826bc5d6c9
Apps should be able to read the contents of mounted OBBs.
Steps to reproduce:
1) Install com.namcobandaigames.soulcaliburgp (SoulCalibur)
2) Attempt to run the app.
Expected:
App runs successfully.
Actual:
App crashes. See denials below.
This can also be reproduced by running the newly introduced CTS
test in I2018b63b0236ce6b5aee4094e40473315b1948c3
Addresses the following denials:
avc: denied { read } for pid=4133 comm="roidJUnitRunner" name="test1.txt" dev="loop0" ino=23 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vfat:s0 tclass=file
avc: denied { open } for pid=4133 comm="roidJUnitRunner" name="test1.txt" dev="loop0" ino=23 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vfat:s0 tclass=file
avc: denied { getattr } for pid=4133 comm="roidJUnitRunner" path="/mnt/obb/f73da56689d166b5389d49ad31ecbadb/test1.txt" dev="loop0" ino=23 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vfat:s0 tclass=file
avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="loop0" ino=1 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vfat:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
(cherrypick of commit 62083414a4)
Bug: 17633509
Change-Id: I49b722b24c1c7d9ab084ebee7c1e349d8d660ffa
344 lines
13 KiB
Text
344 lines
13 KiB
Text
###
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### Domain for all zygote spawned apps
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###
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### This file is the base policy for all zygote spawned apps.
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### Other policy files, such as isolated_app.te, untrusted_app.te, etc
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### extend from this policy. Only policies which should apply to ALL
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### zygote spawned apps should be added here.
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###
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# Dalvik Compiler JIT Mapping.
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allow appdomain self:process execmem;
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allow appdomain ashmem_device:chr_file execute;
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# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from zygote.
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allow appdomain zygote:fd use;
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# gdbserver for ndk-gdb reads the zygote.
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# valgrind needs mmap exec for zygote
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allow appdomain zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
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allow appdomain self:process ptrace;
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# Read system properties managed by zygote.
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allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file read;
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# Notify zygote of death;
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allow appdomain zygote:process sigchld;
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# Notify shell and adbd of death when spawned via runas for ndk-gdb.
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allow appdomain shell:process sigchld;
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allow appdomain adbd:process sigchld;
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# child shell or gdbserver pty access for runas.
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allow appdomain devpts:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
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# Use pipes and sockets provided by system_server via binder or local socket.
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allow appdomain system_server:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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allow appdomain system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
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allow appdomain system_server:tcp_socket { read write getattr getopt shutdown };
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# Communication with other apps via fifos
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allow appdomain appdomain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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# Communicate with surfaceflinger.
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allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
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# App sandbox file accesses.
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allow appdomain app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain app_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
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# lib subdirectory of /data/data dir is system-owned.
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allow appdomain system_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain system_data_file:file { execute execute_no_trans open execmod };
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# Access to OEM provided data and apps
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allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain oemfs:file rx_file_perms;
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# Execute the shell or other system executables.
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allow appdomain shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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allow appdomain system_file:file rx_file_perms;
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# Execute dex2oat when apps call dexclassloader
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allow appdomain dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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# Read/write wallpaper file (opened by system).
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allow appdomain wallpaper_file:file { getattr read write };
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# Write to /data/anr/traces.txt.
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allow appdomain anr_data_file:dir search;
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allow appdomain anr_data_file:file { open append };
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# Allow apps to send dump information to dumpstate
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allow appdomain dumpstate:fd use;
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allow appdomain dumpstate:unix_stream_socket { read write getopt getattr shutdown };
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allow appdomain shell_data_file:file { write getattr };
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# Write to /proc/net/xt_qtaguid/ctrl file.
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allow appdomain qtaguid_proc:file rw_file_perms;
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# Everybody can read the xt_qtaguid resource tracking misc dev.
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# So allow all apps to read from /dev/xt_qtaguid.
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allow appdomain qtaguid_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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# Grant GPU access to all processes started by Zygote.
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# They need that to render the standard UI.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } gpu_device:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };
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# Use the Binder.
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binder_use(appdomain)
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# Perform binder IPC to binder services.
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binder_call(appdomain, binderservicedomain)
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# Perform binder IPC to other apps.
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binder_call(appdomain, appdomain)
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# Already connected, unnamed sockets being passed over some other IPC
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# hence no sock_file or connectto permission. This appears to be how
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# Chrome works, may need to be updated as more apps using isolated services
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# are examined.
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allow appdomain appdomain:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr read write shutdown };
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# Backup ability for every app. BMS opens and passes the fd
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# to any app that has backup ability. Hence, no open permissions here.
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allow appdomain backup_data_file:file { read write getattr };
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allow appdomain cache_backup_file:file { read write getattr };
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allow appdomain cache_backup_file:dir getattr;
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# Backup ability using 'adb backup'
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allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file getattr;
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# Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
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allow appdomain media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
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# Read and write /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
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allow appdomain radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };
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# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder.
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# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for
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# cropping or taking user photos.
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allow untrusted_app system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr };
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# Access SDcard via the fuse mount.
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allow appdomain fuse:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain fuse:file create_file_perms;
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# Access OBBs (vfat images) mounted by vold (b/17633509)
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allow appdomain vfat:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain vfat:file r_file_perms;
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# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
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# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
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#
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# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
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# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
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allow appdomain usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
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allow appdomain usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
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# For art.
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
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# /data/dalvik-cache/profiles
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_profiles_data_file:dir { search getattr };
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_profiles_data_file:file rw_file_perms;
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# Allow any app to read shared RELRO files.
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allow appdomain shared_relro_file:dir search;
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allow appdomain shared_relro_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Allow apps to read/execute installed binaries
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allow appdomain apk_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain apk_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod };
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# /data/resource-cache
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allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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###
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### CTS-specific rules
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###
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# For cts/tests/tests/permission/src/android/permission/cts/FileSystemPermissionTest.java.
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# testRunAsHasCorrectCapabilities
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allow appdomain runas_exec:file getattr;
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# Others are either allowed elsewhere or not desired.
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# For cts/tests/tests/security/src/android/security/cts/SELinuxTest.java
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# Check SELinux policy and contexts.
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selinux_check_access(appdomain)
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selinux_check_context(appdomain)
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# Enable reading of current selinux policy file
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allow appdomain kernel:security read_policy;
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# Validate that each process is running in the correct security context.
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allow appdomain domain:process getattr;
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# logd access
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read_logd(appdomain)
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control_logd(appdomain)
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# application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
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allow appdomain zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
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allow appdomain keystore:keystore_key { test get insert delete exist saw sign verify };
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use_keystore(appdomain)
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###
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### Neverallow rules
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###
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### These are things that Android apps should NEVER be able to do
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###
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# Superuser capabilities.
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# bluetooth requires net_admin and wake_alarm.
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } self:capability *;
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } self:capability2 *;
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# Block device access.
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neverallow appdomain dev_type:blk_file { read write };
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# Access to any of the following character devices.
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neverallow appdomain {
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audio_device
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camera_device
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dm_device
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radio_device
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gps_device
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rpmsg_device
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}:chr_file { read write };
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# Note: Try expanding list of app domains in the future.
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neverallow { untrusted_app isolated_app shell } graphics_device:chr_file { read write };
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neverallow { appdomain -nfc } nfc_device:chr_file
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{ read write };
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } hci_attach_dev:chr_file
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{ read write };
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neverallow appdomain tee_device:chr_file { read write };
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# Privileged netlink socket interfaces.
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neverallow appdomain
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self:{
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netlink_socket
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netlink_firewall_socket
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netlink_tcpdiag_socket
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netlink_nflog_socket
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netlink_xfrm_socket
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netlink_audit_socket
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netlink_ip6fw_socket
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netlink_dnrt_socket
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} *;
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# These messages are broadcast messages from the kernel to userspace.
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# Do not allow the writing of netlink messages, which has been a source
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# of rooting vulns in the past.
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neverallow appdomain self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { write append };
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# Sockets under /dev/socket that are not specifically typed.
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neverallow appdomain socket_device:sock_file write;
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# Unix domain sockets.
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neverallow appdomain adbd_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow appdomain installd_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -radio -shell -system_app }
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property_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow { appdomain -radio } rild_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow appdomain vold_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow appdomain zygote_socket:sock_file write;
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# ptrace access to non-app domains.
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neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process ptrace;
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# Write access to /proc/pid entries for any non-app domain.
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neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:file write;
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# signal access to non-app domains.
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# sigchld allowed for parent death notification.
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# signull allowed for kill(pid, 0) existence test.
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# All others prohibited.
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neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process
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{ sigkill sigstop signal };
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# Transition to a non-app domain.
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# Exception for the shell domain, can transition to runas, etc.
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neverallow { appdomain -shell } { domain -appdomain }:process
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{ transition dyntransition };
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# Write to rootfs.
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neverallow appdomain rootfs:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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# Write to /system.
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neverallow appdomain system_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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# Write to entrypoint executables.
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neverallow appdomain exec_type:file
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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# Write to system-owned parts of /data.
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# This is the default type for anything under /data not otherwise
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# specified in file_contexts. Define a different type for portions
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# that should be writable by apps.
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# Exception for system_app for Settings.
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neverallow { appdomain -system_app }
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system_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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# Write to various other parts of /data.
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neverallow appdomain drm_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow appdomain gps_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
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apk_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
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apk_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
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apk_private_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
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apk_private_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -shell }
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shell_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth }
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bluetooth_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow appdomain
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keystore_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow appdomain
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systemkeys_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow appdomain
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wifi_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow appdomain
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dhcp_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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# Access to factory files.
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neverallow appdomain efs_file:dir_file_class_set write;
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neverallow { appdomain -shell } efs_file:dir_file_class_set read;
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# Write to various pseudo file systems.
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -nfc }
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sysfs:dir_file_class_set write;
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neverallow appdomain
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proc:dir_file_class_set write;
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# Access to syslog(2) or /proc/kmsg.
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neverallow { appdomain -system_app }
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kernel:system { syslog_mod syslog_console };
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neverallow { appdomain -system_app -shell }
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kernel:system syslog_read;
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# Ability to perform any filesystem operation other than statfs(2).
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# i.e. no mount(2), unmount(2), etc.
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neverallow appdomain fs_type:filesystem ~getattr;
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# Ability to set system properties.
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neverallow { appdomain -system_app -radio -shell -bluetooth }
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property_type:property_service set;
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