platform_system_sepolicy/private/coredomain.te
Andreas Gampe 30186cf611 Sepolicy: Allow otapreopt access to vendor overlay files
A handful of APKs are vendor overlay files. Allow access.

Test: m
Change-Id: I791fa37a3bcb07729386047f0cda178753af9de5
2019-03-22 12:13:53 -07:00

207 lines
4.1 KiB
Text

get_prop(coredomain, pm_prop)
get_prop(coredomain, exported_pm_prop)
full_treble_only(`
neverallow {
coredomain
# for chowning
-init
# generic access to sysfs_type
-ueventd
-vold
} sysfs_leds:file *;
')
# On TREBLE devices, a limited set of files in /vendor are accessible to
# only a few whitelisted coredomains to keep system/vendor separation.
full_treble_only(`
# Limit access to /vendor/app
neverallow {
coredomain
-appdomain
-dex2oat
-idmap
-init
-installd
userdebug_or_eng(`-perfprofd')
userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
-postinstall_dexopt
-rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
-system_server
} vendor_app_file:dir { open read getattr search };
')
full_treble_only(`
neverallow {
coredomain
-appdomain
-dex2oat
-idmap
-init
-installd
userdebug_or_eng(`-perfprofd')
userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
-postinstall_dexopt
-rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
-system_server
-mediaserver
} vendor_app_file:file r_file_perms;
')
full_treble_only(`
# Limit access to /vendor/overlay
neverallow {
coredomain
-appdomain
-idmap
-init
-installd
-postinstall_dexopt
-rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
-system_server
-app_zygote
-webview_zygote
-zygote
userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
} vendor_overlay_file:dir { getattr open read search };
')
full_treble_only(`
neverallow {
coredomain
-appdomain
-idmap
-init
-installd
-postinstall_dexopt
-rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
-system_server
-app_zygote
-webview_zygote
-zygote
userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
} vendor_overlay_file:file r_file_perms;
')
# Core domains are not permitted to use kernel interfaces which are not
# explicitly labeled.
# TODO(b/65643247): Apply these neverallow rules to all coredomain.
full_treble_only(`
# /proc
neverallow {
coredomain
-init
-vold
} proc:file no_rw_file_perms;
# /sys
neverallow {
coredomain
-init
-ueventd
-vold
} sysfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
# /dev
neverallow {
coredomain
-fsck
-init
-ueventd
} device:{ blk_file file } no_rw_file_perms;
# debugfs
neverallow {
coredomain
-dumpstate
-init
-system_server
} debugfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
# tracefs
neverallow {
coredomain
-atrace
-dumpstate
-init
userdebug_or_eng(`-perfprofd')
-traced_probes
-shell
-traceur_app
} debugfs_tracing:file no_rw_file_perms;
# inotifyfs
neverallow {
coredomain
-init
} inotify:file no_rw_file_perms;
# pstorefs
neverallow {
coredomain
-bootstat
-charger
-dumpstate
-healthd
userdebug_or_eng(`-incidentd')
-init
-logd
-logpersist
-recovery_persist
-recovery_refresh
-shell
-system_server
} pstorefs:file no_rw_file_perms;
# configfs
neverallow {
coredomain
-init
-system_server
} configfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
# functionfs
neverallow {
coredomain
-adbd
-init
-mediaprovider
-system_server
} functionfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
# usbfs and binfmt_miscfs
neverallow {
coredomain
-init
}{ usbfs binfmt_miscfs }:file no_rw_file_perms;
')
# Following /dev nodes must not be directly accessed by coredomain, but should
# instead be wrapped by HALs.
neverallow coredomain {
iio_device
radio_device
}:chr_file { open read append write ioctl };
# TODO(b/120243891): HAL permission to tee_device is included into coredomain
# on non-Treble devices.
full_treble_only(`
neverallow coredomain tee_device:chr_file { open read append write ioctl };
')
# Allow access to ashmemd to request /dev/ashmem fds.
allow {
coredomain
-init
-iorapd
-perfprofd
} ashmem_device_service:service_manager find;
binder_call({
coredomain
-init
-iorapd
-perfprofd
}, ashmemd)