platform_system_sepolicy/public/keystore.te
Alex Klyubin f7543d27b8 Switch Keymaster HAL policy to _client/_server
This switches Keymaster HAL policy to the design which enables us to
conditionally remove unnecessary rules from domains which are clients
of Keymaster HAL.

Domains which are clients of Keymaster HAL, such as keystore and vold
domains, are granted rules targeting hal_keymaster only when the
Keymaster HAL runs in passthrough mode (i.e., inside the client's
process). When the HAL runs in binderized mode (i.e., in another
process/domain, with clients talking to the HAL over HwBinder IPC),
rules targeting hal_keymaster are not granted to client domains.

Domains which offer a binderized implementation of Keymaster HAL, such
as hal_keymaster_default domain, are always granted rules targeting
hal_keymaster.

Test: Password-protected sailfish boots up and lock screen unlocks --
      this exercises vold -> Keymaster HAL interaction
Test: All Android Keystore CTS tests pass -- this exercises keystore ->
      Keymaster HAL interaction:
      make cts cts-tradefed
      cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
      --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi arm64-v8a \
      --module CtsKeystoreTestCases
Bug: 34170079

Change-Id: I2254d0fdee72145721654d6c9e6e8d3331920ec7
2017-02-22 20:18:28 -08:00

37 lines
1.1 KiB
Text

type keystore, domain, domain_deprecated;
type keystore_exec, exec_type, file_type;
# keystore daemon
typeattribute keystore mlstrustedsubject;
binder_use(keystore)
binder_service(keystore)
binder_call(keystore, system_server)
# talk to keymaster
hal_client_domain(keystore, hal_keymaster)
allow keystore keystore_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow keystore keystore_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
allow keystore keystore_exec:file { getattr };
add_service(keystore, keystore_service)
allow keystore sec_key_att_app_id_provider_service:service_manager find;
# Check SELinux permissions.
selinux_check_access(keystore)
r_dir_file(keystore, cgroup)
###
### Neverallow rules
###
### Protect ourself from others
###
neverallow { domain -keystore } keystore_data_file:dir ~{ open create read getattr setattr search relabelto ioctl };
neverallow { domain -keystore } keystore_data_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };
neverallow { domain -keystore -init } keystore_data_file:dir *;
neverallow { domain -keystore -init } keystore_data_file:notdevfile_class_set *;
neverallow * keystore:process ptrace;