75e2ef9260
Prior to this change, the init and recovery domains were allowed unrestricted use of context= mount options to force all files within a given filesystem to be treated as having a security context specified at mount time. The context= mount option can be used in device-specific fstab.<board> files to assign a context to filesystems that do not support labeling such as vfat where the default label of sdcard_external is not appropriate (e.g. /firmware on hammerhead). Restrict the use of context= mount options to types marked with the contextmount_type attribute, and then remove write access from such types from unconfineddomain and prohibit write access to such types via neverallow. This ensures that the no write to /system restriction cannot be bypassed via context= mount. Change-Id: I4e773fadc9e11328d13a0acec164124ad6e840c1 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
91 lines
3.6 KiB
Text
91 lines
3.6 KiB
Text
#######################################################
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#
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# This is the unconfined template. This template is the base policy
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# which is used by daemons and other privileged components of
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# Android.
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#
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# Historically, this template was called "unconfined" because it
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# allowed the domain to do anything it wanted. Over time,
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# this has changed, and will continue to change in the future.
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# The rules in this file will be removed when no remaining
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# unconfined domains require it, or when the rules contradict
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# Android security best practices. Domains which need rules not
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# provided by the unconfined template should add them directly to
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# the relevant policy.
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#
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# The use of this template is discouraged.
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######################################################
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allow unconfineddomain self:capability ~{ sys_ptrace sys_rawio mknod sys_module audit_write audit_control linux_immutable };
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allow unconfineddomain self:capability2 ~{ mac_override mac_admin };
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allow unconfineddomain kernel:security ~{ load_policy setenforce setcheckreqprot setbool setsecparam };
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allow unconfineddomain kernel:system ~{ syslog_read syslog_mod syslog_console };
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allow unconfineddomain domain:process {
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fork
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sigchld
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sigkill
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sigstop
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signull
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signal
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getsched
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setsched
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getsession
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getpgid
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setpgid
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getcap
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setcap
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share
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getattr
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noatsecure
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siginh
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setrlimit
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rlimitinh
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};
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allow unconfineddomain domain:fd *;
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allow unconfineddomain domain:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow unconfineddomain domain:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow unconfineddomain domain:{ fifo_file file } rw_file_perms;
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allow unconfineddomain domain:socket_class_set *;
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allow unconfineddomain domain:ipc_class_set *;
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allow unconfineddomain domain:key *;
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allow unconfineddomain {fs_type -contextmount_type}:{ dir lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } ~relabelto;
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allow unconfineddomain dev_type:{ dir lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } ~relabelto;
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allow unconfineddomain {
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file_type
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-keystore_data_file
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-property_data_file
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-system_file
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-exec_type
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-security_file
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-shell_data_file
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}:{ dir lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } ~relabelto;
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allow unconfineddomain exec_type:{ file dir lnk_file } ~{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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allow unconfineddomain system_file:{ dir lnk_file } ~{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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allow unconfineddomain system_file:file ~{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename entrypoint };
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allow unconfineddomain {
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fs_type
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-usermodehelper
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-proc_security
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-contextmount_type
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}:{ chr_file file } ~{entrypoint execmod execute relabelto};
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allow unconfineddomain {dev_type -kmem_device}:{ chr_file file } ~{entrypoint execmod execute relabelto};
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allow unconfineddomain {
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file_type
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-keystore_data_file
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-property_data_file
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-system_file
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-exec_type
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-security_file
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-shell_data_file
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}:{ chr_file file } ~{entrypoint execmod execute relabelto};
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allow unconfineddomain { rootfs system_file exec_type }:file execute;
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allow unconfineddomain contextmount_type:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow unconfineddomain contextmount_type:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
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allow unconfineddomain node_type:node *;
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allow unconfineddomain node_type:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } node_bind;
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allow unconfineddomain netif_type:netif *;
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allow unconfineddomain port_type:socket_class_set name_bind;
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allow unconfineddomain port_type:{ tcp_socket dccp_socket } name_connect;
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allow unconfineddomain domain:peer recv;
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allow unconfineddomain { domain -init }:binder { call transfer set_context_mgr };
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allow unconfineddomain { property_type -security_prop }:property_service set;
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