platform_system_sepolicy/ueventd.te
William Roberts 85c5fc21c8 Start confining ueventd
* Keep ueventd in permissive
* Drop unconfined macro to collect logs
* Restore allow rules to current NSA maintained policy

Change-Id: Ic4ee8e24ccd8887fed151ae1e4f197512849f57b
2013-10-08 09:43:28 -04:00

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# ueventd seclabel is specified in init.rc since
# it lives in the rootfs and has no unique file type.
type ueventd, domain;
permissive ueventd;
tmpfs_domain(ueventd)
write_klog(ueventd)
security_access_policy(ueventd)
relabelto_domain(ueventd)
allow ueventd rootfs:file entrypoint;
allow ueventd init:process sigchld;
allow ueventd self:capability { chown mknod net_admin setgid fsetid sys_rawio dac_override fowner };
allow ueventd device:file create_file_perms;
allow ueventd device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow ueventd sysfs:file rw_file_perms;
allow ueventd sysfs:file setattr;
allow ueventd sysfs_type:file { relabelfrom relabelto };
allow ueventd tmpfs:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow ueventd dev_type:dir create_dir_perms;
allow ueventd dev_type:lnk_file { create unlink };
allow ueventd dev_type:chr_file { create setattr unlink };
allow ueventd dev_type:blk_file { create setattr unlink };
allow ueventd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
allow ueventd efs_file:dir search;
allow ueventd efs_file:file r_file_perms;