a0e7a6da28
See https://source.android.com/setup/contribute/respectful-code for reference Bug: 161896447 Change-Id: I0caf39b349c48e44123775d98c52a773b0b504ff
119 lines
4.8 KiB
Text
119 lines
4.8 KiB
Text
###
|
|
### Services with isolatedProcess=true in their manifest.
|
|
###
|
|
### This file defines the rules for isolated apps. An "isolated
|
|
### app" is an APP with UID between AID_ISOLATED_START (99000)
|
|
### and AID_ISOLATED_END (99999).
|
|
###
|
|
|
|
typeattribute isolated_app coredomain;
|
|
|
|
app_domain(isolated_app)
|
|
|
|
# Access already open app data files received over Binder or local socket IPC.
|
|
allow isolated_app app_data_file:file { append read write getattr lock };
|
|
|
|
allow isolated_app activity_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow isolated_app display_service:service_manager find;
|
|
allow isolated_app webviewupdate_service:service_manager find;
|
|
|
|
# Google Breakpad (crash reporter for Chrome) relies on ptrace
|
|
# functionality. Without the ability to ptrace, the crash reporter
|
|
# tool is broken.
|
|
# b/20150694
|
|
# https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=475270
|
|
allow isolated_app self:process ptrace;
|
|
|
|
# b/32896414: Allow accessing sdcard file descriptors passed to isolated_apps
|
|
# by other processes. Open should never be allowed, and is blocked by
|
|
# neverallow rules below.
|
|
# media_rw_data_file is included for sdcardfs, and can be removed if sdcardfs
|
|
# is modified to change the secontext when accessing the lower filesystem.
|
|
allow isolated_app { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:file { read write append getattr lock };
|
|
|
|
# For webviews, isolated_app processes can be forked from the webview_zygote
|
|
# in addition to the zygote. Allow access to resources inherited from the
|
|
# webview_zygote process. These rules are specialized copies of the ones in app.te.
|
|
# Inherit FDs from the webview_zygote.
|
|
allow isolated_app webview_zygote:fd use;
|
|
# Notify webview_zygote of child death.
|
|
allow isolated_app webview_zygote:process sigchld;
|
|
# Inherit logd write socket.
|
|
allow isolated_app webview_zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
|
|
# Read system properties managed by webview_zygote.
|
|
allow isolated_app webview_zygote_tmpfs:file read;
|
|
|
|
# TODO (b/63631799) fix this access
|
|
# suppress denials to /data/local/tmp
|
|
dontaudit isolated_app shell_data_file:dir search;
|
|
|
|
# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
|
|
# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
|
|
allow isolated_app traced:fd use;
|
|
allow isolated_app traced_tmpfs:file { read write getattr map };
|
|
unix_socket_connect(isolated_app, traced_producer, traced)
|
|
|
|
#####
|
|
##### Neverallow
|
|
#####
|
|
|
|
# Do not allow isolated_app to directly open tun_device
|
|
neverallow isolated_app tun_device:chr_file open;
|
|
|
|
# Isolated apps should not directly open app data files themselves.
|
|
neverallow isolated_app app_data_file:file open;
|
|
|
|
# Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
|
|
# TODO: are there situations where isolated_apps write to this file?
|
|
# TODO: should we tighten these restrictions further?
|
|
neverallow isolated_app anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
|
|
neverallow isolated_app anr_data_file:dir ~search;
|
|
|
|
# Isolated apps must not be permitted to use HwBinder
|
|
neverallow isolated_app hwbinder_device:chr_file *;
|
|
neverallow isolated_app *:hwservice_manager *;
|
|
|
|
# Isolated apps must not be permitted to use VndBinder
|
|
neverallow isolated_app vndbinder_device:chr_file *;
|
|
|
|
# Isolated apps must not be permitted to perform actions on Binder and VndBinder service_manager
|
|
# except the find actions for services allowlisted below.
|
|
neverallow isolated_app *:service_manager ~find;
|
|
|
|
# b/17487348
|
|
# Isolated apps can only access three services,
|
|
# activity_service, display_service and webviewupdate_service.
|
|
neverallow isolated_app {
|
|
service_manager_type
|
|
-activity_service
|
|
-display_service
|
|
-webviewupdate_service
|
|
}:service_manager find;
|
|
|
|
# Isolated apps shouldn't be able to access the driver directly.
|
|
neverallow isolated_app gpu_device:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };
|
|
|
|
# Do not allow isolated_app access to /cache
|
|
neverallow isolated_app cache_file:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
|
|
neverallow isolated_app cache_file:file ~{ read getattr };
|
|
|
|
# Do not allow isolated_app to access external storage, except for files passed
|
|
# via file descriptors (b/32896414).
|
|
neverallow isolated_app { storage_file mnt_user_file sdcard_type }:dir ~getattr;
|
|
neverallow isolated_app { storage_file mnt_user_file }:file_class_set *;
|
|
neverallow isolated_app sdcard_type:{ devfile_class_set lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } *;
|
|
neverallow isolated_app sdcard_type:file ~{ read write append getattr lock };
|
|
|
|
# Do not allow USB access
|
|
neverallow isolated_app { usb_device usbaccessory_device }:chr_file *;
|
|
|
|
# Restrict the webview_zygote control socket.
|
|
neverallow isolated_app webview_zygote:sock_file write;
|
|
|
|
# Limit the /sys files which isolated_app can access. This is important
|
|
# for controlling isolated_app attack surface.
|
|
neverallow isolated_app {
|
|
sysfs_type
|
|
-sysfs_devices_system_cpu
|
|
-sysfs_usb # TODO: check with audio team if needed for isolated_app (b/28417852)
|
|
}:file no_rw_file_perms;
|