ab82125fc8
In particular, add assertions limiting which processes may directly open files owned by apps. Reduce this to just apps, init, and installd. App data is protected by a combination of selinux permissions and Unix permissions, so limiting the open permission to just apps (which are not allowed to have CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) ensures that only installd and init have complete access an app's private directory. In addition to apps/init/installd, other processes currently granted open are mediaserver, uncrypt, and vold. Uncrypt's access appears to be deprecated (b/80299612). Uncrypt now uses /data/ota_package instead. b/80418809 and b/80300620 track removal for vold and mediaserver. Test: build/boot aosp_taimen-userdebug. Verify no "granted" audit messages in the logs. Bug: 80190017 Bug: 80300620 Bug: 80418809 Fixes: 80299612 Change-Id: I153bc7b62294b36ccd596254a5976dd887fed046
178 lines
3.6 KiB
Text
178 lines
3.6 KiB
Text
# Transition to crash_dump when /system/bin/crash_dump* is executed.
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# This occurs when the process crashes.
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domain_auto_trans(domain, crash_dump_exec, crash_dump);
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allow domain crash_dump:process sigchld;
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# Limit ability to ptrace or read sensitive /proc/pid files of processes
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# with other UIDs to these whitelisted domains.
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neverallow {
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domain
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-vold
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-dumpstate
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userdebug_or_eng(`-incidentd')
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-storaged
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-system_server
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userdebug_or_eng(`-perfprofd')
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} self:global_capability_class_set sys_ptrace;
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# Limit ability to generate hardware unique device ID attestations to priv_apps
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neverallow { domain -priv_app } *:keystore_key gen_unique_id;
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neverallow {
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domain
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-init
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-vendor_init
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userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')
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} debugfs_tracing_debug:file no_rw_file_perms;
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# Core domains are not permitted to use kernel interfaces which are not
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# explicitly labeled.
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# TODO(b/65643247): Apply these neverallow rules to all coredomain.
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full_treble_only(`
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# /proc
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neverallow {
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coredomain
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-vold
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} proc:file no_rw_file_perms;
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# /sys
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neverallow {
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coredomain
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-init
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-ueventd
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-vold
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} sysfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
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# /dev
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neverallow {
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coredomain
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-fsck
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-init
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-ueventd
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} device:{ blk_file file } no_rw_file_perms;
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# debugfs
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neverallow {
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coredomain
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-dumpstate
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-init
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-system_server
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} debugfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
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# tracefs
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neverallow {
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coredomain
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-atrace
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-dumpstate
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-init
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userdebug_or_eng(`-perfprofd')
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-traced_probes
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-shell
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-traceur_app
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} debugfs_tracing:file no_rw_file_perms;
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# inotifyfs
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neverallow {
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coredomain
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-init
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} inotify:file no_rw_file_perms;
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# pstorefs
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neverallow {
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coredomain
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-bootstat
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-charger
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-dumpstate
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-healthd
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userdebug_or_eng(`-incidentd')
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-init
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-logd
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-logpersist
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-recovery_persist
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-recovery_refresh
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-shell
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-system_server
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} pstorefs:file no_rw_file_perms;
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# configfs
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neverallow {
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coredomain
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-init
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-system_server
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} configfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
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# functionfs
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neverallow {
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coredomain
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-adbd
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-init
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-mediaprovider
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-system_server
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} functionfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
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# usbfs and binfmt_miscfs
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neverallow {
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coredomain
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-init
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}{ usbfs binfmt_miscfs }:file no_rw_file_perms;
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')
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# System_server owns dropbox data, and init creates/restorecons the directory
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# Disallow direct access by other processes.
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neverallow { domain -init -system_server } dropbox_data_file:dir *;
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neverallow { domain -init -system_server } dropbox_data_file:file ~{ getattr read };
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###
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# Services should respect app sandboxes
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neverallow {
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domain
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-appdomain
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-installd # creation of sandbox
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} app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
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# Only the following processes should be directly accessing private app
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# directories.
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neverallow {
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domain
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-adbd
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-appdomain
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-dexoptanalyzer
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-init
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-installd
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-mediaserver # b/80300620
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userdebug_or_eng(`-perfprofd')
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-profman
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-runas
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-system_server
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-vold
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} app_data_file:dir *;
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# Only apps should be modifying app data. init and installd are exempted for
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# restorecon and package install/uninstall.
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neverallow {
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domain
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-appdomain
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-init
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-installd
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} app_data_file:dir ~r_dir_perms;
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neverallow {
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domain
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-appdomain
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-installd
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-mediaserver # b/80300620
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userdebug_or_eng(`-perfprofd')
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-vold # b/80418809
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} app_data_file:file_class_set open;
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neverallow {
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domain
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-appdomain
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-installd # creation of sandbox
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} app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
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neverallow {
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domain
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-init
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-installd
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} app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { relabelfrom relabelto };
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