ab02397814
Give system_server and network_stack the same permissions as netd. This is needed as we are continuously moving code out of netd into network_stack and system_server. Test: TH Bug: 233300834 Change-Id: I9559185081213fdeb33019733654ce95af816d99
241 lines
9 KiB
Text
241 lines
9 KiB
Text
###
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### Domain for all zygote spawned apps
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###
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### This file is the base policy for all zygote spawned apps.
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### Other policy files, such as isolated_app.te, untrusted_app.te, etc
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### extend from this policy. Only policies which should apply to ALL
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### zygote spawned apps should be added here.
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###
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type appdomain_tmpfs, file_type;
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###
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### Neverallow rules
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###
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### These are things that Android apps should NEVER be able to do
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###
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# Superuser capabilities.
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# bluetooth requires net_admin and wake_alarm. network stack app requires net_admin.
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -network_stack } self:capability_class_set *;
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# Block device access.
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neverallow appdomain dev_type:blk_file { read write };
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# Access to any of the following character devices.
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neverallow appdomain {
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audio_device
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camera_device
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dm_device
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radio_device
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rpmsg_device
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video_device
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}:chr_file { read write };
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# Note: Try expanding list of app domains in the future.
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neverallow { untrusted_app isolated_app shell } graphics_device:chr_file { read write };
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neverallow { appdomain -nfc } nfc_device:chr_file
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{ read write };
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } hci_attach_dev:chr_file
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{ read write };
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neverallow appdomain tee_device:chr_file { read write };
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# Privileged netlink socket interfaces.
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neverallow { appdomain -network_stack }
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domain:{
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netlink_tcpdiag_socket
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netlink_nflog_socket
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netlink_xfrm_socket
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netlink_audit_socket
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netlink_dnrt_socket
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} *;
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# These messages are broadcast messages from the kernel to userspace.
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# Do not allow the writing of netlink messages, which has been a source
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# of rooting vulns in the past.
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neverallow { appdomain -network_stack }
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domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { write append };
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# Sockets under /dev/socket that are not specifically typed.
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neverallow appdomain socket_device:sock_file write;
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# Unix domain sockets.
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neverallow appdomain adbd_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow { appdomain -radio } rild_socket:sock_file write;
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# ptrace access to non-app domains.
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neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process ptrace;
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# The Android security model guarantees the confidentiality and integrity
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# of application data and execution state. Ptrace bypasses those
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# confidentiality guarantees. Disallow ptrace access from system components
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# to apps. Crash_dump is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
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# produce stack traces. llkd is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
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# inspect stack traces for live lock conditions.
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neverallow {
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domain
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-appdomain
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-crash_dump
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userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd')
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} appdomain:process ptrace;
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# Read or write access to /proc/pid entries for any non-app domain.
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# A different form of hidepid=2 like protections
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neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:file no_w_file_perms;
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neverallow { appdomain -shell } { domain -appdomain }:file no_rw_file_perms;
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# signal access to non-app domains.
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# sigchld allowed for parent death notification.
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# signull allowed for kill(pid, 0) existence test.
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# All others prohibited.
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# -perfetto is to allow shell (which is an appdomain) to kill perfetto
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# (see private/shell.te).
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neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain -perfetto }:process
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{ sigkill sigstop signal };
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# Write to rootfs.
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neverallow appdomain rootfs:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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# Write to /system.
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neverallow appdomain system_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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# Write to entrypoint executables.
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neverallow appdomain exec_type:file
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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# Write to system-owned parts of /data.
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# This is the default type for anything under /data not otherwise
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# specified in file_contexts. Define a different type for portions
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# that should be writable by apps.
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neverallow appdomain system_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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# Write to various other parts of /data.
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neverallow appdomain drm_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
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apk_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
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apk_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
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apk_private_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
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apk_private_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -shell }
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shell_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth }
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bluetooth_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { domain -credstore -init } credstore_data_file:dir_file_class_set *;
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neverallow appdomain
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keystore_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow appdomain
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systemkeys_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow appdomain
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wifi_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow appdomain
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dhcp_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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# access tmp apk files
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neverallow { appdomain -untrusted_app_all -platform_app -priv_app }
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{ apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir_file_class_set *;
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neverallow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:{ devfile_class_set dir fifo_file lnk_file sock_file } *;
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neverallow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file ~{ getattr read };
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# Access to factory files.
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neverallow appdomain efs_file:dir_file_class_set write;
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neverallow { appdomain -shell } efs_file:dir_file_class_set read;
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# Write to various pseudo file systems.
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -nfc }
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sysfs:dir_file_class_set write;
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neverallow appdomain
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proc:dir_file_class_set write;
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# Access to syslog(2) or /proc/kmsg.
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neverallow appdomain kernel:system { syslog_read syslog_mod syslog_console };
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# SELinux is not an API for apps to use
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neverallow { appdomain -shell } *:security { compute_av check_context };
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neverallow { appdomain -shell } *:netlink_selinux_socket *;
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# Ability to perform any filesystem operation other than statfs(2).
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# i.e. no mount(2), unmount(2), etc.
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neverallow appdomain fs_type:filesystem ~getattr;
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# prevent creation/manipulation of globally readable symlinks
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neverallow appdomain {
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apk_data_file
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cache_file
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cache_recovery_file
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dev_type
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rootfs
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system_file
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tmpfs
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}:lnk_file no_w_file_perms;
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# Applications should use the activity model for receiving events
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neverallow {
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appdomain
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-shell # bugreport
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} input_device:chr_file ~getattr;
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# Do not allow access to Bluetooth-related system properties except for a few allowed domains.
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# neverallow rules for access to Bluetooth-related data files are above.
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neverallow {
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appdomain
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-bluetooth
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-system_app
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} { bluetooth_audio_hal_prop bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop bluetooth_prop exported_bluetooth_prop }:file create_file_perms;
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# allow system_app to access Nfc-related system properties.
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set_prop(system_app, nfc_prop)
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# allow system_app to access radio_config system properties.
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set_prop(system_app, radio_control_prop)
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# Apps cannot access proc_uid_time_in_state
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neverallow appdomain proc_uid_time_in_state:file *;
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# Apps cannot access proc_uid_concurrent_active_time
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neverallow appdomain proc_uid_concurrent_active_time:file *;
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# Apps cannot access proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time
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neverallow appdomain proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time:file *;
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# Apps cannot access proc_uid_cpupower
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neverallow appdomain proc_uid_cpupower:file *;
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# Apps may not read /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6}. These files leak information across the
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# application boundary. VPN apps may use the ConnectivityManager.getConnectionOwnerUid() API to
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# perform UID lookups.
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neverallow { appdomain -shell } proc_net_tcp_udp:file *;
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# Apps cannot access bootstrap files. The bootstrap files are only for
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# extremely early processes (like init, etc.) which are started before
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# the runtime APEX is activated and Bionic libs are provided from there.
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# If app process accesses (or even load/execute) the bootstrap files,
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# it might cause problems such as ODR violation, etc.
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neverallow appdomain system_bootstrap_lib_file:file
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{ open read write append execute execute_no_trans map };
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neverallow appdomain system_bootstrap_lib_file:dir
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{ open read getattr search };
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# Allow to read ro.vendor.camera.extensions.enabled
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get_prop(appdomain, camera2_extensions_prop)
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# Allow to ro.camerax.extensions.enabled
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get_prop(appdomain, camerax_extensions_prop)
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