3f40d4f4b1
Only allow to domains as required and amend the existing neverallow on block_device:blk_file to replace the exemption for unconfineddomain with an explicit whitelist. The neverallow does not check other device types as specific ones may need to be writable by device-specific domains. Change-Id: I0f2f1f565e886ae110a719a08aa3a1e7e9f23e8c Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
25 lines
841 B
Text
25 lines
841 B
Text
# init switches to init domain (via init.rc).
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type init, domain;
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# init is unconfined.
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unconfined_domain(init)
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tmpfs_domain(init)
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relabelto_domain(init)
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# add a rule to handle unlabelled mounts
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allow init unlabeled:filesystem mount;
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allow init self:capability { sys_rawio mknod };
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allow init dev_type:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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allow init fs_type:filesystem *;
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allow init {fs_type dev_type file_type}:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
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allow init kernel:security load_policy;
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allow init usermodehelper:file rw_file_perms;
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allow init proc_security:file rw_file_perms;
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# Transitions to seclabel processes in init.rc
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allow init adbd:process transition;
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allow init healthd:process transition;
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allow init recovery:process transition;
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allow init shell:process transition;
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allow init ueventd:process transition;
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allow init watchdogd:process transition;
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