19f4998480
The test was failing because of a selinux denial. This adds the required rule. Test: atest (previously failing CTS test passed) Change-Id: Ieb99f9ab4c6014a3d0aa1fe6c6fb6b82fa9b7631
76 lines
2.7 KiB
Text
76 lines
2.7 KiB
Text
# Perfetto user-space tracing daemon (unprivileged)
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# type traced is defined under /public (because iorapd rules
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# under public/ need to refer to it).
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type traced_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
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type traced_tmpfs, file_type;
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# Allow init to exec the daemon.
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init_daemon_domain(traced)
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tmpfs_domain(traced)
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# Allow apps in other MLS contexts (for multi-user) to access
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# share memory buffers created by traced.
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typeattribute traced_tmpfs mlstrustedobject;
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# Allow traced to start with a lower scheduling class and change
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# class accordingly to what defined in the config provided by
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# the privileged process that controls it.
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allow traced self:global_capability_class_set { sys_nice };
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# Allow to pass a file descriptor for the output trace from "perfetto" (the
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# cmdline client) and other shell binaries to traced and let traced write
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# directly into that (rather than returning the trace contents over the socket).
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allow traced perfetto:fd use;
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allow traced shell:fd use;
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allow traced shell:fifo_file { read write };
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allow traced perfetto_traces_data_file:file { read write };
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# Allow traceur to pass open file descriptors to traced, so traced can directly
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# write into the output file without doing roundtrips over IPC.
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allow traced traceur_app:fd use;
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allow traced trace_data_file:file { read write };
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# Allow iorapd to pass memfd descriptors to traced, so traced can directly
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# write into the shmem buffer file without doing roundtrips over IPC.
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allow traced iorapd:fd use;
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allow traced iorapd_tmpfs:file { read write };
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###
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### Neverallow rules
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###
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### traced should NEVER do any of this
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# Disallow mapping executable memory (execstack and exec are already disallowed
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# globally in domain.te).
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neverallow traced self:process execmem;
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# Block device access.
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neverallow traced dev_type:blk_file { read write };
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# ptrace any other process
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neverallow traced domain:process ptrace;
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# Disallows access to /data files, still allowing to write to file descriptors
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# passed through the socket.
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neverallow traced {
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data_file_type
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-system_data_file
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# TODO(b/72998741) Remove vendor_data_file exemption. Further restricted in a
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# subsequent neverallow. Currently only getattr and search are allowed.
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-vendor_data_file
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-zoneinfo_data_file
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}:dir *;
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neverallow traced { system_data_file }:dir ~{ getattr search };
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neverallow traced zoneinfo_data_file:dir ~r_dir_perms;
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neverallow traced { data_file_type -zoneinfo_data_file }:lnk_file *;
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neverallow traced {
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data_file_type
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-zoneinfo_data_file
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-perfetto_traces_data_file
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-trace_data_file
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}:file ~write;
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# Only init is allowed to enter the traced domain via exec()
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neverallow { domain -init } traced:process transition;
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neverallow * traced:process dyntransition;
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