platform_system_sepolicy/prebuilts/api/29.0/private/traced_probes.te
Pirama Arumuga Nainar b65824642b In native coverage builds, allow all domains to access /data/misc/trace
Bug: http://b/135139675

Coverage files are written to /data/misc/trace (governed by the
method_trace_data_file selinux type).  Allow all domains to access
(create directories, access files) this directory when native coverage
is enabled (by setting NATIVE_COVERAGE to true) in an userdebug or eng
build.

Also relax neverallow constraints to allow access to
method_trace_data_file for native coverage builds.

Test: Build 32-bit cuttlefish with coverage:
          m NATIVE_COVERAGE=true COVERAGE_PATHS="*"
      and verify that there are no selinux denials in kernel log and
      logcat.

Change-Id: I3fe7c77612854b9de7de7a0ddd5cbf44a2f5c21e
(cherry picked from commit ce9c0c5a5f)
2019-06-19 16:27:17 -07:00

125 lines
4.6 KiB
Text

# Perfetto tracing probes, has tracefs access.
type traced_probes_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
# Allow init to exec the daemon.
init_daemon_domain(traced_probes)
# Write trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires connecting to its
# producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
allow traced_probes traced:fd use;
allow traced_probes traced_tmpfs:file { read write getattr map };
unix_socket_connect(traced_probes, traced_producer, traced)
# Allow traced_probes to access tracefs.
allow traced_probes debugfs_tracing:dir r_dir_perms;
allow traced_probes debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
allow traced_probes debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
# TODO(primiano): temporarily I/O tracing categories are still
# userdebug only until we nail down the blacklist/whitelist.
userdebug_or_eng(`
allow traced_probes debugfs_tracing_debug:dir r_dir_perms;
allow traced_probes debugfs_tracing_debug:file rw_file_perms;
')
# Allow traced_probes to start with a higher scheduling class and then downgrade
# itself.
allow traced_probes self:global_capability_class_set { sys_nice };
# Allow procfs access
r_dir_file(traced_probes, domain)
# Allow to read packages.list file.
allow traced_probes packages_list_file:file r_file_perms;
# Allow to log to kernel dmesg when starting / stopping ftrace.
allow traced_probes kmsg_device:chr_file write;
# Allow traced_probes to list the system partition.
allow traced_probes system_file:dir { open read };
# Allow traced_probes to list some of the data partition.
allow traced_probes self:global_capability_class_set dac_read_search;
allow traced_probes apk_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
allow traced_probes dalvikcache_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
userdebug_or_eng(`
# search and getattr are granted via domain and coredomain, respectively.
allow traced_probes system_data_file:dir { open read };
')
allow traced_probes system_app_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
allow traced_probes backup_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
allow traced_probes bootstat_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
allow traced_probes update_engine_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
allow traced_probes update_engine_log_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
allow traced_probes user_profile_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
# Allow traced_probes to run atrace. atrace pokes at system services to enable
# their userspace TRACE macros.
domain_auto_trans(traced_probes, atrace_exec, atrace);
# Allow traced_probes to kill atrace on timeout.
allow traced_probes atrace:process sigkill;
# Allow traced_probes to access /proc files for system stats.
# Note: trace data is NOT exposed to anything other than shell and privileged
# system apps that have access to the traced consumer socket.
allow traced_probes {
proc_meminfo
proc_vmstat
proc_stat
}:file r_file_perms;
# Allow access to the IHealth and IPowerStats HAL service for tracing battery counters.
hal_client_domain(traced_probes, hal_health)
hal_client_domain(traced_probes, hal_power_stats)
# On debug builds allow to ingest system logs into the trace.
userdebug_or_eng(`read_logd(traced_probes)')
###
### Neverallow rules
###
### traced_probes should NEVER do any of this
# Disallow mapping executable memory (execstack and exec are already disallowed
# globally in domain.te).
neverallow traced_probes self:process execmem;
# Block device access.
neverallow traced_probes dev_type:blk_file { read write };
# ptrace any other app
neverallow traced_probes domain:process ptrace;
# Disallows access to /data files.
neverallow traced_probes {
data_file_type
-apk_data_file
-dalvikcache_data_file
-system_data_file
-system_app_data_file
-backup_data_file
-bootstat_data_file
-update_engine_data_file
-update_engine_log_data_file
-user_profile_data_file
# TODO(b/72998741) Remove vendor_data_file exemption. Further restricted in a
# subsequent neverallow. Currently only getattr and search are allowed.
-vendor_data_file
-zoneinfo_data_file
with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
}:dir *;
neverallow traced_probes system_data_file:dir ~{ getattr userdebug_or_eng(`open read') search };
neverallow traced_probes zoneinfo_data_file:dir ~r_dir_perms;
neverallow traced_probes { data_file_type -zoneinfo_data_file }:lnk_file *;
neverallow traced_probes {
data_file_type
-zoneinfo_data_file
-packages_list_file
with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
}:file *;
# Only init is allowed to enter the traced_probes domain via exec()
neverallow { domain -init } traced_probes:process transition;
neverallow * traced_probes:process dyntransition;