095fbea563
Add additional compile time constraints on the ability to ptrace various sensitive domains. llkd: remove some domains which llkd should never ptrace, even on debuggable builds, such as kernel threads and init. crash_dump neverallows: Remove the ptrace neverallow checks because it duplicates other neverallow assertions spread throughout the policy. Test: policy compiles and device boots Change-Id: Ia4240d1ce7143b983bb048e046bb4729d0af5a6e
35 lines
1.3 KiB
Text
35 lines
1.3 KiB
Text
# bpf program loader
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type bpfloader, domain;
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type bpfloader_exec, exec_type, file_type;
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typeattribute bpfloader coredomain;
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# Process need CAP_NET_ADMIN to run bpf programs as cgroup filter
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allow bpfloader self:global_capability_class_set net_admin;
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r_dir_file(bpfloader, cgroup_bpf)
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# These permission is required for pin bpf program for netd.
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allow bpfloader fs_bpf:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow bpfloader fs_bpf:file create_file_perms;
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allow bpfloader devpts:chr_file { read write };
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allow bpfloader netd:fd use;
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# Use pinned bpf map files from netd.
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allow bpfloader netd:bpf { map_read map_write };
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allow bpfloader self:bpf { prog_load prog_run };
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dontaudit bpfloader self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
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###
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### Neverallow rules
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###
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader } *:bpf prog_load;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -netutils_wrapper} *:bpf prog_run;
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neverallow { domain -netd -bpfloader } bpfloader_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };
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neverallow bpfloader domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
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# only system_server, netd and bpfloader can read/write the bpf maps
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neverallow { domain -system_server -netd -bpfloader} netd:bpf { map_read map_write };
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# No domain should be allowed to ptrace bpfloader
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neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd') } bpfloader:process ptrace;
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