
|
allow system_server preloads_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms write remove_name rmdir };
|
|
allow system_server preloads_media_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
|
|
allow system_server preloads_media_file:dir { r_dir_perms write remove_name rmdir };
|
|
|
|
r_dir_file(system_server, cgroup)
|
|
allow system_server ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
r_dir_file(system_server, proc_asound)
|
|
r_dir_file(system_server, proc_net)
|
|
r_dir_file(system_server, proc_qtaguid_stat)
|
|
allow system_server {
|
|
proc_loadavg
|
|
proc_meminfo
|
|
proc_pagetypeinfo
|
|
proc_pipe_conf
|
|
proc_stat
|
|
proc_uid_cputime_showstat
|
|
proc_uid_time_in_state
|
|
proc_uid_concurrent_active_time
|
|
proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time
|
|
proc_version
|
|
proc_vmallocinfo
|
|
}:file r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
allow system_server proc_uid_time_in_state:dir r_dir_perms;
|
|
allow system_server proc_uid_cpupower:file r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
r_dir_file(system_server, rootfs)
|
|
|
|
# Allow WifiService to start, stop, and read wifi-specific trace events.
|
|
allow system_server debugfs_tracing_instances:dir search;
|
|
allow system_server debugfs_wifi_tracing:dir search;
|
|
allow system_server debugfs_wifi_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# allow system_server to exec shell, asanwrapper & zygote(app_process) on ASAN builds. Needed to run
|
|
# asanwrapper.
|
|
with_asan(`
|
|
allow system_server shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
|
|
allow system_server asanwrapper_exec:file rx_file_perms;
|
|
allow system_server zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
|
|
')
|
|
|
|
# allow system_server to read the eBPF maps that stores the traffic stats information amd clean up
|
|
# the map after snapshot is recorded
|
|
allow system_server fs_bpf:dir search;
|
|
allow system_server fs_bpf:file read;
|
|
allow system_server netd:bpf map_read;
|
|
|
|
# ART Profiles.
|
|
# Allow system_server to open profile snapshots for read.
|
|
# System server never reads the actual content. It passes the descriptor to
|
|
# to privileged apps which acquire the permissions to inspect the profiles.
|
|
allow system_server user_profile_data_file:dir { search };
|
|
allow system_server user_profile_data_file:file { getattr open read };
|
|
|
|
userdebug_or_eng(`
|
|
# Allow system server to notify mediaextractor of the plugin update.
|
|
allow system_server mediaextractor_update_service:service_manager find;
|
|
')
|
|
|
|
# UsbDeviceManager uses /dev/usb-ffs
|
|
allow system_server functionfs:dir search;
|
|
allow system_server functionfs:file rw_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
###
|
|
### Neverallow rules
|
|
###
|
|
### system_server should NEVER do any of this
|
|
|
|
# Do not allow opening files from external storage as unsafe ejection
|
|
# could cause the kernel to kill the system_server.
|
|
neverallow system_server sdcard_type:dir { open read write };
|
|
neverallow system_server sdcard_type:file rw_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# system server should never be operating on zygote spawned app data
|
|
# files directly. Rather, they should always be passed via a
|
|
# file descriptor.
|
|
# Types extracted from seapp_contexts type= fields, excluding
|
|
# those types that system_server needs to open directly.
|
|
neverallow system_server { bluetooth_data_file nfc_data_file shell_data_file app_data_file }:file { open create unlink link };
|
|
|
|
# Forking and execing is inherently dangerous and racy. See, for
|
|
# example, https://www.linuxprogrammingblog.com/threads-and-fork-think-twice-before-using-them
|
|
# Prevent the addition of new file execs to stop the problem from
|
|
# getting worse. b/28035297
|
|
neverallow system_server {
|
|
file_type
|
|
-toolbox_exec
|
|
-logcat_exec
|
|
with_asan(`-shell_exec -asanwrapper_exec -zygote_exec')
|
|
}:file execute_no_trans;
|
|
|
|
# Ensure that system_server doesn't perform any domain transitions other than
|
|
# transitioning to the crash_dump domain when a crash occurs.
|
|
neverallow system_server { domain -crash_dump }:process transition;
|
|
neverallow system_server *:process dyntransition;
|
|
|
|
# Only allow crash_dump to connect to system_ndebug_socket.
|
|
neverallow { domain -init -system_server -crash_dump } system_ndebug_socket:sock_file { open write };
|
|
|
|
# system_server should never be executing dex2oat. This is either
|
|
# a bug (for example, bug 16317188), or represents an attempt by
|
|
# system server to dynamically load a dex file, something we do not
|
|
# want to allow.
|
|
neverallow system_server dex2oat_exec:file no_x_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# system_server should never execute or load executable shared libraries
|
|
# in /data
|
|
neverallow system_server data_file_type:file no_x_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# The only block device system_server should be accessing is
|
|
# the frp_block_device. This helps avoid a system_server to root
|
|
# escalation by writing to raw block devices.
|
|
neverallow system_server { dev_type -frp_block_device }:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# system_server should never use JIT functionality
|
|
neverallow system_server self:process execmem;
|
|
neverallow system_server ashmem_device:chr_file execute;
|
|
|
|
# TODO: deal with tmpfs_domain pub/priv split properly
|
|
neverallow system_server system_server_tmpfs:file execute;
|
|
|
|
# dexoptanalyzer is currently used only for secondary dex files which
|
|
# system_server should never access.
|
|
neverallow system_server dexoptanalyzer_exec:file no_x_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# No ptracing others
|
|
neverallow system_server { domain -system_server }:process ptrace;
|
|
|
|
# CAP_SYS_RESOURCE was traditionally needed for sensitive /proc/PID
|
|
# file read access. However, that is now unnecessary (b/34951864)
|
|
neverallow system_server system_server:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
|