platform_system_sepolicy/private/traced.te
Nolan Scobie 1f448fcf50 Allow Perfetto's traced daemon to set debug sysprops
This is required for the android.sdk_sysprop_guard data source
implemented in traced's builtin producers to set the system properties
that guard Skia's inititialization of the Perfetto SDK and track_event
data source in SurfaceFlinger/RenderEngine and HWUI apps.

Bug: 279614916
Test: presubmit?
Change-Id: Ia04014336e86672e54c21883533afe70fcb83e84
2023-05-10 10:44:20 -04:00

125 lines
4.5 KiB
Text

# Perfetto user-space tracing daemon (unprivileged)
type traced_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
# Allow init to exec the daemon.
init_daemon_domain(traced)
tmpfs_domain(traced)
# Allow apps in other MLS contexts (for multi-user) to access
# share memory buffers created by traced.
typeattribute traced_tmpfs mlstrustedobject;
# Allow traced to start with a lower scheduling class and change
# class accordingly to what defined in the config provided by
# the privileged process that controls it.
allow traced self:global_capability_class_set { sys_nice };
# Allow to pass a file descriptor for the output trace from "perfetto" (the
# cmdline client) and other shell binaries to traced and let traced write
# directly into that (rather than returning the trace contents over the socket).
allow traced perfetto:fd use;
allow traced shell:fd use;
allow traced shell:fifo_file { read write };
# Allow the service to create new files within /data/misc/perfetto-traces.
allow traced perfetto_traces_data_file:file create_file_perms;
allow traced perfetto_traces_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
# Allow traceur to pass open file descriptors to traced, so traced can directly
# write into the output file without doing roundtrips over IPC.
allow traced traceur_app:fd use;
allow traced trace_data_file:file { read write };
# Allow perfetto to access the proxy service for notifying Traceur.
allow traced tracingproxy_service:service_manager find;
binder_use(traced);
binder_call(traced, system_server);
# Allow traced to use shared memory supplied by producers. Typically, traced
# (i.e. the tracing service) creates the shared memory used for data transfer
# from the producer. This rule allows an alternative scheme, where the producer
# creates the shared memory, that is then adopted by traced (after validating
# that it is appropriately sealed).
# This list has to replicate the tmpfs domains of all applicable domains that
# have perfetto_producer() macro applied to them.
# perfetto_tmpfs excluded as it should never need to use the producer-supplied
# shared memory scheme.
allow traced {
appdomain_tmpfs
heapprofd_tmpfs
surfaceflinger_tmpfs
traced_probes_tmpfs
userdebug_or_eng(`system_server_tmpfs')
}:file { getattr map read write };
# Allow setting debug properties which guard initialization of the Perfetto SDK
# in SurfaceFlinger and HWUI's copy of Skia.
# Required for the android.sdk_sysprop_guard data source.
# TODO(b/281329340): remove this when no longer needed.
set_prop(traced, debug_prop)
# Allow traced to notify Traceur when a trace ends by setting the
# sys.trace.trace_end_signal property.
set_prop(traced, system_trace_prop)
# Allow to lazily start producers.
set_prop(traced, traced_lazy_prop)
# Allow tracking the count of sessions intercepting Java OutOfMemoryError
# If there are such tracing sessions and an OutOfMemoryError is thrown by ART,
# the hprof plugin intercepts the error, lazily registers a data source to
# traced and collects a heap dump.
set_prop(traced, traced_oome_heap_session_count_prop)
# Allow traced to talk to statsd for logging metrics.
unix_socket_send(traced, statsdw, statsd)
###
### Neverallow rules
###
### traced should NEVER do any of this
# Disallow mapping executable memory (execstack and exec are already disallowed
# globally in domain.te).
neverallow traced self:process execmem;
# Block device access.
neverallow traced dev_type:blk_file { read write };
# ptrace any other process
neverallow traced domain:process ptrace;
# Disallows access to /data files, still allowing to write to file descriptors
# passed through the socket.
neverallow traced {
data_file_type
-perfetto_traces_data_file
-system_data_file
-system_data_root_file
-media_userdir_file
-system_userdir_file
-vendor_userdir_file
# TODO(b/72998741) Remove vendor_data_file exemption. Further restricted in a
# subsequent neverallow. Currently only getattr and search are allowed.
-vendor_data_file
with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
}:dir *;
neverallow traced { system_data_file }:dir ~{ getattr search };
neverallow traced {
data_file_type
-perfetto_traces_data_file
-trace_data_file
with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
}:file ~write;
# Only init is allowed to enter the traced domain via exec()
neverallow { domain -init } traced:process transition;
neverallow * traced:process dyntransition;
# Limit the processes that can access tracingproxy_service.
neverallow {
domain
-traced
-dumpstate
-traceur_app
-shell
-system_server
-perfetto
} tracingproxy_service:service_manager find;