platform_system_sepolicy/public/shell.te
dcashman cc39f63773 Split general policy into public and private components.
Divide policy into public and private components.  This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies.  The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation.  Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.

Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal.  For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.

Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.

Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c
2016-10-06 13:09:06 -07:00

184 lines
5.7 KiB
Text

# Domain for shell processes spawned by ADB or console service.
type shell, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
type shell_exec, exec_type, file_type;
# Create and use network sockets.
net_domain(shell)
# Run app_process.
# XXX Transition into its own domain?
app_domain(shell)
# logcat
read_logd(shell)
control_logd(shell)
# logcat -L (directly, or via dumpstate)
allow shell pstorefs:dir search;
allow shell pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
# logpersistd (nee logcatd) files
userdebug_or_eng(`
allow shell misc_logd_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow shell misc_logd_file:file r_file_perms;
')
# Root fs.
allow shell rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
# read files in /data/anr
allow shell anr_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow shell anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# Access /data/local/tmp.
allow shell shell_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow shell shell_data_file:file create_file_perms;
allow shell shell_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
allow shell shell_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
# Access /data/misc/profman.
allow shell profman_dump_data_file:dir { search getattr write remove_name };
allow shell profman_dump_data_file:file { getattr unlink };
# Read/execute files in /data/nativetest
userdebug_or_eng(`
allow shell nativetest_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow shell nativetest_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
')
# adb bugreport
unix_socket_connect(shell, dumpstate, dumpstate)
allow shell devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow shell tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow shell console_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow shell input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
allow shell input_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
r_dir_file(shell, system_file)
allow shell system_file:file x_file_perms;
allow shell toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow shell shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow shell zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
r_dir_file(shell, apk_data_file)
# Set properties.
set_prop(shell, shell_prop)
set_prop(shell, ctl_bugreport_prop)
set_prop(shell, ctl_dumpstate_prop)
set_prop(shell, dumpstate_prop)
set_prop(shell, debug_prop)
set_prop(shell, powerctl_prop)
set_prop(shell, log_tag_prop)
set_prop(shell, wifi_log_prop)
userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(shell, log_prop)')
userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(shell, logpersistd_logging_prop)')
# systrace support - allow atrace to run
allow shell debugfs_tracing:dir r_dir_perms;
allow shell debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
allow shell debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
allow shell atrace_exec:file rx_file_perms;
userdebug_or_eng(`
# "systrace --boot" support - allow boottrace service to run
allow shell boottrace_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow shell boottrace_data_file:file create_file_perms;
set_prop(shell, persist_debug_prop)
')
# allow shell to run dmesg
allow shell kernel:system syslog_read;
# allow shell access to services
allow shell servicemanager:service_manager list;
# don't allow shell to access GateKeeper service
allow shell { service_manager_type -gatekeeper_service -netd_service }:service_manager find;
# allow shell to look through /proc/ for ps, top, netstat
r_dir_file(shell, proc)
r_dir_file(shell, proc_net)
allow shell proc_interrupts:file r_file_perms;
allow shell proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
allow shell proc_stat:file r_file_perms;
allow shell proc_timer:file r_file_perms;
allow shell proc_zoneinfo:file r_file_perms;
r_dir_file(shell, cgroup)
allow shell domain:dir { search open read getattr };
allow shell domain:{ file lnk_file } { open read getattr };
# statvfs() of /proc and other labeled filesystems
# (yaffs2, jffs2, ext2, ext3, ext4, xfs, btrfs, f2fs, squashfs)
allow shell { proc labeledfs }:filesystem getattr;
# stat() of /dev
allow shell device:dir getattr;
# allow shell to read /proc/pid/attr/current for ps -Z
allow shell domain:process getattr;
# Allow pulling the SELinux policy for CTS purposes
allow shell selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
allow shell selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
# enable shell domain to read/write files/dirs for bootchart data
# User will creates the start and stop file via adb shell
# and read other files created by init process under /data/bootchart
allow shell bootchart_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow shell bootchart_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Make sure strace works for the non-privileged shell user
allow shell self:process ptrace;
# allow shell to get battery info
allow shell sysfs_batteryinfo:file r_file_perms;
allow shell sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
# Allow access to ion memory allocation device.
allow shell ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# Access to /data/media.
# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
# accesses to the underlying FS.
allow shell media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow shell media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
#
# filesystem test for insecure chr_file's is done
# via a host side test
#
allow shell dev_type:dir r_dir_perms;
allow shell dev_type:chr_file getattr;
# /dev/fd is a symlink
allow shell proc:lnk_file getattr;
#
# filesystem test for insucre blk_file's is done
# via hostside test
#
allow shell dev_type:blk_file getattr;
###
### Neverallow rules
###
# Do not allow shell to hard link to any files.
# In particular, if shell hard links to app data
# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
# bugs, so we want to ensure the shell user never has this
# capability.
neverallow shell file_type:file link;
# Do not allow privileged socket ioctl commands
neverallowxperm shell domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
# limit shell access to sensitive char drivers to
# only getattr required for host side test.
neverallow shell {
fuse_device
hw_random_device
kmem_device
}:chr_file ~getattr;
# Limit shell to only getattr on blk devices for host side tests.
neverallow shell dev_type:blk_file ~getattr;