da19b45a14
There don't seem to be any security issues raised by allowing crash dump to access keystore. More specifically, all key material is encrypted by KeyMint anyways in the absolute worst case, so even if key exposure occurred, there would be no harm. Fixes: 186868271 Test: The comment is gone. Change-Id: Ib09fc8e1eaa3f1a0876139e175dc28be9e0d4a4a
64 lines
1.3 KiB
Text
64 lines
1.3 KiB
Text
typeattribute crash_dump coredomain;
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# Crash dump does not need to access devices passed across exec().
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dontaudit crash_dump { devpts dev_type }:chr_file { read write };
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allow crash_dump {
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domain
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-apexd
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-bpfloader
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-crash_dump
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-crosvm # TODO(b/236672526): Remove exception for crosvm
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-diced
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-init
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-kernel
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-keystore
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-llkd
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-logd
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-ueventd
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-vendor_init
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-vold
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}:process { ptrace signal sigchld sigstop sigkill };
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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allow crash_dump {
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apexd
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keystore
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llkd
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logd
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vold
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}:process { ptrace signal sigchld sigstop sigkill };
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')
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###
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### neverallow assertions
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###
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# ptrace neverallow assertions are spread throughout the other policy
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# files, so we avoid adding redundant assertions here
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neverallow crash_dump {
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apexd
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userdebug_or_eng(`-apexd')
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bpfloader
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diced
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init
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kernel
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keystore
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userdebug_or_eng(`-keystore')
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llkd
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userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd')
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logd
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userdebug_or_eng(`-logd')
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ueventd
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vendor_init
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vold
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userdebug_or_eng(`-vold')
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}:process { signal sigstop sigkill };
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neverallow crash_dump self:process ptrace;
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neverallow crash_dump gpu_device:chr_file *;
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# Read ART APEX data directory
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allow crash_dump apex_art_data_file:dir { getattr search };
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allow crash_dump apex_art_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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