platform_system_sepolicy/public/vold.te
Alan Stokes 7aa40413ae Split user_profile_data_file label.
user_profile_data_file is mlstrustedobject. And it needs to be,
because we want untrusted apps to be able to write to their profile
files, but they do not have levels.

But now we want to apply levels in the parent directories that have
the same label, and we want them to work so they need to not be
MLS-exempt. To resolve that we introduce a new label,
user_profile_root_file, which is applied to those directories (but no
files). We grant mostly the same access to the new label as
directories with the existing label.

Apart from appdomain, almost every domain which accesses
user_profile_data_file, and now user_profile_root_file, is already
mlstrustedsubject and so can't be affected by this change. The
exception is postinstall_dexopt which we now make mlstrustedobject.

Bug: 141677108
Bug: 175311045
Test: Manual: flash with wipe
Test: Manual: flash on top of older version
Test: Manual: install & uninstall apps
Test: Manual: create & remove user
Test: Presubmits.
Change-Id: I4e0def3d513b129d6c292f7edb076db341b4a2b3
2020-12-11 17:35:06 +00:00

357 lines
12 KiB
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# volume manager
type vold, domain;
type vold_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
# Read already opened /cache files.
allow vold cache_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow vold cache_file:file { getattr read };
allow vold cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
r_dir_file(vold, { sysfs_type -sysfs_batteryinfo })
# XXX Label sysfs files with a specific type?
allow vold {
sysfs # writing to /sys/*/uevent during coldboot.
sysfs_devices_block
sysfs_dm
sysfs_loop # writing to /sys/block/loop*/uevent during coldboot.
sysfs_usb
sysfs_zram_uevent
sysfs_fs_f2fs
}:file w_file_perms;
r_dir_file(vold, rootfs)
r_dir_file(vold, metadata_file)
allow vold {
proc # b/67049235 processes /proc/<pid>/* files are mislabeled.
proc_cmdline
proc_drop_caches
proc_filesystems
proc_meminfo
proc_mounts
}:file r_file_perms;
#Get file contexts
allow vold file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
# Allow us to jump into execution domains of above tools
allow vold self:process setexec;
# For formatting adoptable storage devices
allow vold e2fs_exec:file rx_file_perms;
# Run fstrim on mounted partitions
# allowxperm still requires the ioctl permission for the individual type
allowxperm vold { fs_type file_type }:dir ioctl FITRIM;
# Get/set file-based encryption policies on dirs in /data and adoptable storage,
# and add/remove file-based encryption keys.
allowxperm vold data_file_type:dir ioctl {
FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY
FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY
};
# Only vold and init should ever set file-based encryption policies.
neverallowxperm {
domain
-vold
-init
-vendor_init
} data_file_type:dir ioctl { FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY };
# Only vold should ever add/remove file-based encryption keys.
neverallowxperm {
domain
-vold
} data_file_type:dir ioctl { FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY };
# Allow securely erasing crypto key files. F2FS_IOC_SEC_TRIM_FILE is
# tried first. Otherwise, FS_IOC_FIEMAP is needed to get the
# location of the file's blocks on the raw block device to erase.
allowxperm vold {
vold_data_file
vold_metadata_file
}:file ioctl {
F2FS_IOC_SEC_TRIM_FILE
FS_IOC_FIEMAP
};
typeattribute vold mlstrustedsubject;
allow vold self:process setfscreate;
allow vold system_file:file x_file_perms;
not_full_treble(`allow vold vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
allow vold block_device:dir create_dir_perms;
allow vold device:dir write;
allow vold devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow vold rootfs:dir mounton;
allow vold sdcard_type:dir mounton; # TODO: deprecated in M
allow vold sdcard_type:filesystem { mount remount unmount }; # TODO: deprecated in M
allow vold sdcard_type:dir create_dir_perms; # TODO: deprecated in M
allow vold sdcard_type:file create_file_perms; # TODO: deprecated in M
# Manage locations where storage is mounted
allow vold { mnt_media_rw_file storage_file sdcard_type }:dir create_dir_perms;
allow vold { mnt_media_rw_file storage_file sdcard_type }:file create_file_perms;
# Access to storage that backs emulated FUSE daemons for migration optimization
allow vold media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow vold media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Allow mounting (lower filesystem) on parts of media for performance
allow vold media_rw_data_file:dir mounton;
# Allow setting extended attributes (for project quota IDs) on files and dirs
# and to enable project ID inheritance through FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
allowxperm vold media_rw_data_file:{ dir file } ioctl {
FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR
FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR
FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
};
# Allow mounting of storage devices
allow vold { mnt_media_rw_stub_file storage_stub_file }:dir { mounton create rmdir getattr setattr };
# Manage per-user primary symlinks
allow vold mnt_user_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
allow vold mnt_user_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
allow vold mnt_user_file:file create_file_perms;
# Manage per-user pass_through primary symlinks
allow vold mnt_pass_through_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
allow vold mnt_pass_through_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
# Allow to create and mount expanded storage
allow vold mnt_expand_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
allow vold apk_data_file:dir { create getattr setattr };
allow vold shell_data_file:dir { create getattr setattr };
# Allow to mount incremental file system on /data/incremental and create files
allow vold apk_data_file:dir { mounton rw_dir_perms };
# Allow to create and write files in /data/incremental
allow vold apk_data_file:file rw_file_perms;
# Allow to bind-mount incremental file system on /data/app/vmdl*.tmp and read files
allow vold apk_tmp_file:dir { mounton r_dir_perms };
# Allow to read incremental control file and call selinux restorecon on it
allow vold incremental_control_file:file { r_file_perms relabelto };
allow vold tmpfs:filesystem { mount unmount };
allow vold tmpfs:dir create_dir_perms;
allow vold tmpfs:dir mounton;
allow vold self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin dac_override dac_read_search mknod sys_admin chown fowner fsetid };
allow vold self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
allow vold loop_control_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow vold loop_device:blk_file { create setattr unlink rw_file_perms };
allowxperm vold loop_device:blk_file ioctl {
LOOP_CLR_FD
LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE
LOOP_GET_STATUS64
LOOP_SET_FD
LOOP_SET_STATUS64
};
allow vold vold_device:blk_file { create setattr unlink rw_file_perms };
allowxperm vold vold_device:blk_file ioctl { BLKDISCARD BLKGETSIZE };
allow vold dm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow vold dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allowxperm vold dm_device:blk_file ioctl BLKSECDISCARD;
# For vold Process::killProcessesWithOpenFiles function.
allow vold domain:dir r_dir_perms;
allow vold domain:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
allow vold domain:process { signal sigkill };
allow vold self:global_capability_class_set { sys_ptrace kill };
allow vold kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# Run fsck in the fsck domain.
allow vold fsck_exec:file { r_file_perms execute };
# Log fsck results
allow vold fscklogs:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow vold fscklogs:file create_file_perms;
#
# Rules to support encrypted fs support.
#
# Unmount and mount the fs.
allow vold labeledfs:filesystem { mount unmount remount };
# Access /efs/userdata_footer.
# XXX Split into a separate type?
allow vold efs_file:file rw_file_perms;
# Create and mount on /data/tmp_mnt and management of expansion mounts
allow vold {
system_data_file
system_data_root_file
}:dir { create rw_dir_perms mounton setattr rmdir };
allow vold system_data_file:lnk_file getattr;
# Vold create users in /data/vendor_{ce,de}/[0-9]+
allow vold vendor_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
# for secdiscard
allow vold system_data_file:file read;
# Set scheduling policy of kernel processes
allow vold kernel:process setsched;
# ASEC
allow vold asec_image_file:file create_file_perms;
allow vold asec_image_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow vold asec_apk_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton relabelfrom relabelto };
allow vold asec_public_file:dir { relabelto setattr };
allow vold asec_apk_file:file { r_file_perms setattr relabelfrom relabelto };
allow vold asec_public_file:file { relabelto setattr };
# restorecon files in asec containers created on 4.2 or earlier.
allow vold unlabeled:dir { r_dir_perms setattr relabelfrom };
allow vold unlabeled:file { r_file_perms setattr relabelfrom };
# Access to FUSE control filesystem to hard-abort FUSE mounts
allow vold fusectlfs:file rw_file_perms;
allow vold fusectlfs:dir rw_dir_perms;
# Handle wake locks (used for device encryption)
wakelock_use(vold)
# Allow vold to publish a binder service and make binder calls.
binder_use(vold)
add_service(vold, vold_service)
# Allow vold to call into the system server so it can check permissions.
binder_call(vold, system_server)
allow vold permission_service:service_manager find;
# talk to batteryservice
binder_call(vold, healthd)
# talk to keymaster
hal_client_domain(vold, hal_keymaster)
# talk to health storage HAL
hal_client_domain(vold, hal_health_storage)
# talk to bootloader HAL
full_treble_only(`hal_client_domain(vold, hal_bootctl)')
# Access userdata block device.
allow vold userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allowxperm vold userdata_block_device:blk_file ioctl BLKSECDISCARD;
# Access metadata block device used for encryption meta-data.
allow vold metadata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allowxperm vold metadata_block_device:blk_file ioctl BLKSECDISCARD;
# Allow vold to manipulate /data/unencrypted
allow vold unencrypted_data_file:{ file } create_file_perms;
allow vold unencrypted_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
# Write to /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
allow vold proc_drop_caches:file w_file_perms;
# Give vold a place where only vold can store files; everyone else is off limits
allow vold vold_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow vold vold_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# And a similar place in the metadata partition
allow vold vold_metadata_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow vold vold_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
# linux keyring configuration
allow vold init:key { write search setattr };
allow vold vold:key { write search setattr };
# vold temporarily changes its priority when running benchmarks
allow vold self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
# vold needs to chroot into app namespaces to remount when runtime permissions change
allow vold self:global_capability_class_set sys_chroot;
allow vold storage_file:dir mounton;
# For AppFuse.
allow vold fuse_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow vold fuse:filesystem { relabelfrom };
allow vold app_fusefs:filesystem { relabelfrom relabelto };
allow vold app_fusefs:filesystem { mount unmount };
allow vold app_fuse_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow vold app_fuse_file:file { read write open getattr append };
# MoveTask.cpp executes cp and rm
allow vold toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
# Prepare profile dir for users.
allow vold { user_profile_data_file user_profile_root_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
# Raw writes to misc block device
allow vold misc_block_device:blk_file w_file_perms;
# vold might need to search or mount /mnt/vendor/*
allow vold mnt_vendor_file:dir search;
dontaudit vold self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
# vold needs to know whether we're running a GSI.
allow vold gsi_metadata_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow vold gsi_metadata_file:file r_file_perms;
neverallow {
domain
-vold
-vold_prepare_subdirs
} vold_data_file:dir ~{ open create read getattr setattr search relabelfrom relabelto ioctl };
neverallow {
domain
-init
-vold
-vold_prepare_subdirs
} vold_data_file:dir *;
neverallow {
domain
-init
-vold
} vold_metadata_file:dir *;
neverallow {
domain
-kernel
-vold
-vold_prepare_subdirs
} vold_data_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };
neverallow {
domain
-init
-vold
-vold_prepare_subdirs
} vold_metadata_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };
neverallow {
domain
-init
-kernel
-vold
-vold_prepare_subdirs
} { vold_data_file vold_metadata_file }:notdevfile_class_set *;
neverallow { domain -vold -init } restorecon_prop:property_service set;
neverallow vold {
domain
-hal_health_storage_server
-hal_keymaster_server
-system_suspend_server
-hal_bootctl_server
-healthd
-hwservicemanager
-iorapd_service
-servicemanager
-system_server
userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
}:binder call;
neverallow vold fsck_exec:file execute_no_trans;
neverallow { domain -init } vold:process { transition dyntransition };
neverallow vold *:process ptrace;
neverallow vold *:rawip_socket *;