platform_system_sepolicy/private/bpfloader.te
Maciej Żenczykowski 49c73b06a2 cut down bpf related privileges
This is driven by 3 things:
  - netd no longer needs setattr, since this is now done by bpfloader
  - nothing should ever unpin maps or programs
  - generic cleanups and additional neverallows

Test: build, atest
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Change-Id: I881cc8bf9fe062aaff709727406c5a51fc363c8e
2020-02-22 02:14:58 +00:00

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1.5 KiB
Text

# bpf program loader
type bpfloader, domain;
type bpfloader_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
typeattribute bpfloader coredomain;
# These permissions are required to pin ebpf maps & programs.
allow bpfloader fs_bpf:dir { search write add_name };
allow bpfloader fs_bpf:file { create setattr };
# Allow bpfloader to create bpf maps and programs.
allow bpfloader self:bpf { map_create map_read map_write prog_load prog_run };
allow bpfloader self:capability { chown sys_admin };
###
### Neverallow rules
###
# TODO: get rid of init & vendor_init
neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } fs_bpf:dir setattr;
neverallow { domain -bpfloader } fs_bpf:dir { write add_name };
neverallow domain fs_bpf:dir { reparent rename rmdir };
# TODO: get rid of init & vendor_init
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -vendor_init } fs_bpf:file setattr;
neverallow { domain -bpfloader } fs_bpf:file create;
neverallow domain fs_bpf:file { rename unlink };
neverallow { domain -bpfloader } *:bpf { map_create prog_load };
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -netutils_wrapper -system_server } *:bpf prog_run;
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -system_server } *:bpf { map_read map_write };
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init } bpfloader_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };
neverallow bpfloader domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
# No domain should be allowed to ptrace bpfloader
neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd') } bpfloader:process ptrace;
set_prop(bpfloader, bpf_progs_loaded_prop)