4cafae77a4
Add an exemption to neverallow rule to use sockets from HAL servers only for automotive build Bug: 78901167 Test: assign this attribute to hal_vehicle_default and try to open socket from HAL implementation Test: verify that new CTS test will fail for non-automotive build with this attribute buing used Test: make cts && cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info --skip-preconditions --abi arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest Change-Id: I27976443dad4fc5b7425c089512cac65bb54d6d9
59 lines
2.3 KiB
Text
59 lines
2.3 KiB
Text
# only HALs responsible for network hardware should have privileged
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# network capabilities
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neverallow {
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halserverdomain
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-hal_bluetooth_server
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-hal_wifi_server
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-hal_wifi_hostapd_server
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-hal_wifi_supplicant_server
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-hal_telephony_server
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} self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw };
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# Unless a HAL's job is to communicate over the network, or control network
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# hardware, it should not be using network sockets.
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# NOTE: HALs for automotive devices have an exemption from this rule because in
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# a car it is common to have external modules and HALs need to communicate to
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# those modules using network. Using this exemption for non-automotive builds
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# will result in CTS failure.
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neverallow {
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halserverdomain
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-hal_automotive_socket_exemption
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-hal_tetheroffload_server
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-hal_wifi_server
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-hal_wifi_hostapd_server
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-hal_wifi_supplicant_server
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-hal_telephony_server
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} domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
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###
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# HALs are defined as an attribute and so a given domain could hypothetically
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# have multiple HALs in it (or even all of them) with the subsequent policy of
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# the domain comprised of the union of all the HALs.
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#
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# This is a problem because
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# 1) Security sensitive components should only be accessed by specific HALs.
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# 2) hwbinder_call and the restrictions it provides cannot be reasoned about in
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# the platform.
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# 3) The platform cannot reason about defense in depth if there are
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# monolithic domains etc.
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#
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# As an example, hal_keymaster and hal_gatekeeper can access the TEE and while
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# its OK for them to share a process its not OK with them to share processes
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# with other hals.
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#
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# The following neverallow rules, in conjuntion with CTS tests, assert that
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# these security principles are adhered to.
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#
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# Do not allow a hal to exec another process without a domain transition.
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# TODO remove exemptions.
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neverallow {
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halserverdomain
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-hal_dumpstate_server
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-hal_telephony_server
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} { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
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# Do not allow a process other than init to transition into a HAL domain.
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neverallow { domain -init } halserverdomain:process transition;
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# Only allow transitioning to a domain by running its executable. Do not
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# allow transitioning into a HAL domain by use of seclabel in an
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# init.*.rc script.
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neverallow * halserverdomain:process dyntransition;
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