75806ef3c5
Ideally, public should only contain APIs (types / attributes) for
vendor. The other statements like allow/neverallow/typeattributes are
regarded as implementation detail for platform and should be in private.
Bug: 232023812
Test: m selinux_policy
Test: diff <(git diff --staged | grep "^-" | cut -b2- | sort) \
<(git diff --staged | grep "^+" | cut -b2- | sort)
Test: remove comments on plat_sepolicy.cil, replace base_typeattr_*
to base_typeattr and then compare old and new plat_sepolicy.cil
Change-Id: I5e7d2da4465ab0216de6bacdf03077d37f6ffe12
127 lines
3.5 KiB
Text
127 lines
3.5 KiB
Text
typeattribute logd coredomain;
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init_daemon_domain(logd)
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# Access device logging gating property
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get_prop(logd, device_logging_prop)
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# logd is not allowed to write anywhere other than /data/misc/logd, and then
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# only on userdebug or eng builds
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neverallow logd {
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file_type
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-runtime_event_log_tags_file
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# shell_data_file access is needed to dump bugreports
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-shell_data_file
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userdebug_or_eng(`-coredump_file -misc_logd_file')
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with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
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}:file { create write append };
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# protect the event-log-tags file
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neverallow {
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domain
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-appdomain # covered below
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-bootstat
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-dumpstate
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-init
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-logd
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userdebug_or_eng(`-logpersist')
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-servicemanager
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-system_server
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-surfaceflinger
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-zygote
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} runtime_event_log_tags_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
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neverallow {
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appdomain
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-bluetooth
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-platform_app
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-priv_app
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-radio
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-shell
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userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
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-system_app
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} runtime_event_log_tags_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
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# Only binder communication between logd and system_server is allowed
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binder_use(logd)
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binder_service(logd)
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binder_call(logd, system_server)
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add_service(logd, logd_service)
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allow logd logcat_service:service_manager find;
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# Read access to pseudo filesystems.
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r_dir_file(logd, cgroup)
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r_dir_file(logd, cgroup_v2)
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r_dir_file(logd, proc_kmsg)
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r_dir_file(logd, proc_meminfo)
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allow logd self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid setpcap sys_nice audit_control };
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allow logd self:global_capability2_class_set syslog;
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allow logd self:netlink_audit_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_write };
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allow logd kernel:system syslog_read;
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allow logd kmsg_device:chr_file { getattr w_file_perms };
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allow logd system_data_file:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
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allow logd packages_list_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow logd pstorefs:dir search;
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allow logd pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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# Access to /data/misc/logd/event-log-tags
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allow logd misc_logd_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow logd misc_logd_file:file rw_file_perms;
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')
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allow logd runtime_event_log_tags_file:file rw_file_perms;
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r_dir_file(logd, domain)
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allow logd kernel:system syslog_mod;
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control_logd(logd)
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read_runtime_log_tags(logd)
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allow runtime_event_log_tags_file tmpfs:filesystem associate;
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# Typically harmlessly blindly trying to access via liblog
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# event tag mapping while in the untrusted_app domain.
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# Access for that domain is controlled and gated via the
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# event log tag service (albeit at a performance penalty,
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# expected to be locally cached).
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dontaudit domain runtime_event_log_tags_file:file { map open read };
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# Logd sets defaults if certain properties are empty.
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set_prop(logd, logd_prop)
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###
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### Neverallow rules
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###
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### logd should NEVER do any of this
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# Block device access.
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neverallow logd dev_type:blk_file { read write };
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# ptrace any other app
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neverallow logd domain:process ptrace;
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# ... and nobody may ptrace me (except on userdebug or eng builds)
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neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-crash_dump -llkd') } logd:process ptrace;
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# Write to /system.
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neverallow logd system_file_type:dir_file_class_set write;
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# Write to files in /data/data or system files on /data
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neverallow logd {
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app_data_file_type
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system_data_file
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packages_list_file
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-shell_data_file # for bugreports
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}:dir_file_class_set write;
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# Only init is allowed to enter the logd domain via exec()
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neverallow { domain -init } logd:process transition;
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neverallow * logd:process dyntransition;
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# protect the event-log-tags file
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neverallow {
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domain
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-init
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-logd
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} runtime_event_log_tags_file:file no_w_file_perms;
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