9b2e0cbeea
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
141 lines
5.2 KiB
Text
141 lines
5.2 KiB
Text
# network manager
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type netd, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
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type netd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
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net_domain(netd)
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# in addition to ioctls whitelisted for all domains, grant netd priv_sock_ioctls.
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allowxperm netd self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
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r_dir_file(netd, cgroup)
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allow netd system_server:fd use;
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allow netd self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw kill };
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# Note: fsetid is deliberately not included above. fsetid checks are
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# triggered by chmod on a directory or file owned by a group other
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# than one of the groups assigned to the current process to see if
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# the setgid bit should be cleared, regardless of whether the setgid
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# bit was even set. We do not appear to truly need this capability
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# for netd to operate.
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dontaudit netd self:global_capability_class_set fsetid;
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allow netd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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allow netd self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
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allow netd self:netlink_nflog_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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allow netd self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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allow netd self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_read nlmsg_write };
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allow netd self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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allow netd self:netlink_netfilter_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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allow netd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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allow netd system_file:file x_file_perms;
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not_full_treble(`allow netd vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
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allow netd devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# Acquire advisory lock on /system/etc/xtables.lock
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allow netd system_file:file lock;
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# Allow netd to write to qtaguid ctrl file. This is the same privilege level that normal apps have
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# TODO: Add proper rules to prevent other process to access qtaguid_proc file after migration
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# complete
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allow netd qtaguid_proc:file rw_file_perms;
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# Allow netd to read /dev/qtaguid. This is the same privilege level that normal apps have.
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allow netd qtaguid_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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r_dir_file(netd, proc_net)
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# For /proc/sys/net/ipv[46]/route/flush.
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allow netd proc_net:file rw_file_perms;
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# Access for /proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid.
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allow netd proc_overflowuid:file r_file_perms;
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# Enables PppController and interface enumeration (among others)
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allow netd sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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r_dir_file(netd, sysfs_net)
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# Allows setting interface MTU
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allow netd sysfs_net:file w_file_perms;
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# TODO: added to match above sysfs rule. Remove me?
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allow netd sysfs_usb:file write;
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# TODO: netd previously thought it needed these permissions to do WiFi related
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# work. However, after all the WiFi stuff is gone, we still need them.
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# Why?
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allow netd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override chown };
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# Needed to update /data/misc/net/rt_tables
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allow netd net_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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allow netd net_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
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allow netd self:global_capability_class_set fowner;
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# Needed to lock the iptables lock.
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allow netd system_file:file lock;
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# Allow netd to spawn dnsmasq in it's own domain
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allow netd dnsmasq:process signal;
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# Allow netd to start clatd in its own domain
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allow netd clatd:process signal;
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set_prop(netd, ctl_mdnsd_prop)
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set_prop(netd, netd_stable_secret_prop)
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# Allow netd to publish a binder service and make binder calls.
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binder_use(netd)
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add_service(netd, netd_service)
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allow netd dumpstate:fifo_file { getattr write };
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# Allow netd to call into the system server so it can check permissions.
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allow netd system_server:binder call;
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allow netd permission_service:service_manager find;
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# Allow netd to talk to the framework service which collects netd events.
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allow netd netd_listener_service:service_manager find;
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# Allow netd to operate on sockets that are passed to it.
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allow netd netdomain:{
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tcp_socket
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udp_socket
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rawip_socket
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tun_socket
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} { read write getattr setattr getopt setopt };
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allow netd netdomain:fd use;
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# give netd permission to read and write netlink xfrm
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allow netd self:netlink_xfrm_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_write nlmsg_read };
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# Allow netd to register as hal server.
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add_hwservice(netd, system_net_netd_hwservice)
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hwbinder_use(netd)
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get_prop(netd, hwservicemanager_prop)
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###
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### Neverallow rules
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###
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### netd should NEVER do any of this
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# Block device access.
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neverallow netd dev_type:blk_file { read write };
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# ptrace any other app
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neverallow netd { domain }:process ptrace;
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# Write to /system.
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neverallow netd system_file:dir_file_class_set write;
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# Write to files in /data/data or system files on /data
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neverallow netd { app_data_file system_data_file }:dir_file_class_set write;
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# only system_server and dumpstate may find netd service
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neverallow { domain -system_server -dumpstate -netd } netd_service:service_manager find;
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# apps may not interact with netd over binder.
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neverallow appdomain netd:binder call;
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neverallow netd { appdomain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:binder call;
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# persist.netd.stable_secret contains RFC 7217 secret key which should never be
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# leaked to other processes. Make sure it never leaks.
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neverallow { domain -netd -init } netd_stable_secret_prop:file r_file_perms;
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# We want to ensure that no other process ever tries tampering with persist.netd.stable_secret,
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# the RFC 7217 secret key managed by netd. Doing so could compromise user privacy.
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neverallow { domain -netd -init } netd_stable_secret_prop:property_service set;
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