4ba3045740
Denial messages:
03-17 20:30:54.274 1445 1445 I PackageInstalle: type=1400 audit(0.0:6): avc: denied { ioctl } for path=2F646174612F696E6372656D656E74616C2F4D545F646174615F696E6372656D656E74616C5F746D705F313134353234353836342F6D6F756E742F2E70656E64696E675F7265616473202864656C6574656429 dev="incremental-fs" ino=2 ioctlcmd=0x6721 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
03-17 20:30:54.274 1445 1445 I PackageInstalle: type=1400 audit(0.0:7): avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/data/incremental/MT_data_incremental_tmp_1145245864/mount/.index/2b300000000000000000000000000000" dev="incremental-fs" ino=6794 ioctlcmd=0x6720 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
03-17 20:49:11.797 16182 16182 I Binder:16182_6: type=1400 audit(0.0:13): avc: denied { ioctl } for path=2F646174612F696E6372656D656E74616C2F4D545F646174615F696E6372656D656E74616C5F746D705F3537383539353635322F6D6F756E742F2E70656E64696E675F7265616473202864656C6574656429 dev="incremental-fs" ino=2 ioctlcmd=0x6721 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 app=com.android.vending
03-17 20:49:11.797 16182 16182 I Binder:16182_6: type=1400 audit(0.0:14): avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/data/incremental/MT_data_incremental_tmp_578595652/mount/.index/626173652e61706b0000000000000000" dev="incremental-fs" ino=5810 ioctlcmd=0x6720 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 app=com.android.vending
Test: manual
BUG: 150809360
Change-Id: If43fa9edad0848a59c0712b124adfcdbbd0c99a4
218 lines
8.4 KiB
Text
218 lines
8.4 KiB
Text
###
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### A domain for further sandboxing privileged apps.
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###
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typeattribute priv_app coredomain;
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app_domain(priv_app)
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# Access the network.
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net_domain(priv_app)
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# Access bluetooth.
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bluetooth_domain(priv_app)
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# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
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# Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
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create_pty(priv_app)
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# Allow loading executable code from writable priv-app home
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# directories. This is a W^X violation, however, it needs
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# to be supported for now for the following reasons.
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# * /data/user_*/0/*/code_cache/* POSSIBLE uses (b/117841367)
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# 1) com.android.opengl.shaders_cache
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# 2) com.android.skia.shaders_cache
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# 3) com.android.renderscript.cache
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# * /data/user_de/0/com.google.android.gms/app_chimera
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# TODO: Tighten (b/112357170)
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allow priv_app privapp_data_file:file execute;
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allow priv_app privapp_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
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# Priv apps can find services that expose both @SystemAPI and normal APIs.
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allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app network_watchlist_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app oem_lock_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app radio_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app recovery_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app stats_service:service_manager find;
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# Allow privileged apps to interact with gpuservice
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binder_call(priv_app, gpuservice)
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allow priv_app gpu_service:service_manager find;
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# Write to /cache.
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allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms;
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# /cache is a symlink to /data/cache on some devices. Allow reading the link.
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allow priv_app cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Access to /data/media.
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allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
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# running "adb install foo.apk".
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allow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Allow traceur to pass file descriptors through a content provider to betterbug
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allow priv_app trace_data_file:file { getattr read };
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# Allow verifier to access staged apks.
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allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms;
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# For AppFuse.
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allow priv_app vold:fd use;
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allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write };
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# /proc access
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allow priv_app {
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proc_vmstat
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}:file r_file_perms;
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allow priv_app sysfs_type:dir search;
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# Read access to /sys/class/net/wlan*/address
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r_dir_file(priv_app, sysfs_net)
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# Read access to /sys/block/zram*/mm_stat
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r_dir_file(priv_app, sysfs_zram)
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r_dir_file(priv_app, rootfs)
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# access the mac address
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allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR;
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# Allow com.android.vending to communicate with statsd.
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binder_call(priv_app, statsd)
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# Allow Phone to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
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allow priv_app ringtone_file:file { getattr read write };
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# Access to /data/preloads
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allow priv_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow priv_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow priv_app preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow priv_app preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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read_runtime_log_tags(priv_app)
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# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
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# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
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perfetto_producer(priv_app)
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# Allow priv_apps to request and collect incident reports.
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# (Also requires DUMP and PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS permissions)
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allow priv_app incident_service:service_manager find;
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binder_call(priv_app, incidentd)
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allow priv_app incidentd:fifo_file { read write };
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# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
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can_profile_heap(priv_app)
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can_profile_perf(priv_app)
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# Allow priv_apps to check whether Dynamic System Update is enabled
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get_prop(priv_app, dynamic_system_prop)
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# suppress denials for non-API accesses.
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dontaudit priv_app exec_type:file getattr;
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dontaudit priv_app device:dir read;
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dontaudit priv_app fs_bpf:dir search;
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dontaudit priv_app net_dns_prop:file read;
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dontaudit priv_app proc:file read;
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dontaudit priv_app proc_interrupts:file read;
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dontaudit priv_app proc_modules:file read;
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dontaudit priv_app proc_net:file read;
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dontaudit priv_app proc_stat:file read;
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dontaudit priv_app proc_version:file read;
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dontaudit priv_app sysfs:dir read;
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dontaudit priv_app sysfs:file read;
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dontaudit priv_app sysfs_android_usb:file read;
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dontaudit priv_app sysfs_dm:file r_file_perms;
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dontaudit priv_app wifi_prop:file read;
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dontaudit priv_app { wifi_prop exported_wifi_prop }:file read;
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# allow privileged apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
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# modify them other than to connect
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allow priv_app system_server:udp_socket {
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connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
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# allow apps like Phonesky to check the file signature of an apk installed on
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# the Incremental File System, and fill missing blocks in the apk
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allowxperm priv_app apk_data_file:file ioctl { INCFS_IOCTL_READ_SIGNATURE INCFS_IOCTL_FILL_BLOCKS };
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# allow privileged data loader apps (e.g. com.android.vending) to read logs from Incremental File System
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allow priv_app incremental_control_file:file { read getattr ioctl };
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# allow apps like Phonesky to request permission to fill blocks of an apk file
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# on the Incremental File System.
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allowxperm priv_app incremental_control_file:file ioctl INCFS_IOCTL_PERMIT_FILL;
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# Receive or send uevent messages.
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neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
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# Receive or send generic netlink messages
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neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_socket *;
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# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
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# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
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neverallow priv_app debugfs:file read;
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# Do not allow privileged apps to register services.
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# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
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# services.
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neverallow priv_app service_manager_type:service_manager add;
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# Do not allow privileged apps to connect to the property service
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# or set properties. b/10243159
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neverallow priv_app property_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow priv_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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neverallow priv_app property_type:property_service set;
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# Do not allow priv_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
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# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
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# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
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# constraints. As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
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# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
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# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
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# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
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# and priv_app is allowed fork permission to itself.
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neverallow priv_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
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# Do not allow priv_app to hard link to any files.
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# In particular, if priv_app links to other app data
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# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
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# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
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# bugs, so we want to ensure priv_app never has this
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# capability.
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neverallow priv_app file_type:file link;
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# priv apps should not be able to open trace data files, they should depend
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# upon traceur to pass a file descriptor which they can then read
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neverallow priv_app trace_data_file:dir *;
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neverallow priv_app trace_data_file:file { no_w_file_perms open };
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# Do not allow priv_app access to cgroups.
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neverallow priv_app cgroup:file *;
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# Do not allow loading executable code from non-privileged
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# application home directories. Code loading across a security boundary
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# is dangerous and allows a full compromise of a privileged process
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# by an unprivileged process. b/112357170
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neverallow priv_app app_data_file:file no_x_file_perms;
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# Do not follow untrusted app provided symlinks
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neverallow priv_app app_data_file:lnk_file { open read getattr };
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