83ac242fb9
This leaves only the existence of blkid and blkid_untrusted domains as
public API. All other rules are implementation details of these
domains' policy and are thus now private.
Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for
disappearance of all allow rules to do with blkid_current and
blkid_untrusted_current (as expected).
Bug: 31364497
Change-Id: I0dda2feeb64608b204006eecd8a7c9b9c7bb2b81
20 lines
670 B
Text
20 lines
670 B
Text
# blkid called from vold
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type blkid_exec, exec_type, file_type;
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# Allowed read-only access to encrypted devices to extract UUID/label
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allow blkid block_device:dir search;
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allow blkid userdata_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
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allow blkid dm_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
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# Allow stdin/out back to vold
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allow blkid vold:fd use;
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allow blkid vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
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# For blkid launched through popen()
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allow blkid blkid_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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# Only allow entry from vold
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neverallow { domain -vold } blkid:process transition;
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neverallow * blkid:process dyntransition;
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neverallow blkid { file_type fs_type -blkid_exec -shell_exec }:file entrypoint;
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