e7ec2f5258
tmpfs_domain() macro defines a per-domain type and allows access for tmpfs-backed files, including ashmem regions. execute-related permissions crept into it, thereby allowing write + execute to ashmem regions for most domains. Move the execute permission out of tmpfs_domain() to app_domain() and specific domains as required. Drop execmod for now we are not seeing it. Similarly, execute permission for /dev/ashmem crept into binder_use() as it was common to many binder using domains. Move it out of binder_use() to app_domain() and specific domains as required. Change-Id: I66f1dcd02932123eea5d0d8aaaa14d1b32f715bb Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
359 lines
14 KiB
Text
359 lines
14 KiB
Text
###
|
|
### Domain for all zygote spawned apps
|
|
###
|
|
### This file is the base policy for all zygote spawned apps.
|
|
### Other policy files, such as isolated_app.te, untrusted_app.te, etc
|
|
### extend from this policy. Only policies which should apply to ALL
|
|
### zygote spawned apps should be added here.
|
|
###
|
|
|
|
# Dalvik Compiler JIT Mapping.
|
|
allow appdomain self:process execmem;
|
|
allow appdomain ashmem_device:chr_file execute;
|
|
|
|
# Allow apps to connect to the keystore
|
|
unix_socket_connect(appdomain, keystore, keystore)
|
|
|
|
# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from zygote.
|
|
allow appdomain zygote:fd use;
|
|
|
|
# Needed to close the zygote socket, which involves getopt / getattr
|
|
# This should be deleted after b/12061011 is fixed
|
|
allow appdomain zygote:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr };
|
|
|
|
# gdbserver for ndk-gdb reads the zygote.
|
|
allow appdomain zygote_exec:file r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
|
|
allow appdomain self:process ptrace;
|
|
|
|
# Read system properties managed by zygote.
|
|
allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file read;
|
|
|
|
# Notify zygote of death;
|
|
allow appdomain zygote:process sigchld;
|
|
|
|
# Notify shell and adbd of death when spawned via runas for ndk-gdb.
|
|
allow appdomain shell:process sigchld;
|
|
allow appdomain adbd:process sigchld;
|
|
|
|
# child shell or gdbserver pty access for runas.
|
|
allow appdomain devpts:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
|
|
|
|
# Communicate with system_server.
|
|
allow appdomain system_server:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
|
|
allow appdomain system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt };
|
|
binder_call(appdomain, system_server)
|
|
|
|
# Communication with other apps via fifos
|
|
allow appdomain appdomain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Communicate with surfaceflinger.
|
|
allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt };
|
|
binder_call(appdomain, surfaceflinger)
|
|
|
|
# App sandbox file accesses.
|
|
allow appdomain app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
|
|
allow appdomain app_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Read/write data files created by the platform apps if they
|
|
# were passed to the app via binder or local IPC. Do not allow open.
|
|
allow appdomain platform_app_data_file:file { getattr read write };
|
|
|
|
# lib subdirectory of /data/data dir is system-owned.
|
|
allow appdomain system_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
|
|
allow appdomain system_data_file:file { execute execute_no_trans open };
|
|
|
|
# Execute the shell or other system executables.
|
|
allow appdomain shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
|
|
allow appdomain system_file:file rx_file_perms;
|
|
allow appdomain ping_exec:file rx_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Read/write wallpaper file (opened by system).
|
|
allow appdomain wallpaper_file:file { read write };
|
|
|
|
# Write to /data/anr/traces.txt.
|
|
allow appdomain anr_data_file:dir search;
|
|
allow appdomain anr_data_file:file { open append };
|
|
|
|
# Allow apps to send dump information to dumpstate
|
|
allow appdomain dumpstate:fd use;
|
|
allow appdomain dumpstate:unix_stream_socket { read write getopt getattr };
|
|
|
|
# Write to /proc/net/xt_qtaguid/ctrl file.
|
|
allow appdomain qtaguid_proc:file rw_file_perms;
|
|
# Everybody can read the xt_qtaguid resource tracking misc dev.
|
|
# So allow all apps to read from /dev/xt_qtaguid.
|
|
allow appdomain qtaguid_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Grant GPU access to all processes started by Zygote.
|
|
# They need that to render the standard UI.
|
|
allow appdomain gpu_device:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };
|
|
|
|
# Use the Binder.
|
|
binder_use(appdomain)
|
|
# Perform binder IPC to binder services.
|
|
binder_call(appdomain, binderservicedomain)
|
|
# Perform binder IPC to other apps.
|
|
binder_call(appdomain, appdomain)
|
|
|
|
# Appdomain interaction with isolated apps
|
|
r_dir_file(appdomain, isolated_app)
|
|
|
|
# Already connected, unnamed sockets being passed over some other IPC
|
|
# hence no sock_file or connectto permission. This appears to be how
|
|
# Chrome works, may need to be updated as more apps using isolated services
|
|
# are examined.
|
|
allow appdomain isolated_app:unix_stream_socket { read write };
|
|
|
|
# Backup ability for every app. BMS opens and passes the fd
|
|
# to any app that has backup ability. Hence, no open permissions here.
|
|
allow appdomain backup_data_file:file { read write getattr };
|
|
allow appdomain cache_backup_file:file { read write getattr };
|
|
# Backup ability using 'adb backup'
|
|
allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file getattr;
|
|
|
|
# Allow all applications to read downloaded files
|
|
allow appdomain download_file:dir search;
|
|
allow appdomain download_file:file r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Allow applications to communicate with netd via /dev/socket/dnsproxyd
|
|
# to do DNS resolution
|
|
unix_socket_connect(appdomain, dnsproxyd, netd)
|
|
|
|
# Allow applications to communicate with drmserver over binder
|
|
binder_call(appdomain, drmserver)
|
|
|
|
# Allow applications to communicate with mediaserver over binder
|
|
binder_call(appdomain, mediaserver)
|
|
|
|
# Allow applications to make outbound tcp connections to any port
|
|
allow appdomain port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
|
|
|
|
# Allow apps to see changes to the routing table.
|
|
allow appdomain self:netlink_route_socket {
|
|
read
|
|
bind
|
|
create
|
|
nlmsg_read
|
|
ioctl
|
|
getattr
|
|
setattr
|
|
getopt
|
|
setopt
|
|
shutdown
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
# Allow apps to use rawip sockets. This is needed for apps which execute
|
|
# /system/bin/ping, for example.
|
|
allow appdomain self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
|
|
# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
|
|
#
|
|
# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
|
|
# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
|
|
allow appdomain usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
|
|
allow appdomain usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
|
|
|
|
# For art.
|
|
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
|
|
|
|
###
|
|
### CTS-specific rules
|
|
###
|
|
|
|
# For cts/tools/device-setup/TestDeviceSetup/src/android/tests/getinfo/RootProcessScanner.java.
|
|
# Reads /proc/pid/status and statm entries to check that
|
|
# no unexpected root processes are running.
|
|
# Also for cts/tests/tests/security/src/android/security/cts/VoldExploitTest.java
|
|
# Reads /proc/pid/cmdline of vold.
|
|
allow appdomain domain:dir { open read search getattr };
|
|
allow appdomain domain:{ file lnk_file } { open read getattr };
|
|
|
|
# For cts/tests/tests/permission/src/android/permission/cts/FileSystemPermissionTest.java.
|
|
# testRunAsHasCorrectCapabilities
|
|
allow appdomain runas_exec:file getattr;
|
|
# Others are either allowed elsewhere or not desired.
|
|
|
|
# For cts/tests/tests/security/src/android/security/cts/SELinuxTest.java
|
|
# Check SELinux policy and contexts.
|
|
selinux_check_access(appdomain)
|
|
selinux_check_context(appdomain)
|
|
# Validate that each process is running in the correct security context.
|
|
allow appdomain domain:process getattr;
|
|
|
|
###
|
|
### Neverallow rules
|
|
###
|
|
### These are things that Android apps should NEVER be able to do
|
|
###
|
|
|
|
# Superuser capabilities.
|
|
# bluetooth requires net_admin.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain -bluetooth } self:capability *;
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } self:capability2 *;
|
|
|
|
# Block device access.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } dev_type:blk_file { read write };
|
|
|
|
# Access to any character device that is not specifically typed.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } device:chr_file { read write };
|
|
|
|
# Access to any of the following character devices.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } {
|
|
audio_device
|
|
camera_device
|
|
dm_device
|
|
radio_device
|
|
gps_device
|
|
rpmsg_device
|
|
}:chr_file { read write };
|
|
|
|
# Note: Try expanding list of app domains in the future.
|
|
neverallow { untrusted_app isolated_app shell -unconfineddomain }
|
|
graphics_device:chr_file { read write };
|
|
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -nfc -unconfineddomain } nfc_device:chr_file
|
|
{ read write };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -unconfineddomain } hci_attach_dev:chr_file
|
|
{ read write };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } tee_device:chr_file { read write };
|
|
|
|
# Set SELinux enforcing mode, booleans or any other SELinux settings.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } kernel:security
|
|
{ setenforce setbool setsecparam setcheckreqprot };
|
|
|
|
# Load security policy.
|
|
neverallow appdomain kernel:security load_policy;
|
|
|
|
# Privileged netlink socket interfaces.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain }
|
|
self:{
|
|
netlink_socket
|
|
netlink_firewall_socket
|
|
netlink_tcpdiag_socket
|
|
netlink_nflog_socket
|
|
netlink_xfrm_socket
|
|
netlink_audit_socket
|
|
netlink_ip6fw_socket
|
|
netlink_dnrt_socket
|
|
netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
|
|
} *;
|
|
|
|
# Sockets under /dev/socket that are not specifically typed.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } socket_device:sock_file write;
|
|
|
|
# Unix domain sockets.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } adbd_socket:sock_file write;
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } bluetooth_socket:sock_file write;
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } installd_socket:sock_file write;
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -radio -shell -system_app -unconfineddomain }
|
|
property_socket:sock_file write;
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -radio -unconfineddomain } rild_socket:sock_file write;
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } vold_socket:sock_file write;
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } zygote_socket:sock_file write;
|
|
|
|
# ptrace access to non-app domains.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } { domain -appdomain }:process ptrace;
|
|
|
|
# Write access to /proc/pid entries for any non-app domain.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } { domain -appdomain }:file write;
|
|
|
|
# signal access to non-app domains.
|
|
# sigchld allowed for parent death notification.
|
|
# signull allowed for kill(pid, 0) existence test.
|
|
# All others prohibited.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } { domain -appdomain }:process
|
|
{ sigkill sigstop signal };
|
|
|
|
# Transition to a non-app domain.
|
|
# Exception for the shell domain, can transition to runas, ping, etc.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -shell -unconfineddomain } ~appdomain:process
|
|
{ transition dyntransition };
|
|
|
|
# Map low memory.
|
|
# Note: Take to domain.te and apply to all domains in the future.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } self:memprotect mmap_zero;
|
|
|
|
# Write to rootfs.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } rootfs:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
|
|
# Write to /system.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } system_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
|
|
# Write to entrypoint executables.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } exec_type:file
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
|
|
# Write to system-owned parts of /data.
|
|
# This is the default type for anything under /data not otherwise
|
|
# specified in file_contexts. Define a different type for portions
|
|
# that should be writable by apps.
|
|
# Exception for system_app for Settings.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain -system_app }
|
|
system_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
|
|
# Write to various other parts of /data.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -system_app -unconfineddomain }
|
|
security_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } drm_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } gps_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app -unconfineddomain }
|
|
apk_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app -unconfineddomain }
|
|
apk_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app -unconfineddomain }
|
|
apk_private_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app -unconfineddomain }
|
|
apk_private_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -shell -unconfineddomain }
|
|
shell_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -unconfineddomain }
|
|
bluetooth_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain }
|
|
keystore_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain }
|
|
systemkeys_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain }
|
|
wifi_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain }
|
|
dhcp_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
|
|
# Access to factory files.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain }
|
|
efs_file:dir_file_class_set { read write };
|
|
|
|
# Write to various pseudo file systems.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -nfc -unconfineddomain }
|
|
sysfs:dir_file_class_set write;
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain }
|
|
proc:dir_file_class_set write;
|
|
|
|
# Access to syslog(2) or /proc/kmsg.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -system_app -unconfineddomain }
|
|
kernel:system { syslog_read syslog_mod syslog_console };
|
|
|
|
# Ability to perform any filesystem operation other than statfs(2).
|
|
# i.e. no mount(2), unmount(2), etc.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } fs_type:filesystem ~getattr;
|
|
|
|
# Ability to set system properties.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -system_app -radio -shell -bluetooth -unconfineddomain }
|
|
property_type:property_service set;
|