342362ae3e
kernel commit 2a4c22426955d4fc04069811997b7390c0fb858e (fs: switch order of CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH checks) swapped the order of dac_override and dac_read_search checks. Domains that have dac_override will now generate spurious denials for dac_read_search unless they also have that permission. Since dac_override is a strict superset of dac_read_search, grant dac_read_search to all domains that already have dac_override to get rid of the denials. Bug: 114280985 Bug: crbug.com/877588 Test: Booted on a device running 4.14. Change-Id: I5c1c136b775cceeb7f170e139e8d4279e73267a4
75 lines
3 KiB
Text
75 lines
3 KiB
Text
# ueventd seclabel is specified in init.rc since
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# it lives in the rootfs and has no unique file type.
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type ueventd, domain;
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# Write to /dev/kmsg.
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allow ueventd kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow ueventd self:global_capability_class_set { chown mknod net_admin setgid fsetid sys_rawio dac_override dac_read_search fowner };
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allow ueventd device:file create_file_perms;
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r_dir_file(ueventd, rootfs)
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# ueventd needs write access to files in /sys to regenerate uevents
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allow ueventd sysfs_type:file w_file_perms;
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r_dir_file(ueventd, sysfs_type)
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allow ueventd sysfs_type:{ file lnk_file } { relabelfrom relabelto setattr };
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allow ueventd sysfs_type:dir { relabelfrom relabelto setattr };
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allow ueventd tmpfs:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow ueventd dev_type:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow ueventd dev_type:lnk_file { create unlink };
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allow ueventd dev_type:chr_file { getattr create setattr unlink };
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allow ueventd dev_type:blk_file { getattr relabelfrom relabelto create setattr unlink };
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allow ueventd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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allow ueventd efs_file:dir search;
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allow ueventd efs_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Get SELinux enforcing status.
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r_dir_file(ueventd, selinuxfs)
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# Access for /vendor/ueventd.rc and /vendor/firmware
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r_dir_file(ueventd, { vendor_file_type -vendor_app_file -vendor_overlay_file })
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# Get file contexts for new device nodes
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allow ueventd file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Use setfscreatecon() to label /dev directories and files.
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allow ueventd self:process setfscreate;
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# Allow ueventd to read androidboot.android_dt_dir from kernel cmdline.
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allow ueventd proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
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# Everything is labeled as rootfs in recovery mode. ueventd has to execute
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# the dynamic linker and shared libraries.
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recovery_only(`
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allow ueventd rootfs:file { r_file_perms execute };
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')
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# Suppress denials for ueventd to getattr /postinstall. This occurs when the
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# linker tries to resolve paths in ld.config.txt.
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dontaudit ueventd postinstall_mnt_dir:dir getattr;
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# ueventd loads modules in response to modalias events.
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allow ueventd self:global_capability_class_set sys_module;
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allow ueventd vendor_file:system module_load;
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allow ueventd kernel:key search;
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#####
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##### neverallow rules
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#####
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# ueventd must never set properties, otherwise deadlocks may occur.
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# https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/133120/6/init/devices.cpp@941
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# No writing to the property socket, connecting to init, or setting properties.
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neverallow ueventd property_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow ueventd init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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neverallow ueventd property_type:property_service set;
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# Restrict ueventd access on block devices to maintenence operations.
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neverallow ueventd dev_type:blk_file ~{ getattr relabelfrom relabelto create setattr unlink };
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# Only relabelto as we would never want to relabelfrom kmem_device or port_device
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neverallow ueventd { kmem_device port_device }:chr_file ~{ getattr create setattr unlink relabelto };
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# Nobody should be able to ptrace ueventd
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neverallow * ueventd:process ptrace;
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