platform_system_sepolicy/fsck.te
Jeff Sharkey 5a5b364c54 Separate fsck domains to protect userdata.
Create new vold_fsck domain that only has access to vold_block
devices to prevent any access to internal userdata.

Change-Id: I25ddcd16cbf83d7a25b70bc64d95f5345d0d5731
2015-03-31 08:13:20 -07:00

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# Any fsck program run by init
type fsck, domain;
type fsck_exec, exec_type, file_type;
init_daemon_domain(fsck)
# /dev/__null__ created by init prior to policy load,
# open fd inherited by fsck.
allow fsck tmpfs:chr_file { read write ioctl };
# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
allow fsck devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
# Run fsck on certain block devices
allow fsck block_device:dir search;
allow fsck userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allow fsck cache_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
###
### neverallow rules
###
# fsck should never be run on these block devices
neverallow fsck {
boot_block_device
frp_block_device
metadata_block_device
recovery_block_device
root_block_device
swap_block_device
system_block_device
vold_device
}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
# Only allow entry from init via fsck binaries
neverallow { domain -init } fsck:process transition;
neverallow domain fsck:process dyntransition;
neverallow fsck { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;