156 lines
6.4 KiB
Text
156 lines
6.4 KiB
Text
###
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### Untrusted apps.
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###
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### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps.
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### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
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### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
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### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
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### directory). The untrusted_app domain is the default assignment in
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### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
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### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
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### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml. In current AOSP, this
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### domain is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
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### that are not signed by the platform key. To move
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### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
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### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
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### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
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### seapp_contexts.
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###
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### untrusted_app includes all the appdomain rules, plus the
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### additional following rules:
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###
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type untrusted_app, domain;
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app_domain(untrusted_app)
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net_domain(untrusted_app)
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bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app)
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# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
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# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
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allow untrusted_app app_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod };
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allow untrusted_app tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# ASEC
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allow untrusted_app asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Execute libs in asec containers.
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allow untrusted_app asec_public_file:file { execute execmod };
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# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
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# Used by: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
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create_pty(untrusted_app)
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# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
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# running "adb install foo.apk".
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# TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files.
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# Figure out a way to remove these rules.
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allow untrusted_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow untrusted_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
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# TODO: We shouldn't be allowing all untrusted_apps to read
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# this file. This is only needed for the GMS feedback agent.
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# See also b/18340553. GMS runs as untrusted_app, and
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# it's too late to change the domain it runs in.
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# This line needs to be deleted.
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allow untrusted_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder.
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# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for
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# cropping or taking user photos.
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allow untrusted_app system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr };
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#
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# Rules migrated from old app domains coalesced into untrusted_app.
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# This includes what used to be media_app, shared_app, and release_app.
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#
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# Access /dev/mtp_usb.
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allow untrusted_app mtp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# Access to /data/media.
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allow untrusted_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow untrusted_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Write to /cache.
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allow untrusted_app cache_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow untrusted_app cache_file:file create_file_perms;
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allow untrusted_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app radio_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
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# TODO: remove this once priv-apps are no longer running in untrusted_app
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allow untrusted_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
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# TODO: remove and replace with specific package that accesses this
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allow untrusted_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;
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# Allow verifier to access staged apks.
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allow untrusted_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow untrusted_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms;
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# limit untrusted_apps access to MAC address ioctl
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# MAC address is SIOCGIFHWADDR 0x8927
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# from include/uapi/linux/sockios.h
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# #define SIOCGIFHWADDR 0x8927 /* Get hardware address */
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# Other general 0x89** ioctls should continue to be allowed.
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# 0x8B00 from wireless extensions driver and is used by chrome to
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# determine if wifi is present
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# from include/uapi/linux/wireless.h:
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# #define SIOCSIWCOMMIT 0x8B00 /* Commit pending changes to driver */
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allow untrusted_app self:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } { 0x8900-0x8926 0x8928-0x89ff 0x8b00 };
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# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
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# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
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# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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allow untrusted_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow untrusted_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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')
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# Receive or send uevent messages.
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neverallow untrusted_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
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# Receive or send generic netlink messages
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neverallow untrusted_app domain:netlink_socket *;
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# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
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# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
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neverallow untrusted_app debugfs:file read;
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# Do not allow untrusted apps to register services.
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# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
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# services.
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neverallow untrusted_app service_manager_type:service_manager add;
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# Do not allow untrusted_apps to connect to the property service
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# or set properties. b/10243159
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neverallow untrusted_app property_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow untrusted_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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neverallow untrusted_app property_type:property_service set;
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# Do not allow untrusted_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
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# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
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# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
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# constraints. As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
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# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
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# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
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# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
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# and untrusted_app is allowed fork permission to itself.
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neverallow untrusted_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
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# Do not allow untrusted_app to hard link to any files.
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# In particular, if untrusted_app links to other app data
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# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
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# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
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# bugs, so we want to ensure untrusted_app never has this
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# capability.
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neverallow untrusted_app file_type:file link;
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