e06ed7d09a
(cherry picked from commit 6c3f2831ac)
Allow priv_app, uncrypt, update_engine to access the OTA packages at
/data/ota_package (both A/B and non-A/B). GMSCore (priv_app) checks
the existence of the folder, and downloads the package there if present.
Bug: 28944800
Change-Id: I3c0717861fce7f93b33874a99f6a4a55567612a5
145 lines
5.4 KiB
Text
145 lines
5.4 KiB
Text
###
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### A domain for further sandboxing privileged apps.
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###
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type priv_app, domain, domain_deprecated;
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app_domain(priv_app)
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# Access the network.
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net_domain(priv_app)
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# Access bluetooth.
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bluetooth_domain(priv_app)
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# webview crash handling depends on self ptrace (b/27697529, b/20150694, b/19277529#comment7)
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allow priv_app self:process ptrace;
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# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
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# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
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allow priv_app app_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
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# android.process.media uses /dev/mtp_usb
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allow priv_app mtp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
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# Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
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create_pty(priv_app)
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allow priv_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app radio_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;
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allow priv_app recovery_service:service_manager find;
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# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
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# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
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allow priv_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
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# Write to /cache.
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allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms;
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# Write to /data/ota_package for OTA packages.
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allow priv_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
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allow priv_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Access to /data/media.
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allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
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# running "adb install foo.apk".
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allow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Allow verifier to access staged apks.
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allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms;
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# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
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allow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
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# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
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# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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')
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# Allow GMS core to scan executables on the system partition
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allow priv_app exec_type:file { getattr read open };
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# For AppFuse.
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allow priv_app vold:fd use;
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allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write };
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allow priv_app app_fuse_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
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allow priv_app app_fuse_file:file rw_file_perms;
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# /sys and /proc access
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r_dir_file(priv_app, sysfs_type)
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r_dir_file(priv_app, proc)
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r_dir_file(priv_app, rootfs)
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# access the mac address
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allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR;
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# Allow GMS core to communicate with update_engine for A/B update.
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binder_call(priv_app, update_engine)
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allow priv_app update_engine_service:service_manager find;
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# Allow Phone to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
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allow priv_app ringtone_file:file { getattr read write };
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# Access to /data/preloads
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allow priv_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow priv_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# Receive or send uevent messages.
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neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
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# Receive or send generic netlink messages
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neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_socket *;
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# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
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# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
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neverallow priv_app debugfs:file read;
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# Do not allow privileged apps to register services.
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# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
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# services.
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neverallow priv_app service_manager_type:service_manager add;
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# Do not allow privileged apps to connect to the property service
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# or set properties. b/10243159
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neverallow priv_app property_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow priv_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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neverallow priv_app property_type:property_service set;
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# Do not allow priv_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
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# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
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# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
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# constraints. As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
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# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
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# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
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# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
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# and priv_app is allowed fork permission to itself.
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neverallow priv_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
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# Do not allow priv_app to hard link to any files.
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# In particular, if priv_app links to other app data
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# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
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# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
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# bugs, so we want to ensure priv_app never has this
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# capability.
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neverallow priv_app file_type:file link;
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