91c290b829
Just use notdevfile_class_set to pick up all non-device file classes. Change-Id: Ib3604537ccfc25da67823f0f2b5d70b84edfaadf Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
172 lines
6.1 KiB
Text
172 lines
6.1 KiB
Text
# Rules for all domains.
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# Allow reaping by init.
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allow domain init:process sigchld;
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# Read access to properties mapping.
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allow domain kernel:fd use;
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allow domain tmpfs:file { read getattr };
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# Search /storage/emulated tmpfs mount.
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allow domain tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Intra-domain accesses.
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allow domain self:process ~{ execmem execstack execheap ptrace };
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allow domain self:fd use;
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allow domain self:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow domain self:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow domain self:{ fifo_file file } rw_file_perms;
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allow domain self:{ unix_dgram_socket unix_stream_socket } *;
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# Inherit or receive open files from others.
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allow domain init:fd use;
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allow domain system_server:fd use;
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# Connect to adbd and use a socket transferred from it.
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# This is used for e.g. adb backup/restore.
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allow domain adbd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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allow domain adbd:fd use;
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allow domain adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt read write shutdown };
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###
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### Talk to debuggerd.
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###
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allow domain debuggerd:process sigchld;
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allow domain debuggerd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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# b/9858255 - debuggerd sockets are not getting properly labeled.
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# TODO: Remove this temporary workaround.
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allow domain init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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# Root fs.
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allow domain rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow domain rootfs:file r_file_perms;
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allow domain rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Device accesses.
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allow domain device:dir search;
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allow domain dev_type:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow domain devpts:dir search;
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allow domain device:file read;
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allow domain socket_device:dir search;
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allow domain owntty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow domain null_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow domain zero_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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allow domain ashmem_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow domain binder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow domain ptmx_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow domain powervr_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow domain log_device:dir search;
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allow domain log_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow domain alarm_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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allow domain urandom_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow domain random_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow domain properties_device:file r_file_perms;
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# Filesystem accesses.
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allow domain fs_type:filesystem getattr;
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allow domain fs_type:dir getattr;
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# System file accesses.
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allow domain system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow domain system_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow domain system_file:file execute;
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allow domain system_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Read files already opened under /data.
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allow domain system_data_file:dir { search getattr };
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allow domain system_data_file:file { getattr read };
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allow domain system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Read apk files under /data/app.
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allow domain apk_data_file:dir { getattr search };
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allow domain apk_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Read /data/dalvik-cache.
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allow domain dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
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allow domain dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Read already opened /cache files.
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allow domain cache_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow domain cache_file:file { getattr read };
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allow domain cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Read timezone related information
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r_dir_file(domain, zoneinfo_data_file)
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# For /acct/uid/*/tasks.
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allow domain cgroup:dir { search write };
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allow domain cgroup:file w_file_perms;
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#Allow access to ion memory allocation device
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allow domain ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# Read access to pseudo filesystems.
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r_dir_file(domain, proc)
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r_dir_file(domain, sysfs)
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r_dir_file(domain, sysfs_devices_system_cpu)
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r_dir_file(domain, inotify)
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r_dir_file(domain, cgroup)
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r_dir_file(domain, proc_net)
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# debugfs access
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allow domain debugfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow domain debugfs:file w_file_perms;
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# Get SELinux enforcing status.
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selinux_getenforce(domain)
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# security files
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allow domain security_file:dir { search getattr };
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allow domain security_file:file getattr;
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######## Backwards compatibility - Unlabeled files ############
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# Revert to DAC rules when looking at unlabeled files. Over time, the number
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# of unlabeled files should decrease.
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# TODO: delete these rules in the future.
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#
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# Note on relabelfrom: We allow any app relabelfrom, but without the relabelto
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# capability, it's essentially useless. This is needed to allow an app with
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# relabelto to relabel unlabeled files.
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#
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allow domain unlabeled:notdevfile_class_set { create_file_perms relabelfrom };
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allow domain unlabeled:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom };
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neverallow { domain -relabeltodomain } *:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# Only init should be able to load SELinux policies.
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# The first load technically occurs while still in the kernel domain,
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# but this does not trigger a denial since there is no policy yet.
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# Policy reload requires allowing this to the init domain.
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neverallow { domain -init } kernel:security load_policy;
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# Only init prior to switching context should be able to set enforcing mode.
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# init starts in kernel domain and switches to init domain via setcon in
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# the init.rc, so the setenforce occurs while still in kernel. After
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# switching domains, there is never any need to setenforce again by init.
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neverallow { domain -kernel } kernel:security { setenforce setcheckreqprot };
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# Only init, ueventd and system_server should be able to access HW RNG
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neverallow { domain -init -system_server -ueventd -unconfineddomain } hw_random_device:chr_file *;
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# Ensure that all entrypoint executables are in exec_type.
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neverallow domain { file_type -exec_type }:file entrypoint;
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# Ensure that nothing in userspace can access /dev/mem or /dev/kmem
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neverallow { domain -kernel -ueventd -init } kmem_device:chr_file *;
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neverallow domain kmem_device:chr_file ~{ create relabelto unlink setattr };
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# Only init should be able to configure kernel usermodehelpers or
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# security-sensitive proc settings.
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neverallow { domain -init } usermodehelper:file { append write };
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neverallow { domain -init } proc_security:file { append write };
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# No domain should be allowed to ptrace init.
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neverallow domain init:process ptrace;
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# Init can't receive binder calls. If this neverallow rule is being
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# triggered, it's probably due to a service with no SELinux domain.
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neverallow domain init:binder call;
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