817c49f74c
Bug: 311377497 Test: manual - Call getDexoptChrootSetupServiceRegisterer().waitForService() Test: manual - Set up a chroot environment and call getArtdPreRebootServiceRegisterer().waitForService() Change-Id: I50b5f7f858dab37f05174cb9787f64303d50d083
145 lines
6.1 KiB
Text
145 lines
6.1 KiB
Text
# ART service daemon.
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typeattribute artd coredomain;
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typeattribute artd mlstrustedsubject;
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type artd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
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type artd_tmpfs, file_type;
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# Allow artd to publish a binder service and make binder calls.
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binder_use(artd)
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add_service(artd, artd_service)
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add_service(artd, artd_pre_reboot_service)
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allow artd dumpstate:fifo_file { getattr write };
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allow artd dumpstate:fd use;
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init_daemon_domain(artd)
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# Allow query ART device config properties
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get_prop(artd, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
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get_prop(artd, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
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# Access to "odsign.verification.success" for deciding whether to deny files in
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# the ART APEX data directory.
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get_prop(artd, odsign_prop)
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# Reading an APK opens a ZipArchive, which unpack to tmpfs.
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# Use tmpfs_domain() which will give tmpfs files created by artd their
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# own label, which differs from other labels created by other processes.
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# This allows to distinguish in policy files created by artd vs other
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# processes.
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tmpfs_domain(artd)
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# Allow testing userfaultfd support.
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userfaultfd_use(artd)
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# Read access to primary dex'es on writable partitions
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# ({/data,/mnt/expand/<volume-uuid>}/app/...).
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# Also allow creating the "oat" directory before restorecon.
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allow artd mnt_expand_file:dir { getattr search };
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allow artd apk_data_file:dir { rw_dir_perms create setattr relabelfrom };
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allow artd apk_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Read access to vendor APKs ({/vendor,/odm}/{app,priv-app}/...).
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r_dir_file(artd, vendor_app_file)
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# Read access to vendor overlay APKs ({/vendor,/odm,/oem,/apex/*}/overlay/...).
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allow artd oemfs:dir { getattr search };
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r_dir_file(artd, vendor_overlay_file)
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# Vendor overlay can be found in vendor apex
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allow artd vendor_apex_metadata_file:dir { getattr search };
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# Read access to vendor shared libraries ({/vendor,/odm}/framework/...).
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r_dir_file(artd, vendor_framework_file)
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# Read/write access to all compilation artifacts generated on device for apps'
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# primary dex'es. (/data/dalvik-cache/..., /data/app/.../oat/..., etc.)
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allow artd dalvikcache_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
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allow artd dalvikcache_data_file:file { create_file_perms relabelto };
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# Read access to the ART APEX data directory.
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# Needed for reading the boot image generated on device.
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allow artd apex_module_data_file:dir { getattr search };
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r_dir_file(artd, apex_art_data_file)
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# Read access to /apex/apex-info-list.xml
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# Needed for getting APEX versions.
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allow artd apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Allow getting root capabilities to bypass permission checks.
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# - "dac_override" and "dac_read_search" are for
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# - reading secondary dex'es in app data directories (reading primary dex'es
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# doesn't need root capabilities)
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# - managing (CRUD) compilation artifacts in both APK directories for primary
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# dex'es and in app data directories for secondary dex'es
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# - managing (CRUD) profile files for both primary dex'es and secondary dex'es
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# - "fowner" is for adjusting the file permissions of compilation artifacts and
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# profile files based on whether they include user data or not.
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# - "chown" is for transferring the ownership of compilation artifacts and
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# profile files to the system or apps.
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allow artd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search fowner chown };
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# Read/write access to profiles (/data/misc/profiles/{ref,cur}/...). Also allow
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# scanning /data/misc/profiles/cur, for cleaning up obsolete managed files.
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allow artd user_profile_root_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow artd user_profile_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
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allow artd user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Read/write access to secondary dex files, their profiles, and their
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# compilation artifacts
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# ({/data,/mnt/expand/<volume-uuid>}/{user,user_de}/<user-id>/<package-name>/...).
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allow artd app_data_file_type:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
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allow artd app_data_file_type:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
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# Allow symlinks for secondary dex files. This has be to restricted because
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# symlinks can cause various security issues. We allow "privapp_data_file" just
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# for GMS because so far we only see GMS using symlinks.
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allow artd privapp_data_file:lnk_file { getattr read };
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# Read access to SELinux context files, for restorecon.
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allow artd file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow artd seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Check validity of SELinux context, for restorecon.
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selinux_check_context(artd)
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# Allow scanning /, for cleaning up obsolete managed files.
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allow artd rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Allow scanning /data, for cleaning up obsolete managed files.
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allow artd system_data_root_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Allow scanning /mnt, for cleaning up obsolete managed files.
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allow artd tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Allow scanning /mnt/expand, for cleaning up obsolete managed files.
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allow artd mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Allow scanning {/data,/mnt/expand/<volume-uuid>}/{user,user_de}, for cleaning
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# up obsolete managed files.
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allow artd system_userdir_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Allow scanning {/data,/mnt/expand/<volume-uuid>}/{user,user_de}/<user-id> and
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# /mnt/expand/<volume-uuid>, for cleaning up obsolete managed files.
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allow artd system_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Never allow running other binaries without a domain transition.
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# The only exception is art_exec. It is allowed to use the artd domain because
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# it is a thin wrapper that executes other binaries on behalf of artd.
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neverallow artd ~{art_exec_exec}:file execute_no_trans;
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allow artd art_exec_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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# Allow running other binaries in their own domains.
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domain_auto_trans(artd, profman_exec, profman)
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domain_auto_trans(artd, dex2oat_exec, dex2oat)
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# Allow sending sigkill to subprocesses.
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allow artd { profman dex2oat }:process sigkill;
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# Allow reading process info (/proc/<pid>/...).
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# This is needed for getting CPU time and wall time spent on subprocesses.
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r_dir_file(artd, profman);
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r_dir_file(artd, dex2oat);
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# Allow artd to reopen its own memfd.
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# artd needs to reopen a memfd with readonly in order to pass it to subprocesses
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# that don't have write permissions on memfds.
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allow artd artd_tmpfs:file open;
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