75806ef3c5
Ideally, public should only contain APIs (types / attributes) for
vendor. The other statements like allow/neverallow/typeattributes are
regarded as implementation detail for platform and should be in private.
Bug: 232023812
Test: m selinux_policy
Test: diff <(git diff --staged | grep "^-" | cut -b2- | sort) \
<(git diff --staged | grep "^+" | cut -b2- | sort)
Test: remove comments on plat_sepolicy.cil, replace base_typeattr_*
to base_typeattr and then compare old and new plat_sepolicy.cil
Change-Id: I5e7d2da4465ab0216de6bacdf03077d37f6ffe12
50 lines
1.9 KiB
Text
50 lines
1.9 KiB
Text
# applies all permissions to hal_omx NOT hal_omx_server
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# since OMX must always be in its own process.
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binder_call(hal_omx_server, binderservicedomain)
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binder_call(hal_omx_server, { appdomain -isolated_app })
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# Allow hal_omx_server access to composer sync fences
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allow hal_omx_server hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
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allow hal_omx_server ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow hal_omx_server hal_camera:fd use;
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crash_dump_fallback(hal_omx_server)
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# Recieve gralloc buffer FDs from bufferhubd. Note that hal_omx_server never
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# directly connects to bufferhubd via PDX. Instead, a VR app acts as a bridge
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# between those two: it talks to hal_omx_server via Binder and talks to bufferhubd
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# via PDX. Thus, there is no need to use pdx_client macro.
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allow hal_omx_server bufferhubd:fd use;
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hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_omx, hal_omx_hwservice)
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allow hal_omx_client hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
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get_prop(hal_omx_client, media_variant_prop)
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get_prop(hal_omx_server, media_variant_prop)
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binder_call(hal_omx_client, hal_omx_server)
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binder_call(hal_omx_server, hal_omx_client)
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# hal_omx_server should never execute any executable without a
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# domain transition
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neverallow hal_omx_server { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
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# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
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# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
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# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
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# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
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# hardware/content. Etc.
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#
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# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
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# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
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# Lengthier explanation here:
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# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
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neverallow hal_omx_server domain:{ udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
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neverallow hal_omx_server { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:tcp_socket *;
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