9b2e0cbeea
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
22 lines
757 B
Text
22 lines
757 B
Text
# sgdisk called from vold
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type sgdisk, domain;
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type sgdisk_exec, exec_type, file_type;
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# Allowed to read/write low-level partition tables
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allow sgdisk block_device:dir search;
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allow sgdisk vold_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp()
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allow sgdisk devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
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# Allow stdin/out back to vold
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allow sgdisk vold:fd use;
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allow sgdisk vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
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# Used to probe kernel to reload partition tables
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allow sgdisk self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
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# Only allow entry from vold
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neverallow { domain -vold } sgdisk:process transition;
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neverallow * sgdisk:process dyntransition;
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neverallow sgdisk { file_type fs_type -sgdisk_exec }:file entrypoint;
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