83ac242fb9
This leaves only the existence of blkid and blkid_untrusted domains as
public API. All other rules are implementation details of these
domains' policy and are thus now private.
Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for
disappearance of all allow rules to do with blkid_current and
blkid_untrusted_current (as expected).
Bug: 31364497
Change-Id: I0dda2feeb64608b204006eecd8a7c9b9c7bb2b81
35 lines
1 KiB
Text
35 lines
1 KiB
Text
# blkid for untrusted block devices
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# Allowed read-only access to vold block devices to extract UUID/label
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allow blkid_untrusted block_device:dir search;
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allow blkid_untrusted vold_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
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# Allow stdin/out back to vold
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allow blkid_untrusted vold:fd use;
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allow blkid_untrusted vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
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# For blkid launched through popen()
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allow blkid_untrusted blkid_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# Untrusted blkid should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data
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neverallow blkid_untrusted {
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boot_block_device
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frp_block_device
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metadata_block_device
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recovery_block_device
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root_block_device
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swap_block_device
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system_block_device
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userdata_block_device
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cache_block_device
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dm_device
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}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
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# Only allow entry from vold via blkid binary
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neverallow { domain -vold } blkid_untrusted:process transition;
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neverallow * blkid_untrusted:process dyntransition;
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neverallow blkid_untrusted { file_type fs_type -blkid_exec -shell_exec }:file entrypoint;
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