platform_system_sepolicy/private/vold.te

typeattribute vold coredomain;

init_daemon_domain(vold)

# Switch to more restrictive domains when executing common tools
domain_auto_trans(vold, sgdisk_exec, sgdisk);
domain_auto_trans(vold, sdcardd_exec, sdcardd);
domain_auto_trans(vold, fuseblkd_untrusted_exec, fuseblkd_untrusted);

# Switch to e2fs domain when running mkfs.ext4 to format a partition
domain_auto_trans(vold, e2fs_exec, e2fs);


# For a handful of probing tools, we choose an even more restrictive
# domain when working with untrusted block devices
domain_trans(vold, blkid_exec, blkid);
domain_trans(vold, blkid_exec, blkid_untrusted);
domain_trans(vold, fsck_exec, fsck);
domain_trans(vold, fsck_exec, fsck_untrusted);

# Newly created storage dirs are always treated as mount stubs to prevent us
# from accidentally writing when the mount point isn't present.
type_transition vold storage_file:dir storage_stub_file;
type_transition vold mnt_media_rw_file:dir mnt_media_rw_stub_file;

# Property Service
get_prop(vold, vold_config_prop)
get_prop(vold, storage_config_prop);
get_prop(vold, incremental_prop);
get_prop(vold, gsid_prop);

set_prop(vold, vold_prop)
set_prop(vold, vold_status_prop)
set_prop(vold, powerctl_prop)
set_prop(vold, ctl_fuse_prop)
set_prop(vold, restorecon_prop)
set_prop(vold, ota_prop)
set_prop(vold, boottime_prop)
set_prop(vold, boottime_public_prop)

# Vold will use Keystore instead of using Keymint directly. But it still needs
# to manage its Keymint blobs. This is why it needs the `manage_blob` permission.
allow vold vold_key:keystore2_key {
    convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral
    delete
    get_info
    manage_blob
    rebind
    req_forced_op
    update
    use
};

# vold needs to call keystore methods
allow vold keystore:binder call;

# vold needs to find keystore2 services
allow vold keystore_service:service_manager find;
allow vold keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;

# vold needs to be able to call earlyBootEnded() and deleteAllKeys()
allow vold keystore:keystore2 early_boot_ended;
allow vold keystore:keystore2 delete_all_keys;

is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_UNLOCKED_STORAGE_API, `
    allow vold storage_area_app_dir:dir search;
    # Allow vold to get the encryption policy and
    # verify the ownership of storage areas
    allow vold storage_area_dir:dir {
        read
        open
        getattr
        ioctl
    };
')

# when a storage area is created (with `openStorageArea`), vold creates the key
# and when a storage area is deleted (with `deleteStorageArea`), vold deletes the key
is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_UNLOCKED_STORAGE_API, `
  allow vold storage_area_key_file:file create_file_perms;
  allow vold storage_area_key_file:dir create_dir_perms;
')

# Allow vold to create and delete per-user directories like /data/user/$userId.
allow vold {
    media_userdir_file
    system_userdir_file
    vendor_userdir_file
}:dir {
    add_name
    remove_name
    write
};

# Read already opened /cache files.
allow vold cache_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow vold cache_file:file { getattr read };
allow vold cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;

r_dir_file(vold, { sysfs_type -sysfs_batteryinfo })
# XXX Label sysfs files with a specific type?
allow vold {
  sysfs # writing to /sys/*/uevent during coldboot.
  sysfs_devices_block
  sysfs_dm
  sysfs_loop # writing to /sys/block/loop*/uevent during coldboot.
  sysfs_usb
  sysfs_zram_uevent
  sysfs_fs_f2fs
}:file w_file_perms;

r_dir_file(vold, rootfs)
r_dir_file(vold, metadata_file)
allow vold {
  proc # b/67049235 processes /proc/<pid>/* files are mislabeled.
  proc_bootconfig
  proc_cmdline
  proc_drop_caches
  proc_filesystems
  proc_meminfo
  proc_mounts
}:file r_file_perms;

#Get file contexts
allow vold file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;

# Allow us to jump into execution domains of above tools
allow vold self:process setexec;

# For formatting adoptable storage devices
allow vold e2fs_exec:file rx_file_perms;

# Run fstrim on mounted partitions
# allowxperm still requires the ioctl permission for the individual type
allowxperm vold { fs_type file_type }:dir ioctl FITRIM;

# Get/set file-based encryption policies on dirs in /data and adoptable storage,
# and add/remove file-based encryption keys.
allowxperm vold data_file_type:dir ioctl {
  FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
  FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX
  FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
  FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY
  FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY
  FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS
};

# Allow securely erasing crypto key files. F2FS_IOC_SEC_TRIM_FILE is
# tried first. Otherwise, FS_IOC_FIEMAP is needed to get the
# location of the file's blocks on the raw block device to erase.
allowxperm vold {
  vold_data_file
  vold_metadata_file
  is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_UNLOCKED_STORAGE_API, `storage_area_key_file')
}:file ioctl {
  F2FS_IOC_SEC_TRIM_FILE
  FS_IOC_FIEMAP
};

typeattribute vold mlstrustedsubject;
allow vold self:process setfscreate;
allow vold system_file:file x_file_perms;
not_full_treble(`allow vold vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
allow vold block_device:dir create_dir_perms;
allow vold device:dir write;
allow vold devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow vold rootfs:dir mounton;
allow vold { sdcard_type fuse }:dir mounton; # TODO: deprecated in M
allow vold { sdcard_type fuse }:filesystem { mount remount unmount }; # TODO: deprecated in M

# Manage locations where storage is mounted
allow vold { mnt_media_rw_file storage_file sdcard_type fuse }:dir create_dir_perms;
allow vold { mnt_media_rw_file storage_file sdcard_type fuse }:file create_file_perms;

# Access to storage that backs emulated FUSE daemons for migration optimization
allow vold media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow vold media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Allow mounting (lower filesystem) on parts of media for performance
allow vold media_rw_data_file:dir mounton;

# Allow setting project quota IDs and enabling project ID inheritance on
# /data/media/$userId/* and /mnt/expand/$volume/media/$userId/*
allowxperm vold media_rw_data_file:{ dir file } ioctl {
  FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR
  FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR
  FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
  FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
};

# Allow mounting of storage devices
allow vold { mnt_media_rw_stub_file storage_stub_file }:dir { mounton create rmdir getattr setattr };

# Manage per-user primary symlinks
allow vold mnt_user_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
allow vold mnt_user_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
allow vold mnt_user_file:file create_file_perms;

# Manage per-user pass_through primary symlinks
allow vold mnt_pass_through_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
allow vold mnt_pass_through_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;

# Allow to create and mount expanded storage
allow vold mnt_expand_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
allow vold apk_data_file:dir { create getattr setattr };
allow vold shell_data_file:dir { create getattr setattr };
allow vold system_userdir_file:dir { create getattr setattr };
allow vold media_userdir_file:dir { create getattr setattr open read ioctl };
# Needed to set the casefold flag on /mnt/expand/$volume/media
allowxperm vold media_userdir_file:dir ioctl { FS_IOC_GETFLAGS FS_IOC_SETFLAGS };

# Allow to mount incremental file system on /data/incremental and create files
allow vold apk_data_file:dir { mounton rw_dir_perms };
# Allow to create and write files in /data/incremental
allow vold apk_data_file:file { rw_file_perms unlink };
# Allow to bind-mount incremental file system on /data/app/vmdl*.tmp and read files
allow vold apk_tmp_file:dir { mounton r_dir_perms };
# Allow to read incremental control file and call selinux restorecon on it
allow vold incremental_control_file:file { r_file_perms relabelto };

allow vold tmpfs:filesystem { mount unmount };
allow vold tmpfs:dir create_dir_perms;
allow vold tmpfs:dir mounton;
allow vold self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin dac_override dac_read_search mknod sys_admin chown fowner fsetid };
allow vold self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
allow vold loop_control_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow vold loop_device:blk_file { create setattr unlink rw_file_perms };
allowxperm vold loop_device:blk_file ioctl {
  LOOP_CLR_FD
  LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE
  LOOP_GET_STATUS64
  LOOP_SET_FD
  LOOP_SET_STATUS64
};
allow vold vold_device:blk_file { create setattr unlink rw_file_perms };
allowxperm vold vold_device:blk_file ioctl { BLKDISCARD BLKGETSIZE };
allow vold dm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow vold dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allowxperm vold dm_device:blk_file ioctl { BLKDISCARD BLKSECDISCARD BLKREPORTZONE BLKRESETZONE };
# For vold Process::killProcessesWithOpenFiles function.
allow vold domain:dir r_dir_perms;
allow vold domain:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
allow vold domain:process { signal sigkill };
allow vold self:global_capability_class_set { sys_ptrace kill };

allow vold kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;

# Run fsck in the fsck domain.
allow vold fsck_exec:file { r_file_perms execute };

# Log fsck results
allow vold fscklogs:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow vold fscklogs:file create_file_perms;

# Mount and unmount filesystems.
allow vold labeledfs:filesystem { mount unmount remount };

# Create and mount on /data/tmp_mnt and management of expansion mounts
#
# Also rename per-user encrypted directories such as /data/user/10 from their
# temporary name ("10.new") to their final name ("10").
allow vold {
    system_data_file
    system_data_root_file
}:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
allow vold system_data_file:lnk_file getattr;

# Vold create users in /data/vendor_{ce,de}/[0-9]+
allow vold vendor_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;

# for secdiscard
allow vold system_data_file:file read;

# Set scheduling policy of kernel processes
allow vold kernel:process setsched;

# ASEC
allow vold asec_image_file:file create_file_perms;
allow vold asec_image_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow vold asec_apk_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton relabelfrom relabelto };
allow vold asec_public_file:dir { relabelto setattr };
allow vold asec_apk_file:file { r_file_perms setattr relabelfrom relabelto };
allow vold asec_public_file:file { relabelto setattr };
# restorecon files in asec containers created on 4.2 or earlier.
allow vold unlabeled:dir { r_dir_perms setattr relabelfrom };
allow vold unlabeled:file { r_file_perms setattr relabelfrom };

# Access to FUSE control filesystem to hard-abort FUSE mounts
allow vold fusectlfs:file rw_file_perms;
allow vold fusectlfs:dir rw_dir_perms;

# Allow vold to use wake locks.  Needed for idle maintenance and moving storage.
wakelock_use(vold)

# Allow vold to publish a binder service and make binder calls.
binder_use(vold)
add_service(vold, vold_service)

# Allow vold to call into the system server so it can check permissions.
binder_call(vold, system_server)
allow vold permission_service:service_manager find;

# talk to health storage HAL
hal_client_domain(vold, hal_health_storage)

# talk to bootloader HAL
full_treble_only(`hal_client_domain(vold, hal_bootctl)')

# Access userdata block device.
allow vold userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allowxperm vold userdata_block_device:blk_file ioctl BLKSECDISCARD;

# Access zoned block device.
allow vold zoned_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;

# Access metadata block device used for encryption meta-data.
allow vold metadata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allowxperm vold metadata_block_device:blk_file ioctl BLKSECDISCARD;

# Allow vold to manipulate /data/unencrypted
allow vold unencrypted_data_file:{ file } create_file_perms;
allow vold unencrypted_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;

# Write to /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
allow vold proc_drop_caches:file w_file_perms;

# Give vold a place where only vold can store files; everyone else is off limits
allow vold vold_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow vold vold_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# And a similar place in the metadata partition
allow vold vold_metadata_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow vold vold_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;

# linux keyring configuration
allow vold init:key { write search setattr };
allow vold vold:key { write search setattr };

# vold temporarily changes its priority when running benchmarks
allow vold self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;

# vold needs to chroot into app namespaces to remount when runtime permissions change
allow vold self:global_capability_class_set sys_chroot;
allow vold storage_file:dir mounton;

# For AppFuse.
allow vold fuse_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow vold fuse:filesystem { relabelfrom };
allow vold app_fusefs:filesystem { relabelfrom relabelto };
allow vold app_fusefs:filesystem { mount unmount };
allow vold app_fuse_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow vold app_fuse_file:file { read write open getattr append };

# MoveStorage.cpp executes cp and rm
allow vold toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;

# Prepare profile dir for users.
allow vold { user_profile_data_file user_profile_root_file }:dir create_dir_perms;

# Raw writes to misc block device
allow vold misc_block_device:blk_file w_file_perms;

# vold might need to search or mount /mnt/vendor/*
allow vold mnt_vendor_file:dir search;

dontaudit vold self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;

# Allow ReadDefaultFstab().
read_fstab(vold)

# vold might need to search loopback apex files
allow vold vendor_apex_file:file r_file_perms;

###
### Neverallow rules
###

neverallow {
    domain
    -system_server
    -vdc
    -vold
    -update_verifier
    -apexd
    -gsid
} vold_service:service_manager find;

# Only vold should create (and delete) per-user directories like
# /data/user/$userId.  This is very important, as these directories need to be
# encrypted with per-user keys, which only vold can do.  Encryption can only be
# set up on empty directories, so creation and encryption must happen together.
neverallow {
    domain
    -vold
    -data_between_core_and_vendor_violators
} {
    media_userdir_file
    system_userdir_file
    vendor_userdir_file
}:dir {
    add_name
    remove_name
    write
};

# Only vold and init should ever set file-based encryption policies.
neverallowxperm {
  domain
  -vold
  -init
  -vendor_init
  is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_UNLOCKED_STORAGE_API, ` -vold_prepare_subdirs ')
} data_file_type:dir ioctl { FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY };

# Only vold should ever add/remove file-based encryption keys.
neverallowxperm {
  domain
  -vold
} data_file_type:dir ioctl { FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS };

neverallow {
    domain
    -vold
    -vold_prepare_subdirs
} vold_data_file:dir ~{ open create read getattr setattr search relabelfrom relabelto ioctl };

neverallow {
    domain
    -init
    -vold
    -vold_prepare_subdirs
} vold_data_file:dir *;

neverallow {
    domain
    -init
    -vold
} vold_metadata_file:dir *;

neverallow {
    domain
    -kernel
    -vold
    -vold_prepare_subdirs
} vold_data_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };

neverallow {
    domain
    -init
    -vold
    -vold_prepare_subdirs
} vold_metadata_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };

neverallow {
    domain
    -init
    -kernel
    -vold
    -vold_prepare_subdirs
} { vold_data_file vold_metadata_file }:notdevfile_class_set *;

neverallow { domain -vold -init } restorecon_prop:property_service set;

neverallow vold {
  domain
  -hal_health_storage_server
  -hal_keymaster_server
  -system_suspend_server
  -hal_bootctl_server
  -hwservicemanager
  -keystore
  -servicemanager
  -system_server
  userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
}:binder call;

neverallow vold fsck_exec:file execute_no_trans;
neverallow { domain -init } vold:process { transition dyntransition };
neverallow vold *:process ptrace;
neverallow vold *:rawip_socket *;