5c6a227ebb
Copy the final system sepolicy from oc-dev to its prebuilt dir corresponding to its version (26.0) so that we can uprev policy and start maintaining compatibility files, as well as use it for CTS tests targeting future platforms. Bug: 37896931 Test: none, this just copies the old policy. Change-Id: Ib069d505e42595c467e5d1164fb16fcb0286ab93
49 lines
1.7 KiB
Text
49 lines
1.7 KiB
Text
# Any fsck program run on untrusted block devices
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type fsck_untrusted, domain;
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# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
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allow fsck_untrusted devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
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# Allow stdin/out back to vold
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allow fsck_untrusted vold:fd use;
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allow fsck_untrusted vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
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# Run fsck on vold block devices
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allow fsck_untrusted block_device:dir search;
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allow fsck_untrusted vold_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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r_dir_file(fsck_untrusted, proc)
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# To determine if it is safe to run fsck on a filesystem, e2fsck
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# must first determine if the filesystem is mounted. To do that,
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# e2fsck scans through /proc/mounts and collects all the mounted
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# block devices. With that information, it runs stat() on each block
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# device, comparing the major and minor numbers to the filesystem
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# passed in on the command line. If there is a match, then the filesystem
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# is currently mounted and running fsck is dangerous.
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# Allow stat access to all block devices so that fsck can compare
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# major/minor values.
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allow fsck_untrusted dev_type:blk_file getattr;
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# Untrusted fsck should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data
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neverallow fsck_untrusted {
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boot_block_device
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frp_block_device
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metadata_block_device
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recovery_block_device
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root_block_device
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swap_block_device
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system_block_device
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userdata_block_device
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cache_block_device
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dm_device
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}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
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# Only allow entry from vold via fsck binaries
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neverallow { domain -vold } fsck_untrusted:process transition;
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neverallow * fsck_untrusted:process dyntransition;
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neverallow fsck_untrusted { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;
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