41a2abfc0d
This is being done in preparation for the migration from ashmem to
memfd. In order for tmpfs objects to be usable across the Treble
boundary, they need to be declared in public policy whereas, they're
currently all declared in private policy as part of the
tmpfs_domain() macro. Remove the type declaration from the
macro, and remove tmpfs_domain() from the init_daemon_domain() macro
to avoid having to declare the *_tmpfs types for all init launched
domains. tmpfs is mostly used by apps and the media frameworks.
Bug: 122854450
Test: Boot Taimen and blueline. Watch videos, make phone calls, browse
internet, send text, install angry birds...play angry birds, keep
playing angry birds...
Change-Id: I20a47d2bb22e61b16187015c7bc7ca10accf6358
Merged-In: I20a47d2bb22e61b16187015c7bc7ca10accf6358
(cherry picked from commit e16fb9109c)
76 lines
3 KiB
Text
76 lines
3 KiB
Text
# ueventd seclabel is specified in init.rc since
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# it lives in the rootfs and has no unique file type.
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type ueventd, domain;
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type ueventd_tmpfs, file_type;
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# Write to /dev/kmsg.
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allow ueventd kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow ueventd self:global_capability_class_set { chown mknod net_admin setgid fsetid sys_rawio dac_override dac_read_search fowner };
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allow ueventd device:file create_file_perms;
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r_dir_file(ueventd, rootfs)
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# ueventd needs write access to files in /sys to regenerate uevents
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allow ueventd sysfs_type:file w_file_perms;
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r_dir_file(ueventd, sysfs_type)
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allow ueventd sysfs_type:{ file lnk_file } { relabelfrom relabelto setattr };
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allow ueventd sysfs_type:dir { relabelfrom relabelto setattr };
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allow ueventd tmpfs:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow ueventd dev_type:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow ueventd dev_type:lnk_file { create unlink };
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allow ueventd dev_type:chr_file { getattr create setattr unlink };
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allow ueventd dev_type:blk_file { getattr relabelfrom relabelto create setattr unlink };
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allow ueventd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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allow ueventd efs_file:dir search;
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allow ueventd efs_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Get SELinux enforcing status.
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r_dir_file(ueventd, selinuxfs)
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# Access for /vendor/ueventd.rc and /vendor/firmware
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r_dir_file(ueventd, { vendor_file_type -vendor_app_file -vendor_overlay_file })
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# Get file contexts for new device nodes
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allow ueventd file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Use setfscreatecon() to label /dev directories and files.
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allow ueventd self:process setfscreate;
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# Allow ueventd to read androidboot.android_dt_dir from kernel cmdline.
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allow ueventd proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
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# Everything is labeled as rootfs in recovery mode. ueventd has to execute
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# the dynamic linker and shared libraries.
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recovery_only(`
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allow ueventd rootfs:file { r_file_perms execute };
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')
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# Suppress denials for ueventd to getattr /postinstall. This occurs when the
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# linker tries to resolve paths in ld.config.txt.
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dontaudit ueventd postinstall_mnt_dir:dir getattr;
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# ueventd loads modules in response to modalias events.
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allow ueventd self:global_capability_class_set sys_module;
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allow ueventd vendor_file:system module_load;
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allow ueventd kernel:key search;
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#####
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##### neverallow rules
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#####
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# ueventd must never set properties, otherwise deadlocks may occur.
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# https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/133120/6/init/devices.cpp@941
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# No writing to the property socket, connecting to init, or setting properties.
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neverallow ueventd property_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow ueventd init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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neverallow ueventd property_type:property_service set;
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# Restrict ueventd access on block devices to maintenence operations.
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neverallow ueventd dev_type:blk_file ~{ getattr relabelfrom relabelto create setattr unlink };
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# Only relabelto as we would never want to relabelfrom port_device
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neverallow ueventd port_device:chr_file ~{ getattr create setattr unlink relabelto };
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# Nobody should be able to ptrace ueventd
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neverallow * ueventd:process ptrace;
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